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Abstract
This thesis presents an experimental investigation of free riding behavior
and, more particularly, individual responses to it using, as a workhorse, the so-
called public goods game. This game starkly isolates the conflict between
private and collective interest, providing us with a simple measure of the
extent of free riding behaviour. The unifying theme of the thesis is elicitation
and analysis of different indicators for how subjects perceive free riding under
a number of treatment manipulations.
Chapter 2 explores how people judge the morality of free riding in a
public goods game by eliciting people's moral evaluations in hypothetical
scenarios. The scenarios differed with respect to the framing of the game, the
order of moves, and the behaviour of the non-judged player. Our findings
suggest that free riding is perceived as morally reprehensible, except when the
free rider moves second after observing that the other player free rode as well.
We also find that moral judgments depend on others' behaviour, on framing
and on the order of moves.
Chapter 3 analyses the effect of framing on social preferences, as
measured by self-reported emotions and punishment. Our findings are that, for
111
a given pattern of contributions, neither punishment nor emotion depends on
our framing manipulation.
Chapter 4 assesses the behavioural consequences of unfair punishment. In
this experiment, we generate an unfair environment by assigning punishment
to all group members, irrespective of their first stage behaviour, We find that,
although unfair punishment causes a different time profile of contributions,
contributions are, on average, little different from in the standard punishment
game; and the assignment of punishment in the latter is unaffected by
experience of an environment with unfair punishment. However, a history of
unfair punishment causes different reactions to helping behaviour and
punishment received, respectively.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 General introduction
This thesis explores an important aspect of human decision making:
namely free riding. In particular, we are interested in free riding behaviour
in situations in which there is a tension between personal and collective
interests. Such situations abound in real-life: warfare, environmental
protection, management of commons, tax compliance, voting, participation
in collective actions, donations to charities, just to name a few. Inability to
solve these collective problems would have important implications for the
welfare, and perhaps even survival, of human societies. However, the degree
of cooperation observed in the field is often higher than what the hypothesis
of self-interest, typically made in economics, would suggest.
The objective of this thesis is to improve our understanding of free
riding behavior and its implications, by shedding new light on a number of
questions, including: Under which conditions, and how far, does free riding
behaviour occur? What do agents think about it, and how do they respond to
it behaviourally and emotionally? How far can individuals prevent free
riding through private sanctions and rewards?
Most of these questions have been addressed by previous researchers
too, so this chapter begins by briefly setting the intellectual landscape. At
the most general level, previous work on public goods can be divided into
theoretical and empirical literatures. For theoretical arguments, the seminal
paper by Samuelson (1954) is a standard starting point. Since then, the
theoretical literature on public goods has been further advanced by
significant contributions by many prominent social scientists, such as
Musgrave, Buchanan and Olson. For a general review, see Comes and
Sandler (1996).
However, the aim of the present thesis is to contribute to the empirical
literature of public goods provision, using controlled laboratory
experiments. 1 The most common design for exploring public good games in
the lab is the so-called "voluntary contributions mechanism". In its standard
form, each player receives an identical initial endowment of money. Players
have to decide simultaneously what fraction of the endowment they want to
contribute to a group account and what fraction they wish to keep. All funds
in the group account pay a positive return to each member of the group. The
parameters are chosen so that each agent has a dominant strategy to
contribute zero to the group account (i.e. to free ride fully) but, in the group
I There has also been empirical non-experimental literature investigating the provision of
public goods. For an overview of this literature, see Batina and Ihori (2005).
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optimum, every agent would contribute all of his endowment to the group
account. Thus, this game starkly isolates a conflict between private and
collective interest, providing us with a simple measure of the extent of free
riding behaviour.
The investigation of the public goods game by experimental economists
began to gather pace in the early 80'S.2 These investigations were primarily
concerned with the determinants of contributions (e.g., Isaac, et aI., 1984;
Andreoni, 1988; Isaac and Walker, 1998a, 1988b; Isaac, et aI., 1994). For an
excellent review for the history of the experimental literature on public
goods up to 1995, see Ledyard (1995). Since then, the major new
development in the experimental public goods literature has been the
analysis of games in which there is a possibility of punishment, following,
for example, the seminal contribution by Fehr and Gachter (2000). In sum,
the general structure of these games comprises two stages, the first of which
is identical to the voluntary contributions game described earlier. In the
second stage, individuals are made aware of the profile of contributions of
other group members and allowed to punish them. Punishment is costly for
the punisher and the recipient. These games are particularly interesting as
they shed light both on people's motivations and reactions to free riding, and
because they also inform us on whether and if so, how free riding can be
prevented. Following Fehr and Gachter's original experiment on
2 It is worth mentioning that there were also significant contributions by psychologists
around this time and earlier (e.g., Dawes, et aI, 1977; Marwell and Ames, 1979, 1980,
1981).
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punishment, the public goods literature has flourished with an increasing
number of contributions being made by many researchers.3
The research presented in this thesis has three distinctive characteristics:
(i) focus on non-behavioural responses to free riding, not just behavioural
ones; (ii) focus on the effects of framing on responses to free riding, not just
on contributions; and (iii) analysis of the effects of unfair use of punishment
on contributions and on the future use of private sanctions. While there are
few precursors to (iii), it is worth mentioning that (i) and (ii) extend earlier
work in psychology and economics.
Moral judgment is a prominent notion in psychology (as well, of course,
as in philosophy). Other researchers in this field have investigated the
process with which people arrive at moral judgments and their importance in
various contexts (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Wheatley and Haidt, 2005; Prinz, 2006;
Haidt, 2007; Gino, et al, 2008; Croson and Konow, 2009). Others, such as
Gachter and Riedl (2005, 2006), who elicit normative judgments of fairness
in a bargaining game, have considered the interplay between moral
judgment and economic decision making. We extend the analysis of moral
judgments to another important form of economic behavior, by eliciting the
moral judgments that individuals make of free riders in social dilemma
games. In particular, we are concerned with whether these games are
perceived as having a moral dimension and if so, how moral judgments of
free riding are affected by various aspects of the situation in which it occurs.
3 For example, see Bowles et al. (2001); Maselet, et al. (2003); Carpenter, et al. (2004);
Falk, et al. (200S); Noussair and Tucker (2OOS); Page, et al., (2ooS), Anderson and
Putterman (2006), Bochet, et al. (2006), Gurerk, et al, (2006); Carpenter (20078); Carpenter
(2007b), Sefton, et aI. (2007), Glebter and Herrmann (2007); Herrmann, et 81 (2008);
Glebter and Herrmann (2009).
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Our interest on non-behavioural indicators of how free riding is
perceived also includes looking at self-reported emotional responses.
Emotions constitute an important notion in cognitive and social psychology
(e.g. Sonnemans and Frijda, 1994; Sonnemans and Frijda, 1995; Elster,
1998, among others), but also play an important role in the social
preferences literature (e.g., Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Kirchsteiger, et
al., 2006; Loewenstein, 2000). In our research, we consider emotional
responses to the play of others in voluntary contributions games.
In addition, the study of framing effects constitutes an important part of
this thesis. Such effects have been studied mainly in relation to individual
choice under risk and uncertainty (for starting points, see Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979, 1984 and Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, 1986).
Nevertheless, there has also been some experimental work investigating the
role of framing in the context of public good games (e.g., Andreoni, 1995;
Sonnemans, et al., 1998). Findings from these studies suggest that framing
matters in the sense that behaviour tends to change if subjects are confronted
with alternative wordings for the same objective outcome. In this thesis, our
focus is not so much the effect of framing on free riding, but rather on
responses to free riding.
1.2 Introduction to each chapter
Chapter 2 investigates people's moral perceptions of free riding
behaviour III a public good game. In our experimental design, subjects
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respond to a questionnaire, in which they are confronted with hypothetical
scenarios in a 2-player public good game. These scenarios involve one
fictional player who is always a free rider and another fictional player whose
behavior varies across scenarios. Subjects participating in this experiment
were asked to morally rate (either positively or negatively) the action of free
riding in a series of scenarios with these properties. In other words, they act
as impartial spectators judging the action of free riding in various endings of
these scenarios, without being involved in the decision situation. We
manipulated the scenarios with respect to the framing of the public good
game; the order in which players make their moves; and the contribution to
the public good of the non-judged player.
Our findings from this study suggest that the public good game is indeed
perceived as a moral game, with free riding being considered as a morally
reprehensible action, except when the free rider moves second after
observing that the other player free rode as well. In this case, subjects judge
free riding as morally praiseworthy. What is more, as the contribution of the
non-judged player rises, the free rider is condemned increasingly strongly,
especially when he moves second. We also show that the framing
manipulation of the game is a major determinant of moral evaluations.
Specifically, subjects tend to condemn a failure to contribute more strongly
than a withdrawal although both actions have identical payoff consequences
for both players. Our results are robust regardless of whether the game is
played simultaneously or sequentially, since framing effects work in the
same direction in both conditions. With respect to the order of moves, we
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find that sequential moves trigger stronger condemnation of free riding than
simultaneous moves, provided the non-judged player contributes.
Motivated by our findings suggesting that self-reported moral judgments
are context dependent, Chapter 3 investigates whether a similar effect
applies when self-reported emotions are elicited. Emotions have in common
with moral judgments that both are non-behavioural indicators of
perceptions. However, in this second study, subjects depart from the role of
an outside observer and their decisions have a direct monetary impact on
their and other group members' earnings. In addition to emotional
responses, we study the effects of framing on punishment. This
complements (non-behavioral measures of) emotions, by being a key
behavioural indicator of attitudes to free riders. Once again, our focus is on
the effects of framing on these indicators.
Contrary to our motivating findings from our study on moral judgments,
we find that our framing has little effect on our indicators of negative
reciprocity in Chapter 3 (namely, punishment and emotional responses). Our
findings suggest that the main determinant of punishment and emotional
responses is the difference between the contributions of the punisher and the
punished group member.
Chapter 4 reports an experiment that studies the impact on contributions
and punishment behavior of an institution in which punishment is assigned
unfairly, but players can alleviate its effects from each other. To achieve
this, we introduce a variant of the standard punishment game which we call
as the default punishment game. In this game, all members of a group are
7
punished automatically, regardless of their prior behaviour. The way we
implement the automatic penalty is by exogenously imposing on subjects a
monetary fine that decreases their payoff. Then subjects are allowed to
alleviate the automatic penalty by incurring a cost. However, alleviation
benefits its recipients. Our game is motivated by existing evidence that
shows punishment to be effective when it is assigned fairly, in the sense that
cooperators sanction free riders who in tum accept punishment and as a
result, increase their contributions. But how does punishment work when
subjects have experienced an environment in which it is assigned unfairly by
sanctioning all group members? To test the robustness of the standard
punishment game, our experimental subjects participate in both the standard
and the default punishment games. We can thus assess whether and, if so,
how unfair punishment influences the way punishment is assigned. By this,
we mean both how the default punishment game compares with the standard
one and how prior experience of the default punishment game affects the
play of the standard one.
Our experiment provides evidence that, on average, contributions in the
default punishment game are not sensitive with respect to the standard
punishment game. However, the time profile of contributions is different:
for the default punishment game, contributions follow a hump shaped
pattern as they increase at the beginning and decline after the second half of
the game; whereas, for the standard punishment game, contributions are
rather stable across time. We also find that the assignment of punishment is
unaffected after the experience of an environment with unfair punishment.
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Yet, it turns out that a history of unfair punishment makes a difference
regarding reactions to helping behaviour and punishment received. More
specifically, we observe that those subjects who contributed less than the
group average increase their contributions per punishment point received in
the standard punishment game, but not after a history of the default
punishment game, in which case they do not change their contributions
significantly per punishment point received.
For each of Chapters 2-4, there are accompanying appendices, giving
experimental instructions, tables, and other supplementary material.
Finally, Chapter 5 brings together the main conclusions of the three
previous chapters, as well as offering brief suggestions for future research
and some final thoughts.
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Chapter 2
How do people judge the morality of
free riding in social dilemmas?"
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explore experimentally how individuals
judge the morality of free riding in a social dilemma game. A social
dilemma results from a situation where a group shares a common resource
and each individual has to decide whether to contribute to its provision or
not. Failure to contribute to the common resource brings about negative
side-effects for other individuals; while contributing generates positive side
4 The experiment reported in this chapter was a collaboration with Robin Cubitt and Simon
Gachter. The present chapter is a companion paper to a CeDEx working paper, expected to
appear in Summer 2009.
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effects. The social dilemma game, thus, isolates the conflict between the
personal interest and the collective interest, providing us with a measure for
the degree of people's self-interested behaviour. However, in this chapter,
our objective is not to measure behaviour but instead to assess how
observers judge free riding, from a moral perspective. Our objective is to
assess whether social dilemmas are regarded as having a moral dimension;
and, if so, its nature.
Although the significance of morality has mostly been emphasised by
moral philosophers and psychologists, our study is of interest in the light of
several attempts to incorporate the notion of morality in economic
situations. For instance, past research by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler
(1986) highlight its crucial role and investigate individuals' fairness
perceptions in understanding when price increases are justifiable. Their
findings show that raising prices due to shifts in demand is perceived as
unfair, whereas price increases are acceptable only if they are the result of
cost increases. Most recently, Gachter and Riedl (2005, 2006) elicit
normative judgments of fairness in a bargaining game with infeasible
claims, with both studies suggesting that morality is a key ingredient in
determining individuals' actual negotiating behaviour.
Drawing on earlier work from experimental psychology, our
investigation elicits subjects' moral perceptions of free riding by adapting
their techniques to our social dilemma game.S Specifically, subjects respond
S For application of such techniques in social and moral psychology, see, e.g., Spranca, et
al., 1991; Baron and Ritov, 1994; Haidt and Baron, 1996; Niedermayer and Chapman,
2001; Wheatley and Haidt, 2005; Cushman, et al., 2006; Kelly, et al., 2007; Gino, et al.,
2008.
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to a questionnaire, in which they are confronted with hypothetical scenarios,
involving a 2-player game. In various endings of these scenarios, one person
always free rides; while the other (the non-judged player) contributes
different amounts to the common resource. For each scenario separately,
subjects are asked to express their positive or negative moral rating towards
the free rider without being involved in the decision situation. Thus, subjects
merely act as observers, so their judgments should impartial moral
evaluations of the free rider.
Our experimental design manipulates three factors with respect to the
scenarios. First, as already noted, we examined whether subjects' moral
judgments depend on the other player's behaviour. This manipulation
enables us to examine whether free riding is maintained as morally
(im)permissible regardless of the other player's choice or whether such
judgments are sensitive to the other player's actions. Second, we explored
whether moral judgments are dependent on the framing of the social
dilemma problem. The framing manipulation we look at this study has a
Give (contributing to the common resource) vs. Take (withdrawing from the
common resource) form, since this manipulation is very common in social
psychology studies (e.g. Brewer and Kramer, 1986; Rutte, et aI., 1987;
McDaniel and Sistrunk, 1991; McCusker and Carnevale, 1995; Sell and
Son, 1997; van Dijk and Wilke, 2000). Our third manipulation investigates
the extent to which moral judgments depend on the order of moves of the
players in the hypothetical scenarios. That is, we explore whether
simultaneous moves trigger different moral condemnation of a given action,
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relative to sequential moves. In particular, we investigate whether the order
of moves affects whether and if so, how the behaviour of the non-judged
player affects the judgments passed on the free rider.
Our findings demonstrate that free riding is always perceived as a
morally blameworthy action except for one case in which it is seen as
morally praiseworthy; that is, when the judged free rider moves second after
having observed that the other player has not contributed either. Across
frames, we find that subjects perceive withdrawing tokens from the public
good as being less morally bad than the objectively equivalent action of
failing to contribute tokens to the public good, conditional on the other
player's behaviour. Finally, we provide evidence that, sequential moves
usually trigger higher condemnation of free rider, but irrespective of
whether the order of moves are simultaneous or sequential, the higher is a
player's contribution, the free rider is condemned increasingly strongly.
Interestingly enough, this pattern is observed for a substantial minority in
the simultaneous case, but for an overwhelming majority in the sequential
case.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2
describes the design, the hypotheses and the procedures of our experiment.
Section 2.3 discusses the results and Section 2.4 concludes.
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2.2 Design, Hypotheses and Procedures
2.2.1 Design
In our experiment, each subject responded to a questionnaire requiring
her to report her moral judgment of a player in hypothetical scenarios.
There were four treatments, each defined by a different questionnaire. Each
subject responded to the questionnaire for one treatment only. Before
explaining the differences between them, we first explain the points which
the questionnaires had in common.
Each questionnaire described a decision problem for two fictitious
players, named Person A and Person B; and then gave some possible
endings, each of which specified players' choices and their payoff
consequences. A scenario comprises a description of a decision problem
and an ending. Each questionnaire consisted of five scenarios with the same
decision problem, but different endings.
In all the scenarios, the players were the two members of a group
playing a voluntary contributions game. Within each questionnaire, the
behaviour of Person A varied across scenarios, but Person B was always a
(complete) free-rider. After each ending, the subject was asked, as a
detached observer, to rate the morality of Person B on a scale ranging from -
50 (extremely bad) to + 50 (extremely good)." Thus, in each treatment, we
can test within-subjects for the impact of the behaviour of the non-judged
6 Ratings were selected by using a mouse to move a slider on a computer screen. The slider
was initially positioned at a rating of zero. Subjects had to click on the slider in order to
activate it and were not allowed to proceed unless they had done so. This procedure was
intended to prevent subjects from reporting a judgment of zero accidentally, while allowing
them to do so after reflection.
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player on the moral rating assigned to the free rider. All other tests are
between-subjects and involve comparisons of subjects' responses across
treatments.
There were two treatment variables: the framing used to describe the
decision problem; and the order of moves in that problem. Each variable
had two possible values: "Give" and "Take" for framing; and
"Simultaneous" and "Sequential" for order of moves. Each variable was
manipulated independently, yielding four treatments: Give-Simultaneous,
Take-Simultaneous, Give-Sequential, and Take-Sequential.
To explain the Give versus Take manipulation, we fix for simplicity on
the Simultaneous order of moves. In the Give frame, the decision facing
each player was how much to contribute to a group project. The description
of the decision problem and the first ending for the Give-Simultaneous
treatment were as follows:
Imagine a group that consists of two group members. Person A and Person B. Each group
member receives an endowment of20 tokens and has to decide how many tokens to keep for
himselfand how many to contribute to a group project. Each token he keeps for himselfhas a
value ofone pound for him. Each token contributed to the group project has a value of J. 50
pounds to the project. The total value ofthe project is divided equally between the two group
members. So, each token contributed to the project earns both group members 0.75 pounds
each. The total income ofa group member is the sum earnedfrom tokens kept for himselfand
his share of the earnings of the group project. Each group member decides simultaneously,
that is, without knowing what the other one has done.
A) Assume that Person A contributes 0 tokens to the group project and Person B contributes 0
tokens to the group project. Therefore. the value ofthe group project is 0 pounds and, thus. as
a result of their contributions. Person A's total income is 20 pounds and Person B's total
income is 20 pounds. How do you rate Person B's morality?
As explained above, the scenarios in the Give-Simultaneous questionnaire
differed only in respect of Person A's behaviour. Person A's contribution
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was 0 tokens (as shown) in the first scenario, rising to 20 in increments of 5
over the other four scenarios.
In the Take frame, the decision facing each player was how much to
withdraw from a group project. The description of the decision problem and
first ending for the Take-Simultaneous treatment were as follows:
Imagine a group that consists of two group members. Person A and Person B. There are 40
tokens in a group project. Each group member has to decide how many, up to a maximum of
20, ofthese tokens to withdraw for himselfand how many to leave in the group project. Each
token he withdraws for himselfhas a value ofone poundfor him. Each token left in the group
project has a value of 1.50 pounds to the project. The total value of the project is divided
equally between the two group members. So. each token left in the project earns both group
members O. 75 pounds each. The total income of a group member is the sum earned from
tokens withdrawn by himself and his share of the earnings of the group project. Each group
member decides simultaneously. that is. without knowing what the other one has done.
A) Assume that Person A withdraws 20 tokens from the group project and Person B withdraws
20 tokensfrom the group project. Therefore, the value ofthe group project is 0 pounds and.
thus, as a result oftheir withdrawals, Person A 's total income is 20 pounds and Person B 's
total income is 20 pounds. How do you rate Person B's morality?
As with the Give frame, the only difference between the scenarios in a Take
frame questionnaire was the behaviour of Person A. Person A's withdrawal
was 20 tokens (as shown) in the first scenario, declining to 0 in decrements
of 5 over the remaining four scenarios.
It is important to note that the Give and Take frames differ only in
respect of the description of the decision problem. There is no difference
between the two frames in terms of the feasible sets of monetary outcomes
available to a player. In each frame, each player controlled the final
destination of 20 tokens, each of which could be allocated either to himself
(earning £1 for him) or to the project (earning £0.75 for each player). To
emphasise this similarity, we will use the term "effective contribution"
below to refer to the tokens allocated by a player to the project, regardless of
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whether this allocation anses from a failure to contribute or from a
withdrawal.
In addition to the Simultaneous treatments, we ran two treatments (one
with the Give frame, and one with Take) in which the non-judged player
moved first. Each questionnaire for these Sequential treatments was
obtained from the corresponding Simultaneous one by replacing the last
sentence of the description of the decision situation with "Assume that
Person A decides first and Person B observes Person A's choice before
making his own decision.i" In all other respects, Sequential questionnaires
were identical to the corresponding Simultaneous ones.
2.2.2 Motivation & Hypotheses
To motivate our design, it is helpful to distinguish two broad accounts of
how individuals might arrive at their moral judgments which, for
convenience, we call the reason-based model and the emotion-based model,
respectively.
The reason-based model or the rationalist approach (Kohlberg, 1969;
Piaget, 1932/1965; Turiel, 1983) model sees judgments as being the result of
conscious deliberation, using prior moral principles. On this view, an
individual's moral judgments arise from application of the moral principles
that she endorses to the case in hand. Consequently, hypotheses about how
judgements will vary across our scenarios would, according to the reason-
7 A copy of thc instructions for thc Give-Simultaneous and Take-Simultaneous treatmcnts
can be found in Appendix A. Thc instructions for the corresponding Sequcntial treatmcnts
differed only in thc respect explained.
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based model, be conditional on assumptions about subjects' prior moral
principles.
In contrast, the emotion-based model sees emotions or gut-instincts as
the drivers of moral judgments. On this view, moral judgments are ex post
rationalisations of individuals' emotions and raw intuitions, not the
expression of prior moral principles. Modem examples that emphasise the
role of emotions in reaching moral judgments are the social intuitionist
model of Haidt (200I) and the sentimentalist theory of Prinz (2006).8
According to the emotion-based model, any features of our scenarios that
trigger different emotions or gut-instincts could give rise to different
judgments.
Our experimental design manipulates the framing of the decision
problem facing the judged player (Give versus Take); the order of moves in
that problem (Simultaneous versus Sequential); and the behaviour of the
non-judged player.
The reason-based model delivers a clear prediction in respect of framing,
if subjects hold consequentialist principles. For any consequentialist ethical
theory, the moral value of an action is determined by a comparison of its
consequences with other feasible ones; and so redescribing the decision
problem should have no impact on the moral value of an action with given
consequences. Conditional on subjects endorsing any form of ethical
consequentialism, the reason-based model predicts no difference in moral
judgments between otherwise identical Give and Take questionnaires.
8 These accounts can be seen as modem fonns of a much older naturalistic tradition in
moral philosophy, going back for example to Hume (1739) and Smith (1759).
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If we do observe a difference, the reason-based model would interpret it
as evidence of subjects endorsing non-consequentialist ethical principles.
However, the emotions-based model suggests a different interpretation,
namely that subjects' gut reactions are driven in part by payoff-irrelevant
features of the description of the decision problem. For example, emotional
response to a player whose effective contribution is zero might differ
according to whether this free riding arises from complete failure to
contribute to the project or from maximal withdrawal of tokens from it, even
though the consequences are the same.
Our other experimental manipulations can also be analysed in a similar
way. In particular, conditional on endorsement of the principle that an agent
can only be praised or condemned for her action on the basis of features of
the situation that she could have known, the reason-based model suggests no
difference in moral judgments across the five scenarios of a Simultaneous
questionnaire, since there is no difference between them in what Person B
knows at the moment of choice. If subjects endorse the principle that the
morality of Person B's action does not depend on what Person A does, even
if Person B knows it, the reason-based model also suggests no difference
between the judgments passed on Person B across the scenarios of the
Simultaneous and Sequential questionnaires with a given framing.
Recall that, although Person B's effective contribution is always 0
tokens, the effective contribution of Person A rises across the successive
endings of each questionnaire, leading to outcomes that are progressively
less favourable to Person A and more favourable to Person B. Thus, if we
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observe any difference between the judgments passed on Person B across
the five scenarios of a given questionnaire, it seems likely that this will take
the form that the higher is Person A's effective contribution. the more
negative is the moral rating assigned to Person B. We refer to this
hypothesis as the "increasing condemnation hypothesis".
If results from our Simultaneous treatments conform to the increasing
condemnation hypothesis, this would support the emotion-based model and
be hard to explain using the reason-based model. It is easy to see how
Person A's choice might affect a subject's emotional response to Person B's
action. For example, the subject might be more angered, or disgusted, by
Person B's free riding when it brings about an unequal outcome than when it
does not do so, even though Person B could not have predicted these effects.
In contrast, it is quite difficult to think of a plausible ethical theory that
would rationalise the increasing condemnation hypothesis in Simultaneous
treatments as, to do so, it would have to condemn him on the basis of
something he could not have known.
Finally, either model could account for results that conform to the
increasing condemnation hypothesis in Sequential treatments. The reason-
based model would interpret such a finding as evidence that subjects
endorse moral principles which license reciprocation by Player B of Player
A's behaviour. On this account, it would not be a moral transgression for
Player B to free ride when he knows Player A has already done so, but it
would be a transgression for Player B to free ride when he knows Player A
has not. The emotions-based model would interpret evidence of increasing
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condemnation in Sequential treatments as an indication that emotional
response is more negative to someone who free rides on a known cooperator
than it is to someone who "rats on a rat" (i.e. free rides on a known free
rider).
2.2.3 Procedures
We recruited subjects from the University of Nottingham pool of
students using the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). In total, we sent 2,718
email invitations, resulting in participation by 538 subjects. Once a subject
registered to take part in the experiment, they were directed to the
experiment's website. Subjects were allocated automatically to the four
treatments, in a rotating sequence by time of registration for the experiment.
After assigning their moral ratings, subjects were. asked to give a brief
verbal explanation of them.
Each subject saw only the questionnaire for the treatment they were
assigned to. They could either respond to the questionnaire immediately, or
exit and return to it before the closing date of the experiment (which was
one week after invitations were sent out). Subjects returning later could only
see the questionnaire they were assigned to initially. Subjects were omitted
from the data analysis if they failed to complete a questionnaire by the
closing date. To counter the possibility of multiple submissions from the
same subject, only one registration was permitted from a given invitation.
Our use of ORSEE recruitment software, rather than an open internet
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experiment", enabled us to build in this safeguard, as well as giving us the
demographic information on participants held in the ORSEE database.
It is an inherent feature of our study that we could not incentivise task-
responses, but we could incentivise participation. We comment on these
features in tum.
Our objective was to study subjects' moral attitudes. The use of
questionnaire methods without task-related rewards is standard in the study
of social attitudes. It is appropriate for our purposes because any means of
tying payments to subjects' responses would introduce a confound. In
particular, we wished to elicit the judgments that subjects would give in the
role of disinterested observer. This precluded having subjects be
participants in the voluntary contributions game: hence our use of
hypothetical scenarios. Allowing subjects to assign financial penalties or
rewards to the players in the scenarios, even hypothetically, would have
confounded moral attitudes with attempts to bring about particular
distributional consequences: hence our use of pure judgment tasks rather
than - say - reward or punishment tasks. As our judgment tasks are moral
judgment tasks, as opposed - say - to mathematical puzzles or judgments of
distance, there are no objectively "right" or ''wrong'' answers to them. So,
we could not reward subjects for judging correctly. Finally, rewarding
subjects for making judgments that conform to particular ethical theories, or
to our own ethical views, or to average opinion, would all have introduced
obvious biases, relative to the motivation for the experiment.
9 For a discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of open internet experiments. see
Appendix A.2. The aim of this appendix is to offer some general reflections on internet
experiments.
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We were concerned that, without task-related incentives, it might be
difficult to generate a sufficient number of participants. On the other hand,
having a substantial reward for participation might have attracted subjects
unwilling to give considered responses and only willing to do the minimum
necessary to obtain the reward. In the light of these considerations, we used
two approaches in parallel. Prior to issuing invitations, we divided our
potential subject pool into two equal sub-groups: one for which there would
be no payments at all ("No-Payment experiment") and one in which a
random participation fee was provided ("PaYment" experiment), in the form
of entry to a lottery. The latter provided some protection against low
participation, while conducting both experiments enabled us to check for
any effect of the participation incentive on task-responses.
All subjects participating in either experiment were informed about the
importance of answering the questionnaire as precisely and honestly as
possible and that all responses would remain confidential. Those invited to
the Payment experiment were told that those who completed the
questionnaire would be entered into a prize draw, conducted publicly with
two prizes of £50. Although attending the draw was not compulsory,
subjects were given the date, time and the venue of the draw.
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2.3. Results
2.3.1 Does payingfor participation affect response rates and/or moral
evaluations?
We start our data analysis by exploring whether paying a random
participation fee is an efficient tool for increasing response rates in our
experiment. In the "Payment" experiment, 306 subjects responded a
questionnaire, while, in the "No-Payment" experiment 232 subjects
responded a questionnaire. That is, when incentives were provided 74 more
subjects chose to participate. Performing a Probit regression analysis (see
Table B.l in Appendix B), we fmd that the probability to participate in the
experiment is significantly higher for the subjects receiving the invitation
for the "Payment" experiment than those receiving the invitation for the
"No-Payment" experiment. We therefore conclude that paying a random
participation fee (in our case a random flat fee of £50) is an additional
motivating factor for subjects to participate, apart from their intrinsic
willingness, increasing significantly the response rates. However, paying a
participation fee does not affect subjects' moral evaluations (the
corresponding coefficient in Table B.2 in Appendix B is not statistically
significant). This implies that there is no selection bias between those who
participate in the "Payment" experiment and those who participate in the
''No-Payment'' one. Since no significant differences in moral evaluations
were found, we proceed by pooling the data between the two experiments
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and thus, not including "Payment" as a separate independent variable in the
econometric analysis reported below.
2.3.2 Are mora/judgments subject to framing effects?
In this subsection, we investigate the effects of framing on moral
judgments in the Simultaneous treatments, that is, when Person A and
Person B decide without knowing what the other has done. The tool for our
analysis is the mean moral evaluation function, which is an aggregate
measure of the moral ratings that subjects assigned to the free rider (Person
B), expressed as a function of the five effective contribution levels of his
counterpart (Person A). Recall that we refer to effective contribution as the
amount of tokens contributed to the public account (in the Give frame) or
equally, the amount of tokens left in the public account after the withdrawal
(in the Take frame). Figure 2.1 shows the mean moral evaluation function of
the free rider for all subjects participated in the corresponding treatments.
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Figure 2.1. Give vs. Take in Simultaneous treatment - The moral
evaluation function
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The horizontal axis indicates the amount of tokens Person A effectively
contributes. The vertical axis indicates the average moral rating that ubjects
assign to Person B who is the free rider and i always judged. On thi axis ,
the point 0 denotes that free riding is perceived to be of no moral
significance. Ratings below 0 imply that subjects perceive free riding in thi
scenario as a morally blameworthy action; whereas, ratings above 0 imply
that subjects perceive free riding as a morally praiseworthy action. In thi
graph, the 95% confidence intervals for the mean moral evaluation in each
of the five po sible cenario are also shown. With re pect to framing.
Figure demon tratc that the moral e aluation function In th Gi
treatm nt al a b low the moral e aluation function In th Tak
tr atm nt, II g ting th t ubje t ar mor ond mning in th
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the Take frame. Additionally, we observe that under both frames in all five
possible scenarios free riding is perceived as a morally blameworthy action,
with the moral evaluation function having a negative slope, implying that
the more Person A effectively contributes, the higher is the condemnation of
the judged free rider. Econometric evidence provides also support for these
observations (see Table B.3 in Appendix B). Specifically, we estimated an
OLS model, with the dependent variable being the moral evaluation of
Person B, and the explanatory variables including the effective contribution
levels of Person A (contributing zero is the baseline), the dummy variable
"Take", which equals to 1 for the Take treatment, and 0 otherwise, and the
dummy variable "Male", which equals to 1 if subjects were male and 0
otherwise. We also control for slope differences by including as independent
variables interaction terms between the dummy variable "Take" and each
scenario separately. Regression coefficients (see equation 1 in Table B.3 in
Appendix B) reveal that the dummy variable "Take" is statistically
significant at the 5% level, implying that subjects are significantly more
condemning in the Give than in the Take treatment, since the coefficient is
positive and mean evaluations are in the negative domain of the vertical
axis. In aggregate, subjects evaluate free riding as being an immoral act,
since the coefficient of the constant is negative and statistically significant.
The moral evaluation function is negatively sloped, ceteris paribus, since
the coefficients of the four scenario dummy variables are statistically
different from zero and from each other (from F-test, p-value = 0.000),
suggesting the corroboration of the "increasing condemnation hypothesis".
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This implies that the same act of free riding (contributing nothing or
withdrawing everything) is considered increasingly morally unacceptable
the higher is the other player's effective contribution.
To understand better the observed patterns of moral judgments, we
divided subjects into three groups: (1) subjects with a negatively sloped
moral evaluation function, (2) subjects with a flat moral evaluation function,
and (3) "others", including non-monotonic subjects and subjects with a
positively sloped moral evaluation function.10 The moral evaluation function
for each of these three groups is shown in Figure 2.2. Along with the 95%
confidence intervals for the mean moral evaluation in each of the five
possible scenarios, the percentages of subjects falling under these categories
for each framing manipulation are also reported.
10 Non-monotonic subjectsrefer to those whosemoral evaluation function is strictly
negatively sloped in one rangeand strictlypositively slopedin another.
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Figure 2.2. Give vs. Take in Simultaneous treatments - The moral
evaluation function for each group
Subjects with negat ively sloped moral evaluation function
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From these three panels, we observe that the substantial majority of
subjects have a flat and a nearly flat (that is, "others") moral evaluation
function. This suggests that when there is no information about what the
other has done, most of the subjects perceive free riding as equally
reprehensible across all five scenarios. However, there exists a significant
minority of subjects who display increasing condemnation of free rider and,
in fact, drive the negative slope of the moral evaluation function observed in
the aggregate level (see Figure 2.2). As noted above, the existence of such a
group in Simultaneous treatments is somewhat surprising, from the
perspective of the reason-based model, as they in effect condemn Person B
on the basis of something he did not know. Focusing on the source of the
framing difference, our subjects' classification provides us with useful
insights (econometric evidence is given in Table B.3 in Appendix B). In
particular, it turns out that subjects with a flat moral evaluation function and
subjects classified as "others" are significantly more condemning in the
Give than in the Take treatment. 11 In relation to subjects with a negatively
sloped moral evaluation function, we find that there is no statistically
significant difference across frames. In sum, the existence of a framing
effect recorded by our data can be attributed to those subjects who condemn
free riding equally across scenarios, regardless of how much the other
II Looking at the moral evaluation functions of subjects classified as "others" across
frames, we observe that they are quite stable and flat. This is confirmed from the regression
coefficients of this group (see equation 4 in Table B.3), since they are not statistically
significant from each other. Pooling subjects with a flat m o o e V ~ l u a t i o o ~ c t i ? n n with
"others", we find that the variable dummy "Take" has a positive Sign and IS statistically
significant at the 1% level.
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person has contributed, implying that subjects' views are difficult to be
reconciled with judgments driven by consequentialist theories.
2.3.3 Do sequential moves make a difference?
We now turn our attention to the investigation of how subjects' moral
evaluations were affected in the Sequential treatments (that is, when Person
A decides first and Person B observes Person A's choice before making his
own decision). Figure 2.3 shows the mean moral evaluation function for all
subjects. Similar to the Simultaneous treatments, we also identify a framing
effect to the same direction as displayed in Figure 2.1: subjects tend to be
more condemning in the Give than in the Take frame. A noteworthy aspect
of subjects' moral evaluations is that, under both frames, free riding is
exonerated and perceived to be a morally commendable action if Person B is
aware that Person A is a free rider as well. However, as Person A's effective
contribution increases, moving from scenario 1 to scenario 2, there is a large
drop in moral evaluations, rendering free riding a morally impermissible
action. Comparing the slope of the moral evaluation function in the
Simultaneous treatments to its slope in the Sequential treatments for the
same move, we observe that it is much flatter in the former case (see Table
B.4 in Appendix B for econometric evidence).
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Figure 2.3. Give vs. Take in Sequential treatment - The moral
evaluation function
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As for the effects of framing in Sequential treatments, formal regre ion
analysis (see Table B.5 in Appendix B) sugge t that the regres ' ion
coefficients for each cenano eparately is significantly different from zero
and from each other (from F-te t, p-value = 0.000). The con tant of thi
equation has a positive sign and i also statistically significant from zero.
We also find that there is no level difference with regards to the framing
difference, but a slope difference. A it i clear from Figure 2.3 this i du
to the ub tantial drop in moral judgment from the c nario \ her b th
player ff ctivel contribute 0 to th c nario \ h r P r on ff ti
c ntributes and P r n B ff tiv Iy ontribute O. To und b It r
the patt erns of moral judgm ents observed in the Sequential treatment. w
again classify subj ects into three categories as ou tlined above. The moral
evaluation function for each group is shown in Figure 2.4. Ea h pan I
includes the 95 % confidence interval of mean e aluation of eac h po ible
scenario, along with the percentages of subjects fallin g into eac h group for
the two frames.
Figure 2.4. Give vs. Take in Sequential treatment - The moral
evaluation function for each group
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From these panels, we clearly observe that the composition of the group
changes dramatically, compared to the simultaneous treatment. More
peciftcally, the increasing condemnation hypothe i charactcri c the
o erwhelming majority of ubject in the Sequential treatm nt . \ herea .
only a mall percentage of ubj ct fall under the oth r tv 0 group . R II
that in the imultaneou tr tment thi patt rn i compl t I
Interestingly, the fact that free riding is perceived a morally acceptable
action, when free riding occurs on a known free rider, is due to those
subjects with a negatively sloped moral evaluation function. In the other two
categories, free riding on a known free rider is perceived as a morally
neutral action. Examining the source of the framing difference, we find
again an opposite pattern to the one observed in the Simultaneous
treatments: the significant majority of the negatively sloped subjects appear
to drive this difference, whereas, those with a flat and a nearly flat moral
evaluation function are frame insensitive. Under the Sequential treatments
our findings suggest that moral judgments can be reconciled with the
reason-based moral accounts only if subjects endorse ethical principles that
license reciprocation and only if their judgments are driven by non-
consequentialist ethical motives.
4. Conclusions
This chapter investigates experimentally people's moral impartial
evaluations in the context of an experimental game that has played a key
role in the literature: the public goods game. Our main findings can be
summarized in the following three points.
First we establish that social dilemmas are perceived as having a moral
dimension. Specifically, we find that free riding is a morally reprehensible
action except for one case, in which it is perceived as a morally acceptable
action: the free rider knows that the other group members have also free
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ridden. Second we show that contextual cues that would be irrelevant from a
consequentialist perspective are a major determinant of moral evaluations.
Subjects tend to condemn a failure to contribute more strongly than a
withdrawal of support with the same net consequences. These findings are
explained either by an emotions-based model or a reason-based model only
if subjects endorse non-consequentialist moral principles. Third, we find
evidence in support of the increasing condemnation hypothesis: the free
rider is morally increasingly condemned, as the effective contribution of the
other player increases. This pattern is more prevalent in the sequential
treatments and can be attributed to subjects' moral views consistent with
either an emotions-based model or a reason-based model assuming that
subjects endorse moral principles that licence reciprocation. However, the
presence of increasing condemnation by a significant minority of subjects in
the simultaneous treatments cannot easily be reconciled with reason-based
ethical view, but it is more readily explicable with an emotions-based model
in which gut reactions and intuitions generate the negative slope of the
moral evaluation function, since such reactions may respond to features of
the scenarios not known to the free rider.
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Appendix A. Technical Appendix
Appendix AI: Instructions
Questionnaire for the Give frame and the "Simultaneous" treatment
Imagine a group that consists of two group members, Person A and Person
B. Each group member receives an endowment of 20 tokens and has to
decide how many tokens to keep for himself and how many to contribute to
a group project. Each token he keeps for himself has a value of one pound
for him. Each token contributed to the group project has a value of 1.50
pounds to the project. The total value of the project is divided equally
between the two group members. So, each token contributed to the project
earns both group members 0.75 pounds each. The total income of a group
member is the sum earned from tokens kept for himself and his share of the
earnings of the group project. Each group member decides simultaneously,
that is, without knowing what the other one has done.
A) Assume that Person A contributes 0 tokens to the group project and Person
B contributes 0 tokens to the group project. Therefore, the value of the group
project is 0 pounds and, thus, as a result of their contributions, Person A's total
income is 20 pounds and Person B' s total income is 20 pounds. How do you
rate Person B's morality? (Please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
B) Assume that Person A contributes 5 tokens to the group project and Person
B contributes 0 tokens to the group project. Therefore, the value of the group
project is 7.5 pounds and, thus, as a result of their contributions, Person A's
total income is 18.75 pounds and Person B's total income is 23.75 pounds. How
do you rate Person B's morality? (please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
C) Assume that Person A contributes 10 tokens to the group project and Person
B contributes 0 tokens to the group project. Therefore, the value of the group
project is 15 pounds and, thus, as a result of their contributions, Person A's total
income is 17.5 pounds and Person B's total income is 27.5 pounds. How do you
rate Person B's morality? (Please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
D) Assume that Person A contributes 15 tokens to the group project and Person
B contributes 0 tokens to the group project. Therefore, the value of the group
project is 22.5 pounds and, thus, as a result of their contributions, Person A's
total income is 16.25 pounds and Person B's total income is 31.25 pounds. How
do you rate Person B's morality? (please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
E) Assume that Person A contributes 20 tokens to the group project and Person
B contributes 0 tokens to the group project. Therefore, the value of the group
project is 30 pounds and, thus, as a result of their contributions, Person A's total
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income is 15 pounds and Person B's total income is 35 pounds. How do you
rate Person D's morality? (Please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
Is there a difference among the five cases described above? Please explain why,
or why not, in just a few sentences.
Questionnaire for the Take frame and the "Simultaneous" treatment
Imagine a group that consists of two group members, Person A and Person
B. There are 40 tokens in a group project. Each group member has to decide
how many, up to a maximum of 20, of these tokens to withdraw for himself
and how many to leave in the group project. Each token he withdraws for
himself has a value of one pound for him. Each token left in the group
project has a value of 1.50 pounds to the project. The total value of the
project is divided equally between the two group members. So, each token
left in the project earns both group members 0.75 pounds each. The total
income of a group member is the sum earned from tokens withdrawn by
himself and his share of the earnings of the group project. Each group
member decides simultaneously, that is, without knowing what the other one
has done.
A) Assume that Person A withdraws 20 tokens from the group project and
Person B withdraws 20 tokens from the group project. Therefore, the value of
the group project is 0 pounds and, thus, as a result of their withdrawals, Person
A's total income is 20 pounds and Person B's total income is 20 pounds. How
do you rate Person D's morality? (Please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
B) Assume that Person A withdraws 15 tokens from the group project and
Person B withdraws 20 tokens from the group project. Therefore, the value of
the group project is 7.5 pounds and, thus as a result of their withdrawals, Person
A's total income is 18.75 pounds and Person B's total income is 23.75 pounds.
How do you rate Person D's morality? (Please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
C) Assume that Person A withdraws 10 tokens from the group project and
Person B withdraws 20 tokens from the group project. Therefore, the value of
the group project is IS pounds and, thus as a result of their withdrawals, Person
A's total income is 17.5 pounds and Person B's total income is 27.5 pounds.
How do you rate Person D's morality? (Please select -SO:'extremely bad' to
SO: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
D) Assume that Person A withdraws 5 tokens from the group project and
Person B withdraws 20 tokens from the group project. Therefore, the value of
the group project is 22.5 pounds and, thus as a result of their withdrawals,
Person A's total income is 16.25 pounds and Person B's total income is 31.25
pounds. How do you rate Person B's morality? (please select -SO:'extremely
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bad' to 50:'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider
activates it):
E) Assume that Person A withdraws 0 tokens from the group project and Person
B withdraws 20 tokens from the group project. Therefore, the value of the
project is 30 pounds and, thus as a result of their contributions, Person A's total
income is 15 pounds and Person B's total income is 35 pounds. How do you
rate Person B's morality? (Please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
Is there a difference among the five cases described above? Please explain why,
or why not, in just a few sentences.
Questionnaire for the Give frame and the "Sequential" treatment
Imagine a group that consists of two group members, Person A and Person
B. Each group member receives an endowment of 20 tokens and has to
decide how many tokens to keep for himself and how many to contribute to
a group project. Each token he keeps for himself has a value of one pound
for him. Each token contributed to the group project has a value of 1.50
pounds to the project. The total value of the project is divided equally
between the two group members. So, each token contributed to the project
earns both group members 0.75 pounds each. The total income of a group
member is the sum earned from tokens kept for himself and his share of the
earnings of the group project. Assume that Person A decides first and
Person B observes Person A's choice before making his own decision.
A) Assume that Person A contributes 0 tokens to the group project and, then,
Person B contributes 0 tokens to the group project. Therefore, the value of the
group project is 0 pounds and, thus, as a result of their contributions, Person
A's total income is 20 pounds and Person B's total income is 20 pounds. How
do you rate Person B's morality? (please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
B) Assume that Person A contributes 5 tokens to the group project and, then,
Person B contributes 0 tokens to the group project. Therefore, the value of the
group project is 7.5 pounds and, thus, as a result of their contributions, Person
A's total income is 18.75 pounds and Person B's total income is 23.75 pounds.
How do you rate Person B's morality? (Please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
C) Assume that Person A contributes 10 tokens to the group project and, then,
Person B contributes 0 tokens to the group project. Therefore, the value of the
group project is 15 pounds and, thus, as a result of their contributions, Person
A's total income is 17.5 pounds and Person B's total income is 27.5 pounds.
How do you rate Person B's morality? (Please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
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D) Assume that Person A contributes 15 tokens to the group project and, then,
Person B contributes 0 tokens to the group project. Therefore, the value of the
group project is 22.5 pounds and, thus, as a result of their contributions, Person
A's total income is 16.25 pounds and Person B' s total income is 31.25 pounds.
How do you rate Person D's morality? (Please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
E) Assume that Person A contributes 20 tokens to the group project and, then,
Person B contributes 0 tokens to the group project. Therefore, the value of the
group project is 30 pounds and, thus, as a result of their contributions, Person
A's total income is 15 pounds and Person B's total income is 35 pounds. How
do you rate Person D's morality? (Please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
Is there a difference among the five cases described above? Please explain why,
or why not, in just a few sentences.
Questionnaire for the Take frame and the "Sequential" treatment
Imagine a group that consists of two group members, Person A and Person
B. There are 40 tokens in a group project. Each group member has to decide
how many, up to a maximum of 20, of these tokens to withdraw for himself
and how many to leave in the group project. Each token he withdraws for
himself has a value of one pound for him. Each token left in the group
project has a value of 1.50 pounds to the project. The total value of the
project is divided equally between the two group members. So, each token
left in the project earns both group members 0.75 pounds each. The total
income of a group member is the sum earned from tokens withdrawn by
himself and his share of the earnings of the group project. Assume that
Person A decides first and Person B observes Person A's choice before
making his own decision.
A) Assume that Person A withdraws 20 tokens from the group project and,
then, Person B withdraws 20 tokens from the group project. Therefore, the
value of the group project is 0 pounds and, thus, as a result of their withdrawals,
Person A's total income is 20 pounds and Person B' s total income is 20 pounds.
How do you rate Person D's morality? (Please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
B) Assume that Person A withdraws 15 tokens from the group project and,
then, Person B withdraws 20 tokens from the group project. Therefore, the
value of the group project is 7.5 pounds and, thus as a result of their
withdrawals, Person A's total income is 18.75 pounds and Person B's total
income is 23.75 pounds. How do you rate Person D's morality? (Please select
-50:'extremely bad' to SO:'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking
on a slider activates it):
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C) Assume that Person A withdraws 10 tokens from the group project and,
then, Person 8 withdraws 20 tokens from the group project. Therefore, the
value of the group project is 15 pounds and, thus as a result of their
withdrawals, Person A's total income is 17.5 pounds and Person 8' s total
income is 27.5 pounds. How do you rate Person B's morality? (Please select -
50: 'extremely bad' to 50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider: Clicking
on a slider activates it):
D) Assume that Person A withdraws 5 tokens from the group project and, then,
Person 8 withdraws 20 tokens from the group project. Therefore, the value of
the group project is 22.5 pounds and, thus as a result of their withdrawals,
Person A's total income is 16.25 pounds and Person B's total income is 31 , ~ ~
pounds. How do you rate Person B's morality? (Please select -50: 'extremely
bad' to 50:'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider
activates it):
E) Assume that Person A withdraws 0 tokens from the group project and, then,
Person 8 withdraws 20 tokens from the group project. Therefore, the value of
the project is 30 pounds and, thus as a result of their contributions, Person A's
total income is 15 pounds and Person B's total income is 35 pounds. How do
you rate Person B's morality? (Please select -50:'extremely bad' to
50: 'extremely good' by moving the slider; Clicking on a slider activates it):
Is there a difference among the five cases described above? Please explain why,
or why not, in just a few sentences.
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Appendix A.2: Advantages and Disadvantages of Internet Experiments
The advancement of the World Wide Web has been proved to be a
useful tool of conducting experimental research in the domain of
psychology. During the last decade, an increasing number of researchers use
the Internet as a medium to collect data and their experience of how to
conduct such experiments is of great importance for the economics science
as well. A growing number of Web psychological experiments have been
conducted and advertised via the Internet, with some informative links for
the reader being as follows (although this list is not considered to be
conclusive):
http://psych.fullerton.edulmbirnbaum/exp.htm (M. Birnbaum's
judgment and decision making experiments)
http://www.psychologie.unizh.ch/sowilUlf/Lab/WebExpPsyLab.htm
I (Ulf-Dietrich Reips' Web experimental psychology lab)
http://psych.hanover.edulresearch/exponnet.html (American
Psychological Society)
http://vacognition.wjh.harvard.edul (Online experiments from the
Harvard University)
http://www.surf.to/experiments (Portal for Psychological
Experiments on Language from the Universities of Edinburgh,
Glasgow and Saarlandes)
The increasing conduct of Web experiments during the last years has
resulted into recognising a number of advantages and disadvantages of this
42
medium of experimental research.V The mam advantage of the Web
experiments is related to the generalisability of their findings in two main
respects. First, the number of people using the Internet is growing rapidly
and those who have access to online experiments increase over time. The
population that can now take part in a Web experiment is more diverse and
thus, more representative, compared to the usual student subject pool, used
in traditional laboratory experiments. Participants with completely different
demographic/socio-economic and cultural characteristics can be reached
easily, facilitating the conduct of research, whose primary purpose is to
examine these variables. Second, the sample diversity of the Internet users
adds also to the external validity of the Internet experiments. Experiments in
the lab set aside the external validity of the experiment at the benefit of
gaining more internal validity (i.e. satisfying the requirements for drawing a
causal relationship). However, with online experiments, external validity
and generalisability of the results can be potentially increased, given the
wide variety of the participant population.
Experiments on the Web give also the opportunity to subjects to
participate at any time and day they are available. The experiment now goes
to those interested, who can take part at their own convenience, and not at
the experimenter's convenience. The number of participants increases with
impressive speed since there are no scheduling difficulties or time
constraints with regard to use of lab. The lack of scheduling
12 For a surveyand moredetailed discussion about the pros and cons of Web psychological
experiments. see Reips (2000; 2002) and Birnbaum (2004).
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inconveniencies, along with the savings on the lab space and its equipment,
make Internet experiments an economic medium of obtaining valid data.
The plethora of data that can be collected via online experiments has
also positive implications in the statistical analysis, since one way to
increase the statistical power of the data analysis is to increase the sample
size. The participation rate is much higher in Internet experiments than in
lab ones, and therefore, the data have more statistical power.
In most psychological lab experiments, subjects take part In the
experiment, because they will receive extra credit for their course as a
counter-reward for their coming. However, this simply means that not all
subjects voluntarily participate in the experiment. The so-called "volunteer
bias" in the psychological lab experiments is not present in the Web
experiments, where subjects voluntarily participate in the experiment they
wish to at their own time. This increasing degree of voluntary participation
is coming at some cost: subjects in the Web experiments may show lower
commitment in completing their task. They can leave the experiment and
drop out at any time they want. This drawback can be turned into an
advantage in a between-subjects design, since the drop out rate can help us
detect motivational confounding. Put simply, a higher drop out rate indicates
that the task is more difficult or less attractive.
A criticism that lab experiments have accepted is the interaction between
experimenters and subjects. The presence of the experimenter in the lab
when subjects make their decisions, known also as the "experimenter bias",
can influence and contaminate experimental data. This bias is kept at a
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minimum level with the conduct of Internet experiments, given that subjects
do not have any contact with the experimenter at all. The lack of the
"experimenter bias" is an additional factor that increases the external
validity of this type of experiments.
Yet, the advantages do not come without some cost. To begin with, the
lack of experimental control can be mentioned as a first disadvantage, which
is due to the high external validity of the Web experimental data, compared
to those obtained in the lab. One aspect of this kind of lack refers to multiple
submissions, especially in experiments, which are widely advertised online.
A number of solutions have been put forward to detect multiple
submissions, including, inter alia, that subjects could be asked at the
beginning of the experiment to participate only once, experimenters could
check for similarities in the IF addresses of the participants' computers,
contact a random sample of participants after the experiment and checking
for similarities in their answers (sub-sampling technique), or allow
participation by password only (password technique). However, we need to
emphasise that evidence from psychological mainly experiments suggests
multiple submissions is not considered as a particularly important problem,
since it is quite rare for subjects to participate more than once in the same
experiment.
Another drawback which is present in online experiments is the so-
called "self-selection" bias, since participation is voluntary for all subjects.
A possible solution to this is the multiple site entry technique. This
technique uses multiple entry Web pages to participate in the experiment.
4S
Comparing the data of participants from these different sites, it is possible to
detect whether self-selection is an important factor, affecting the results. or
not. The high drop out rates because of the voluntary participation in Web
experiments is another potential disadvantage. To mitigate this downside of
Web experiments, suggested solutions are to create an attractive website, put
emphasis on the trustworthiness of the site, explain to subjects the
importance of the study and how valuable the data are for the science,
provide information with the current status of the participants' answers and
the total length of the experiment.
Finally, conducting experiments on the Internet is limited to those cases.
where no interaction between the subjects and the experimenter is required.
For instance, in cases where such interaction is needed (for instance, in
fMRI scans), then Web-based experiments are not the appropriate tool to
use.
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Appendix B. Data Analysis
Table B.l. Does paying a random participation fee affect response
rates?
Independent
Variables
Payment
Male
Obs.
Dependent Variable:
Participation = 1; No-participation
=0
0.054***
(0.015)
-0.013
(0.015)
2,718
Notes: Marginal effects listed. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. The
variable "Payment" is a dummy variable equal to J for those subjects who participated in
the "Payment" condition and 0 otherwise. The variable "Male" is a dummy variable equal
to J for male subjects and 0 otherwise. ** denotes significance at the S-percent level. and
'" '" '" at the J-percent level.
Table B.2. Does paying a random participation fee affect moral
evaluations?
Independent
Variables
Person A contributes 5 tokens
Person A contributes 10 tokens
Person A contributes 15 tokens
Person A contributes 20 tokens
Payment
Male
Constant
Dependent Variable:
Moral evaluations of the free rider
-15.571***
(0.923)
-20.314***
(1.046)
-23.942***
(1.133)
-27.507***
(1.224)
1.529
(1.534)
-0.857
(1.531)
0.108
(1.526)
Obs. 2,690
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered
on individuals. •• denotes significance at the 5-percent level. and ••• at the / -percent
level.
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Table B.3. Give vs, Take in Simultaneous treatments - Regression
results
0.446
(6.510)
-4.024
(6.356)
0.998
(7.171)
-4.961
(5.161)
5.272
(6.538)
10.883*
(6.162)
-12.75**
(4.855)
-10.15**
(3.914)
-12.65**
(4.852)
-13.75***
(4.273)
-2.183
(3.245)
7.066**
(3.187)
0.561
(4.357)
-35.442***
(2.611)
-
-24.788***
(2.478)
2.874
(2.606)
-8.006*** -0.069 -15.721*** -2.769
(1.557) (2.121) (2.361) (3.478)
_._-
-9.481***
(1.374)
-11.422***
(1.533)
Obs. 1,365 470 680 215
PersonA
contributes
5 tokens
PersonA
contributes
10 tokens
.----_.._._.._.__.__.._--_.._-_._.... ---- .._•.•...._---._-_._-------_.
Person A -12.837*** -29.423***
contributes (1.601) (2.445)
15 tokens
......_._- __ __._.._._ _.._ _- -_ __ _.__ _._.- __.__._-_.---_.
Person A -15.541***
contributes (1.863)
20 tokens
..··Take······..·········..·······..···········.. · · · · · · · · 5 ~ 8 · 3 4 * - * · - - - · - - - · · · · · · ..····.. 4 · ~ ' j · 6 · 7 · · .. ··..·..
.._ __ _ __..__{2.437) .._ t t ! : 9 . . . ~ ~ ~
Male -2.342 -3.025
........_ _ _ __Q..:..22?)_. .._..__._.. Q _ : . § ~ 1 1 __.. _ ~ - - : : . . . . . t - _ . - - . : ~ - : : . . : : . . . L . .
Person A 3.126 3.089
contributes (1.923) (3.856)
5 tokens x
Take
..." -_._ _ _._---._._._.__.__..-..__._..__._ _ _.__..__._.-_._-_.
Person A 2.400 1.527
contributes (2.200) (4.124)
10 tokens x
Take
.-..__...__._----_.._.._-_...__._-----_.._--_._-_._._--._•....__.. ----------
Person A 1.902 1.256
contributes (2.319) (4.151)
15 tokens x
Take
----------
Person A
contributes
20 tokens x
Take
---=-------_._----_._-_._------------------
Constant
______.;;;.D..;,ependent variable: Moral evaluation of the free rider
All subjects Subjects Subjects "Others"
with with flat
negatively function
sloped
function
-_._----_.
-19.327***
(2.483)
Notes: (I) OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered on
individllQu. • • denotes significance at the 5-percent I ~ / / and ••• at the l-percent I ~ / / (2) Scenario
dummies were excludedfor the subjects whose moral evaluation function wasflat.
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Table B.4. Simultaneous vs. Sequential treatments - Regression
results
Dependent variable: Moral evaluation of the free rider
24.498***
(2.015)
27.244***
(2.157)
-41.332***
(1.719)
-36.374***
(1.649)
-30.725***
(1.557)
._-----_.__.__ -.__._-_.._ _ .
--------------_.._---_.....
.________ All subjects
-23.472***
(1.436)
Person A
contributes 5
tokens
'-Person' A--.--..-....- ...---..-.--.-
contributes
10 tokens
..__...._-_._.._ ...._--
Person A
contributes
15 tokens
.._-----_._--_.__......._..._--_._-
Person A
contributes
20 tokens
"-8imultoo·e·ou·s··-···-..···-··..········..···..·-··..--·_-- -13.642***
..··Male·····..·········..······ ········ ·..·..·..·..·..·.. ···· ....·· .... ·· ..·..·....··..·-..-·-·-..·--·..···-·.. - - - - - - ~ ~ i ~ - - ---.-..
..................._._ _ _ __.._.. _ ~ ( _ 1 . _ 5 1 _ 0 . L - - .
Person A 15.571***
contributes 5 (1.729)
tokens x
Simultaneous
..··Person X· ·-····..··········· ··- ··-·_··..··..-- -·· ··..··· ---·-----20:5i6***·-·· -- ····-·-···· .
contributes (1.906)
10 tokens x
Simultaneous
............._ _ - --- ------
Person A
contributes
15 tokens x
Simultaneous
Person A
contributes
20 tokens x
Simultaneous
Constant 8.008***
(1.452)
O ~ ~ 2 ~ ~
Notes: (J) OLS estimates. Robus: standard errors are presented in parentheses and clustered on
individuals. •• denotes significance at the j-percent level. and ••• at the J-percent level. (2) Scenario
dummies were excludedfor the subjects whose moral evaluation function wasflat.
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Table B.S. Give vs. Take in Sequential treatments - Regression
results
Dependent variable: Moral evaluation of the free rider
17.85*
(9.655)
4.975
(9.886)
-2.695
(6.633)
10.935
(7.164)
-10.1
(8.046)
22.267*
(11.401)
-25.4***
(6.789)
-23.1 ***
(7.592)
-27.6***
(9.437)
"Others"
-9.423
(8.060)
3.846
(10.989)
2.814
(3.092)
-49.407***
(2.093)
-37.885***
(2.209)
-35.25***
(2.155)
-_ -_ _---_.•._._ __.__.__."
-45.602***
(2.159)
All subjects Subjects Subjects
with with flat
negatively function
sloped
function
... Person·i\--····-···- - 2 7 ~ 3 9 9 * * * - - · - = - 3 · o ~ T 4 2 · * * · * · · " - - - - - -
contributes (2.102) (2.147)
5 tokens
._._-_._--_...._---_.
Person A
contributes
10 tokens
.. · · P · e ~ s ~ i 1 - A · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ..···--:40.586*..*-*......·..···..-.. - - ~ 4 3 ~ 5 3 i * - - ..*-·----....--·-..·
contributes (2.148) (2.103)
15 tokens
....._--_.--...---_._-_...._....._...
Person A
contributes
20 tokens
............_ _ _-_...•_- ,-- ..__ _..- _....•.-._ _ _---------
Take 1.054 2.379
.. .._ ..._.... .__. ... (2.515) .__ j ~ . . : . ? 0 5 5
Male -0.731 -1.454
..._ _ _ _ _ . J ~ J 6 J l l ..__j.!.:1?-Q2. _.
Person A 7.596*** 5.708**
contributes (2.848) (2.883)
5 tokens x
Take
.........._ _._ _ _.._-_.._-_ _-_ -..-_ __._-_ _..__ _ _-----
Person A 8.754*** 4.828
contributes (3.072) (3.064)
10 tokens x
Take.__.__..•_-_._._ _... --_.._-_ _..__ _-_ _ ..
Person A 8.148**
contributes (3.253)
15 tokens x
Take
19.733*
(9.865)
2.426
(3.068)
8.258**
(3.387)
7.309*** 8.080*** 2.885 1.220
(1.968) (2.076) (12.864) (3.693)
------ .__._-
Constant
Person A
contributes
20 tokens x
Take
Obs. 1,325 1,095 60 170
Notes: (1) OLS estimates. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses and
clustered on individuals. • • denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and ••• at the J-
percent level. (2) Scenario dummies were excludedfor the subjects whose moral evaluation
function wasflat.
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Chapter 3
Framing and Free Riding: Emotional
Responses and Punishment in Social
Dilemma Carnes':'
3.1 Introduction
The experimental literature has used a number of simple games to
measure aspects of social preferences (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). Its
findings have helped to inspire the development of new models of other-
regarding preferences, such as those surveyed in Camerer (2003, ch. 2),
IJ The present chapter is a substantially expanded version of a joint paper with Robin Cubirt
and Simon Gachter (for more details on this paper see Cubitt, R., Drouvclis. \1 . and
Gachter, S., (2008), 'Framing and Free Riding: Emotional Responses and Punishment in
Social Dilemmas'. CeDEx Working PaperlOOS-(2).
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which in tum have begun to be applied in other areas of economics (Gintis,
Bowles, Boyd and Fehr, 2005). However, recent studies have cast doubt on
the robustness of elicited social preferences to framing and contextual
changes, especially in dictator games (e.g. Dana, Weber and Kuang, 2005;
Haley and Fessler, 2005; Bardsley, 2007; List, 2007). Evidence from these
studies suggests that behaviour is sensitive to seemingly irrelevant context-
specific cues. If such a finding held more generally for the games used to
measure social preferences in the laboratory, this would have senous
implications for the external validity of the measures obtained, for the
theories motivated by them, and for the explanation of subjects' behaviour.
In this chapter, we examine the issue of frame-sensitivity in relation to
the darker side of social preferences by studying a different experimental
game that has played a major part in the literature: the public goods game
with punishment. The framing manipulation we consider is of the
contributions stage of the game and has a Give versus Take form, previously
studied in the social psychology literature and similar to that introduced to
economics by Andreoni (1995).14 In one frame, subjects decide how much
to contribute to a public good; in the other frame, they decide how much to
withdraw from it. The setup is such that the two decision problems are
objectively equivalent, in terms of the feasible set of allocations available to
a subject. However, studies from social psychology found related framing
manipulations to have an effect on contributions (e.g. Brewer and Kramer,
1986; McDaniel and Sistrunk, 1991; McCusker and Carnevale, 1995; Sell
14 For a conceptual discussion and classification of framing effects, see Levin, Schneider
and Gaeth, 1998.
and Son, 1997; van Dijk and Wilke, 2000). Experimental economists have
also identified framing effects, typically in a repeated game context
(Andreoni, 1995; Sonnemans, et aI., 1998; Willinger and Ziegelmeyer,
1999; Cookson, 2000 and Park, 2000).
Our study is distinctive in two main respects. First, we add a stage to the
game in which subjects can punish one another and a further phase in which
their self-reported emotional responses are elicited. Second, unlike most of
the economics literature, we study a one-shot game.
Rather than considering only the impact of framing on contributions to
the public good, we focus mainly on whether it affects emotions and
punishment behaviour. The fact that emotions and punishment have played a
central role in the social preference literature provides a general motivation
for this aspect of our study (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Bosman and van
Winden, 2002; Andreoni, et aI., 2003; Masclet, et aI., 2003).
A more specific motivation stems from the findings reported in Chapter
2. Recall that in this experiment subjects, playing the role of impartial
observers, pass moral judgments on agents in hypothetical scenarios. The
scenarios concerned a simple public goods game. Some were described
using a Give frame and others using a Take frame; and subjects' judgments
of the agents proved to be sensitive to this difference. On average, subjects
tended to condemn a failure to contribute more strongly than a withdrawal
of support with the same net consequences. However, as there may be a
difference between judgments made in the role of impartial observer and
responses to agents with whom one is interacting, it is important to
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investigate whether a parallel finding holds for subjects who are materially
affected by each other's decisions. For this case, self-reported emotions are
analogous to moral judgments to the extent of being non-behavioural
indicators of attitudes; whereas punishment provides a behavioural indicator
ofwillingness to act on one's attitudes.
We study a one-shot game for two reasons. First, as we explain in
Section 3.2, one-shot games provide cleaner tests for framing effects than
repeated games.15 Second, and for similar reasons, one-shot games are of
particular interest to the study of social preferences, as they prevent other-
regarding considerations from being confounded with strategic ones arising
from repetition of the game.
An important issue in studying the effect of the framing of the
contribution stage on subsequent punishment behaviour and emotional
responses is to recognise that the framing might affect punishment and
emotions either because it affects the levels of contributions or because it
affects how subjects see a given level of contributions. We are most
interested in the latter mechanism, since the former is already well-
understood. Our results suggest that, on average, neither punishment nor
emotion varies with the framing of the contribution stage, when one controls
for the level of contributions. Thus, the social preferences we observe are
robust to our framing manipulation. Although our main research questions
are whether and if so, how punishment and emotions, as two separate
15 Conditional on the existence of a framing effect, it may be of interest to study the
persistence or otherwise of the effect in repeat play. But, persistence is a ~ a r a t t issue
from that of the initial existence of the effect. It is for study of the latter Issue that we
suggest one-shot games are superior.
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indicators of negative reciprocity, are context dependent, our design allows
us to investigate the relationship between punishment and emotions. We
maintain that it is worth exploring this possibility and present our findings
from this analysis in an appendix.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2
provides a literature review of the relevant framed social dilemma
experiments in this topic through the lens of social psychologists and
experimental economists. Section 3.3 describes the framework, the design
and the hypotheses of our experiment. Section 3.4 discusses the results and
Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Framing and Free Riding in Social Dilemma Games: A Literature
Review
3.2.1 Psychological experiments
Social psychologists have investigated extensively the role of framing in
social dilemma games. Despite the fact that the methodology of
psychological experiments exhibits significant differences to that employed
in economics experiments.l" evidence from the former type of experiments
can provide us with useful insights, since the frames we study are equivalent
16 Some of the methodological disparities between psychological and economics
experiments lie in the fact that, in the former case, subjects' decisions are not incentivised
according to their performance, false feedback is given to subjects, decision-making is
based on hypothetical scenarios and description of the game is often modelled on real-life
examples, making wording more loaded (see also for some discussion Hertwig and
Ortmann, 2008).
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In terms of final consequences, but may not be equivalent from a
psychological or a moral (see Chapter 2) viewpoint. For our purposes, we
focus our attention on those psychological experiments which are closest to
our framing manipulation. Recall that we are specifically interested in Give
versus Take game structures; that is, environments where subjects can either
give to a common resource or take from it. Findings from psychological
experiments are mixed and equivocal with respect to how framing affects
cooperation.
In a classic study by Brewer and Kramer (1986) subjects' cooperative
behaviour between give and take dilemmas is explored. For the give
treatment, each subject is endowed with 25 points in their personal accounts
and the total number of points in their personal account would determine
their earnings. On every trial the size of the common pool temporarily
dropped by either 200 points (in the case where the group size was equal to
8) or 800 (in the case where the group size was equal to 32). Subjects had to
decide how many of these points to return/give to the common pool. For the
next trial the size of the common pool was determined by the total
contributions and the random replenishment rate ranging from 1% to 10%.
In total, there were 20 trials, in which trial the common pool was completely
depleted by the computer. For the take frame, each subject had now to
decide how many points to withdraw (up to 25) from the common resource.
These points were then added to their personal accounts.
To explain choice behaviour in these two dilemmas, Brewer and Kramer
rely on the risk ingredient of Kahneman and Tversky's (1984) prospect
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theory. Specifically, under the give frame, subjects' contribution involves
giving up something subjects already posses (certain loss) in order to obtain
an uncertain benefit (replenishment rate and total contributions were
unknown from trial to trial). In this treatment, subjects will be risk-seeking
and thus, will contribute less to the public good. However, under the take
frame, whatever subjects withdraw constitutes a certain gain and this makes
individuals more risk averse. It is, therefore, expected that subjects will
prefer to take a small amount from the common pool (definite gain) and
leave more in the public good. On this basis, Brewer and Kramer
hypothesise that a take frame evokes more cooperation than a give frame.
Their findings provide support for this hypothesis.
In another series of experiment, Sell and Son (1997) analysed choice
behaviour in give versus take dilemma under both static and dynamic
contexts." Their results provide, to some extent, support to Brewer and
Kramer's effect. Specifically, in both static and dynamic contexts, the take
dilemma produces higher cooperation than the give one on the first trial.
However, this difference diminishes over time, in dynamic contexts and
when group interaction (that is, knowledge of how much others contribute)
is added in the static context. Following a similar experimental design as
Brewer and Kramer (1986), McCusker and Carnevale (1995) explain
17 In the Give static context, subjects were endowed with 25 tokens and have to decide
whether to contribute all or a portion of their tokens to the common pool. In the Take static
context, subjects had to decide whether to take up to 25 tokens and transfer it to their
private fund. In the Give dynamic context, the group account was endowed with 600
tokens. Subjects were also endowed with 25 tokens per period and have to decide how
many of these 2S tokens to keep for themselves and how many to invest to the group
account. Note that the size of the group account was subject to a replenishment rate ranging
from 1% to 10%. In the Take dynamic context, the decisions involved keeping tokens in the
group account or withdrawing tokens from the group account. In this condition, the group
account was endowed by 700 tokens, 100 ofwhich could be withdrawn by group members.
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behaviour in give and take dilemmas using the loss aversion hypothesis.
Since losses loom larger than gains, they argue that people are motivated to
avoid a loss more that they are motivated to obtain a gain, anticipating thus
higher levels of cooperation in take than in give games. Their findings
replicate Brewer and Kramer's (1986) framing effect. Interestingly, in the
give frame, subjects do not match their fellow group members' contribution
behaviour, while, the opposite effect is observed under the take frame. This
was due to the fact that when others were cooperative, the Give dilemma
evoked lower levels of cooperation than the Take dilemma. A similar
behavioural pattern is corroborated by Fleishman (1988): subjects
conformed to others' behaviour under the take frame, but not under the give
frame, where the average group contribution was greater when others had
contributed little. 18 When choice behaviour between give and take dilemmas
is compared, Fleishman does not find any significant difference. The
absence of a difference in cooperation rates between frames has been also
documented by Rutte, Wilke and Messick (1987). Contrary to the evidence
reported above, findings by McDaniel and Sistrunk (1991) suggest that the
give context produces higher cooperation rates than the corresponding take
context. Additionally, as the expected cooperation ofothers increased, levels
of cooperation for both game structures increased, but the increase in the
take game was not higher than the corresponding increase in the give game.
However, it is important to note that this finding is based on a within-
subjects analysis.
18 Note that the behaviour of the otherswaspre-programmed by the experimenter but
remained constantacross frames.
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In sum, evidence from psychological experiments suggests that different
game contexts are an important factor that affects levels of cooperation,
making the Give and Take frame psychologically different, albeit
economically equivalent. However, much of the inconsistent behaviour
observed in these experiments appears to be produced by different
methodologies and environments in which subjects interact. For instance,
Brewer and Kramer (1986) consider a dynamic context, where the size of
the common pool replenishes at a random rate from trial to trial: an
environment different to that used in Fleishman (1988). Further, McDaniel
and Sistrunk (1991) measure cooperative choices in a context where
subjects act as hypothetical CEOs of an agricultural firm. This context is
quite different from the one used in other studies, such as in Sell and Son
(1997) or in Brewer and Kramer (1986). What is more, in Fleishman's
(1988) and McCusker and Carnevale's (1995) study, decisions are made on
repeated trials; whereas in Rutte, et al., (1987) experiment decisions are
made in one-shot contexts.
The next sub-section reviews the relevant social dilemma experiments
from the economics literature, the framework of which is very similar to
ours. As it will become clear below, in the economics literature, the effects
are more pronounced to the direction of being more cooperative under the
give than under the take context.
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3.2.2 Economics experiments
A seminal paper in this area is due to Andreoni (1995), who analysed the
effects of positive versus negative framing on cooperation. The type of
framing manipulation implemented by Andreoni emphasises the difference
between the positive externality generated to other group members from
investing to the public account and the negative externality generated to
other group members from investing to one's own account. That is, in the
positive frame case, subjects' initial endowment was placed in their private
account; whereas, in the negative-frame case, their endowment was placed
in the public account. Although presentation of the choice problems differs,
they are objectively equivalent, in terms that subjects' economic incentives
are identical in both conditions.
In Andreoni's experiment, each subject was given an endowment of 60
tokens and each group consisted of 5 subjects. The payoff functions for both
conditions are given in equations (1) and (2), respectively:
.. fr 1 1 ~Positive arne: st, = x; +-. g; +-. LJgj
2 2 I ~ ~
Negative frame: n, = x, +.!... s, _.!... LXj +1202 2 j"';
(1)
(2)
where x, and g; denote contributions to the private and public good,
respectively. The positive-frame payoff function is equivalent to the
negative-frame one by simply substituting the budget constraint of the other
group members, xJ + g J = 60, from equation (l) into (2). This allows
economic incentives to remain the same, with the dominant-strategy Nash
equilibrium being complete free riding under both manipulations. In a ten-
60
period game, Andreoni's findings suggest that subjects are far more
cooperative in the positive-frame than in the negative frame condition. In
particular, mean contribution levels, in the positive condition, reach 34% of
players' total endowment, whereas, corresponding levels in the negative
condition were only about 16%. This behavioural asymmetry is attributed to
the fact that the "warm-glow" of doing something good exceeds the "cold-
prickle" of doing something bad. That is, people feel much better if they
contribute to the public good, since they consider their action as a positive
one in which many others have cooperated as well; while the same level of
cooperation in the negative frame may be considered as a negative action, as
long as investment in the private good is made at the expense of the other
group members.
Building on Andreoni's type of framing, Willinger and Ziegelmeyer
(1999) and Park (2000) tested the robustness of his results in different
experimental settings. Specifically, Willinger and Ziegelmeyer designed an
experiment where the unique dominant strategy of the game was to partially
contribute to the public good; whereas, Park examined the connection
between subjects' value orientation and contribution levels in different
frames. In the latter experiment, subjects were classified to types according
to the value orientation method (see Offerman, et at, 1996) before they
made their contribution decisions.i" Both investigations provide support to
Andreoni's framing effect: average levels of contributions are significantly
higher in the positive than in the negative frame. Looking at the specific
19 The value orientation method revealed that subjects are mainly classified as
individualistic (65.5%) and cooperative (32%).
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type classifications in Park's experiment, it IS reported that both
individualists and co-operators contributed more in the positive compared to
the negative frame, although the difference is not significant for co-
operators.
The role of framing effects on cooperative choices has been also
investigated by Cookson (2000). In particular, Cookson examined three
kinds of presentational variations. The first one was related to the
investigation of whether the description of a 4· N stage game as four games
with N stages creates a positive restart effect and thus, this effect
documented in earlier public goods games (see Andreoni, 1988) can be
interpreted as a framing effect. In the second variation, the payoff function
is decomposed in two different, but strategically equivalent, ways. In one
frame, a standard public goods game was implemented, where subjects have
to decide how many tokens to keep in their private account and how many
to contribute to a public account that benefits everyone; whereas, in another
frame, the payoff function is decomposed in such a way that subjects have
to decide how many tokens to keep in their private account and how many
to donate to the other group members. In this second frame, donation
benefits only the other group members and not the donor.2o The third
framing variation was associated with the use of written instructions: in the
first one ("I-task"), the competitive features of the game are stressed (the
20 In the first frame, the material payoff functions is 1f j =400 - gj +0.5· (gj +G-j) , where
gj is player i's contribution to the public good; while in the second frame, the payoff
function is 1f j =400-dj + D_i' where d, is player i's donation to the other group
members. Both frames are strategically equivalent using, for each player i , the
relationships d, =0.5· gl and D-; =0.5· G-;.
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more a player contributes individually, the less he earns); while, in the
second one ("We-task"), the cooperative features of the game are stressed
(the more tokens a player contributes, the more income someone else earns).
Cookson finds a positive and significant restart effect under the standard
payoff description and also that the effects of decomposing the payoff are
positive, in the sense that players make significantly more cooperative
choices when presented with this frame. Regarding the comprehension
tasks, subjects who were given the "We-task" were more cooperative than
those who were given the "l-task",
The literature discussed above records the presence of a rather strong
framing effect when a linear public goods game is finitely repeated.
However, it seems that the existing literature does not provide an
explanation for the documentation of such framing effects. Our previous
chapter sheds some light by investigating subjects' moral judgments. Our
current investigation extends the previous literature (and Chapter 2) by
assessing the reasons for the observed framing difference and examining
punishment and self-reported emotions, as means of understanding how
subjects perceive the Give versus Take manipulation. In particular, we
implemented a design where the same group of subjects interacted only
once, and also added a punishment stage to the game and a phase in which
subjects' self-reported emotional responses are elicited. Such an
experimental design presented in more detail in the following section will
allow us to shed light on our research questions which are concerned with
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whether framing affects the way subjects treat, and respond emotionally to,
a given deviation from contributions.
3.3 Our laboratory experiment with punishment stage
3.3.1 Framework
The basic building block of our study is a framing manipulation of a
voluntary contributions game played by the members of a group. Our
framings follow a similar formulation of the payoff function as in
Dufwenberg, et al. (2006). In the Give frame, each player is endowed with
20 tokens and has to decide how many of them he keeps for himself and
how many he contributes to the public good (described as a "project" to
subjects). Each token kept for himself increases his own monetary payoff by
one Guilder (our experimental currency). Each token contributed to the
public good increases the payoff of every group member by 0.5 Guilders.
The payoff function is given by equation (3).
n
n: =20- e, + 0.5· Igj
j=1
(3)
where n;1 denotes group member i 's payoff, g; the number of tokens
contributed to the public good by group member i , and n the number of
group members."
In the Take frame, there are initially 20· n tokens in the public good
(described again as a "project" to subjects) for each group. Each group
21 The reason for the superscript in groupmember; 's payoffemerges below.
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member has control of 20 tokens and has to decide how many of them he
withdraws from the project and how many he leaves in it. The payoff
function for this framing treatment is now given by equation (4).
n
1r} =tj +0.5·(20·n- Lt j )
j=)
(4)
where t j indicates the number of tokens withdrawn from the public good by
group member i .
In each frame, subjects have the same opportunities, regarding the final
allocation of tokens. Equations (3) and (4) are equivalent using, for each
player i , the relationship gj =20 - t.. Thus, from a consequentialist
perspective, the framing manipulation has no strategic significance.
3.3.2 Procedures and Design
Our experimental design centres on a game with two stages. The first
stage is a standard linear public goods game presented in two different
framings, as described in Section 3.3.1; and the second is a punishment
stage. We refer to the two resulting treatments as Give-P (Give frame for
contributions, with punishment opportunities) and Take-P (Take frame for
contributions, with punishment opportunities). In the second stage of the
voluntary contributions game, players are allowed to punish each other.
Each subject can assign up to five punishment points to each of the other
group members. Punishment is costly both for the punishing and the
punished parties. Adapting Fehr and Gachter (2002), we choose a
6S
punishment technology in which each punishment point assigned costs the
punished player two Guilders and the punishing player one Guilder.
The material payoff function from the whole experiment for a given
subject i is given by equation (5).
n n
1[; =1[: - LPij -2· LPji
j=1 j=1
(5)
where 1[;1 denotes group member i's payoff from the contribution stage,
and Pij the punishment points group member i assigns to group member j.
Conditional on each subject i being motivated to maximise equation (5), the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium requires that subjects free ride
completely in the first stage and refrain completely from punishing in the
second stage.
We asked subjects to state their beliefs about contributions of the other
group members after they had made their own contribution decision (but
before the punishment stage). We also elicited beliefs about how much
punishment a subject expected to receive. We elicited these beliefs after
subjects had had the opportunity to punish. Elicitation of beliefs was non-
incentivised in order to exclude potential income effects in the punishment
treatments. We also wanted to avoid punishment being motivated by
disappointment about low payoffs resulting from inaccurate beliefs.
In each treatment, subjects were asked at the end of the game to indicate
the intensity of emotions they felt about the actual contribution behaviour of
each member of their group. Note that at the time of the emotions'
elicitation, subjects were aware of the amount of tokens contributed to the
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public good by each group member separately (in both no-punishment and
punishment treatments). However, they were not informed at that point
about the punishment points assigned to them by the other group members
(for the corresponding treatments).
The procedure we used to elicit self-reports on perceived emotions is
due to Bosman and van Winden (2002). In particular, subjects were given a
list of thirteen emotions, and were then asked to indicate the intensity with
which they felt each emotion when they saw the contribution of each other
group member. The intensity for each emotion was recorded on a 7-point
scale (1 = "not at all", ... , 7 = "very much"). Appendix A.1 provides a
screenshot of the interface we used for eliciting self-reports on emotions.
The list of the thirteen emotions with the order presented to subjects is as
follows: warmth, anger, fear, envy, sadness, happiness, shame, irritation,
contempt, guilt, joy, jealousy and surprise.
Our design is completed by two treatments without punishment
opportunities. In these treatments, the second stage consisted only of the
elicitation of beliefs and emotions. We refer to the no-punishment
treatments as Give-N (Give frame for contributions, no punishment
opportunities) and Take-N (Take frame for contributions, no punishment
opportunities). The reason for including the no-punishment treatments is to
check for two possibilities: (i) if it turns out that there are differences in
emotions across frames, we want to be able to check whether emotions are
responses to contributions themselves or ex post rationalisations of
punishment behaviour; and (ii) if it turns out that there is no difference in
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emotions across frames, we want to be able to check whether this is because
emotional response to contributions is the same or because the act of
punishment expunges (or arouses) emotional response.
Each subject was assigned at random to a group of three members and
played a one-shot voluntary contributions game under one of the treatments
just described. (Sessions were allocated to treatments at random.) The
advantage of a one-shot game is that it eliminates confounding effects that
might come from repeated interaction, allowing us to focus on pure framing
effects. In contrast, in a repeated game, there is always the possibility that
subjects think that other subjects' future behaviour may be influenced by
their own current behaviour. This could confound the investigation of
framing effects in two ways. First, sufficiently strong repeated game effects
could swamp framing effects that would otherwise be present. Alternatively,
if subjects' views of the dependence of other subjects' behaviour on their
own are frame-sensitive, repetition could create a framing effect that would
not otherwise be present.
In total, 42 subjects took part in the Give-N treatment; 45 in the Take-N
treatment; 42 in the Give-P treatment; and 39 in the Take-P treatment. All
subjects were recruited at the University of Nottingham. The vast majority
were undergraduate students from different academic fields including, but
not confined to, economics. The experiment was conducted in the Centre
for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) lab. All
treatments were computerised and programmed with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). The no-punishment treatments lasted about 50 minutes
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and the punishment treatments about 70 minutes. At the end of each
session, guilders were converted to UK pounds at the pre-announced
exchange rate of £0040 per guilder and subjects were paid in cash. On
average, subjects earned about £9 in the no-punishment and £12.30 in the
punishment treatments. Before subjects played the game, they received the
instructions reproduced in Appendix A.2. As we wanted to ensure that
subjects understood the decision situation and the mechanics of payoff
calculations, all participants answered several computerised test questions,
concerning what the payoffs would be for various hypothetical
configurations of behaviour. The experiment did not proceed until every
subject had answered these questions correctly.
3.3.3 Hypotheses
We now state our hypotheses concemmg the effect of framing on
contributions, and, more importantly, on punishment behaviour, and
reported emotions. To make them comparable between the Give and Take
frame, we express everything in terms of the amount of tokens left in the
public good. That is, the notion of "contribution" used in the remainder of
this chapter matches the concept of "effective contribution" from Chapter 2.
For contributions, the null hypothesis is that framing has no effect on
their level, at least in no-punishment treatments. An alternative hypothesis
for these treatments, suggested by previous evidence from repeated public
goods games and the findings on moral judgments described in Chapter 2, is
that contributions will be higher in the Give frame than in the Take frame.
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Previous evidence suggests that punishment opportunities will tend to raise
contributions (Fehr and Gachter, 2000; 2002), but whether this should be
expected to induce a difference in contributions between Give and Take
frames depends on the first of the two questions to which we now tum.
These questions which are our main concern are: whether the propensity
to punish differs between frames; and whether emotional responses to
contributions do likewise. We investigate them using the "punishment
function" and the "emotions' function", respectively, as tools.
The "punishment function" gives the punishment points assigned by the
punisher, as a function of the recipient's deviation from the punisher's
contribution. Consistent with previous evidence (e.g., Fehr and Gachter,
2000), our expectation is that the punishment function will be downward
sloping for the negative part of the deviation (horizontal) axis, implying that
a subject punishes his co-player more, the more the co-player negatively
deviates from the punisher's contribution.
Having defined the punishment function, we can now state our derived
hypotheses in relation to framing. The null hypothesis predicts that the
punishment function does not depend on framing, ceteris paribus. This
hypothesis is implied by any consequentialist theory of behaviour, even by
those which allow subjects to contribute and punish to some extent. For
instance, although the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
or the ERC model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) can explain contribution
and punishment, these theories cannot account for any framing efTect.22
~ ~ Consequentialist theories suppose that subjects' actions are determined only by the final
consequences of the actions. Almost all economic theories an: conscquentialist 111 this
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Even if framing leads to different contribution levels, punishment may
not be different for a given deviation by the recipient from the punisher's
contribution. This prediction parallels the finding of Fehr and Gachter
(2000) that, even if subjects contribute more under a fixed matching
protocol than under a random matching one, these treatment manipulations
do not affect the level of punishment for given deviations from the average
group contribution. An effect of different treatments on contribution levels
need not imply any corresponding effect on punishment, for a given
deviation from the punisher's contribution.
In principle, the punishment function could be tilted either upwards or
downwards by the Take frame relative to the Give frame.23 However, the
evidence from Chapter 2, in which subjects morally rate free riding,
suggests that failing to contribute is perceived as morally worse than
withdrawing from the public good. Motivated by these findings, the
alternative hypothesis states that the "punishment function" would be
steeper in the Give, compared to the Take frame. Similar hypotheses can be
derived using i-, deviation from the punisher's beliefs about j 's
contributions in place of j 's deviation from i 's contribution.
The second tool we use to analyse subjects' perception of free riding is
the "emotions' function", which gives aggregate emotions in a given
category (i.e. positive or negative) as a function of deviations from
sense. However, psychological game theory (Geanakoplos, et al., 1989) includes beliefs in
the payoff function and can therefore explain framing effects (see Dufwenberg, et al.,
2006).
23 The reason for expecting tilts is that we assume there to be no punishment if the deviation
from the punisher's contribution is zero.
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individual's own contribution.24 We expect the "emotions' function" to be
negatively sloped in the negative deviation interval for the negative
emotions, and positively sloped in the negative deviation interval for the
positive emotions. Although our main concern is with the negative deviation
interval, since we are mostly interested in how subjects treat lower
contributions by their counterparts, we can also state hypotheses for the
emotions' function for the positive deviation interval. We hypothesise that,
within the range of this interval, for the negative emotions the function will
be ~ e g a t i v e l l sloped; whereas, for the positive emotions, it will be positively
slope. As with the "punishment function", we can also state hypotheses for
the slope and level of the "emotions' function". Since punishment and
(negative) emotions are likely to be closely related, we expect that any
differences observed in the "punishment function" will be reflected in the
"emotions' function" as well (and in the same direction).
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Contributions
Table 3.1 shows the average absolute level of contribution across all
subjects in each treatment. In absolute levels, the average contribution is
largest in the Give-P treatment (i.e. 7.21 tokens) and smallest in the Take-N
treatment (i.e. 4.47 tokens), as previous literature on framed public goods
experiments would suggest.
24 Positive emotions comprise wannth, happiness and joy; whereas, negative emotions
comprise anger, fear, envy, sadness, shame, irritation, contempt, guilt and jealousy. We
consider surprised as a "neutrel" emotion as it can either be positive orland negative.
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Table 3.1 Average absolute levels of contribution
Average contribution levels
Give-N
Take-N
Give-P
Take-P
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
5.88
(6.24)
------_._--_._---
4.47
(6.04)
7.21
(5.03)
6.41
(5.12)
A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test suggests significant differences
among treatments (X\3) = 10.089, P = 0.0178). Using a Wilcoxon rank-sum
test shows that the only significant differences at the 5% level are between
the Give-P and Take-N treatments (p = 0.002) and between the Take-N and
Take-P treatments (p = 0.025).
The distribution of contributions across all frames is shown in Figure 3.1,
which suggests three interesting observations. First, the introduction of
punishment reduces the zero contributions both in the Give and the Take
treatments. Second, with respect to the Give frame, there exists a spike for
contributions equal to ten, while this tendency does not seem to exist for the
Take frame, implying that there may be a salience for giving half but not for
taking half. Third, in all treatments, those contribution levels not located at
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either zero or ten are fairly widely spread. Performing a Kolmogorov-
Smimov test for the equality of distribution s, we find signi ficant difference
only for the Give-P and Take-N treatments (p = 0.006 ), and the Take- and
Take-P treatments (p = 0.037)).
Figure 3.1 Distribution of contributions across frames
Give-N
0
0
~
0
co
0
<0
0
'<t
0
N
-
0
c
a>
o Give-PL-
a> 0
Q.. 0
~
0
co
0
<0
0
'<t
0
N
0
Take-N
Take-P
I iii r r r
o 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Contribution
We now examine subjects' beliefs about contributions across frame.
Table 3.2 shows the average beliefs about contributions acros all four
treatments. A Kruskal-Wallis test suggests weakly significant difference
b tween treatments (X\3) = 6.626, p = 0.085). U ing a Wilco on rank- urn
te t h w that the only ignificant diff renee at the 5% Ie el are bet n
the Gi -P and Take- treatm nt (p = 0.032) and bet
T ke-P tr atrn nt (p = 0.023).
7
n th Gi -P nd
Table 3.2 Average absolute levels of beliefs about contributions
Average beliefs about
contributions
Give-N
Take-N
7.08
(5.26)
6.23
(5.93)
........._ __ _ _ __..•__ _ -._ _._.- _---------_._.._---_.._--_._ .
Give-P
Take-P
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
7.70
(4.32)
5.31
(3.78)
From a visual examination of Figure 3.2, we observe that in the Take
treatments there is a spike of beliefs about zero contributions, which is less
pronounced in the Give treatments. In addition, the salience observed in
actual contributions in relation to giving half but not taking half seems to be
reflected in subjects' beliefs about contributions.
Testing for differences in the distribution of beliefs about contributions
across frames, a Kolmogorov-Smimov test suggests no significant
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differences for any pair-wise treatment comparison. A vi ual repre entation
of how beliefs about contributions are distributed for each treatment
separately is provided in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 Distribution of beliefs about contributions across frame
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Beliefs about contributions
Thus far, we observe that framing affect contribution and beliefs about
contributions in a similar way. Next we inve tigate how contribution and
beliefs are related as, in our analysis of punishment and emotions, we are
interested in deviations from contributions and belief: about contribution .
Note also that we derive similar hypotheses for both definition of
deviations and it is thus of interest to examine the interdependence betv n
contribution and belief:. Figure 3.3 provide a graphical illu tration of
contribution a a function of belief: about contribution for each fram
p rat I. ir I r pr nt ombination of contribution and b Ii f p r
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treatment, with the size of the circles being proportional to the number of
observat ions. Circles on the horizontal axis correspond to zero contribution .
whereas, circles on the diagonal indicate contributions that exactly match
beliefs.
Figure 3.3 Contributions as a function of beliefs about contributions
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As Figure 3.3 shows, there IS a positive relationship between
contributions and beliefs for all treatments. The Spearman correlation
coefficient are as follow: Give-N: p = 0.693; Take-N : p = 0.593; Give-P: p
= 0.796; and Take-P: p = 0.708. For each treatment, the corre ponding p-
value i equal to zero, implying that contribut ion and belief: about
contribution' ar po iti el and i nificantly corr lat d. hi ' ob ati n
u t in our n - h t ont t subj ntributi n d
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are closely matched with their expectations about how much the other group
members contribute, and we thus expect that the findings reported in the
following sections to be similar across the two definitions of deviations.
However, in this chapter, our main concern is with punishment
behaviour and emotions, as these are our vehicles to answer the question of
whether, and if so, how framing influences the way subjects treat a given
deviation from contributions or from beliefs about contributions. Before
turning our attention to the investigation of both indicators, we look at
whether standard deviations about contributions and beliefs about
contributions of each group were different between treatments (see Tables
B.I-B.4, Appendix B). Our analysis suggests that performing a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test yields no significant differences for any pair-wise comparison.
However, despite the similarity of standard deviations across frames, our
findings reported in Chapter 2 provide us with motivation to expect that
punishment behaviour and emotions might be different, to the extent that
moral judgments were different, controlling for the level of standard
deviations. In the next two sections, we explore whether subjects treat free-
riding differently by punishing differently or/and displaying different
feelings across framing manipulations, using the "punishment function" and
the "emotions' function" as our tools.
3.4.2 The pll11ishmentfimction
We start our analysis by examining subjects' punishment behaviour for
each framing context. Figure 3.4 below shows the punishment points
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assigned by the punisher to another player j as a function of j 's deviation
from the punisher's contribution." The punishment function is given by the
solid line, which indicates the fitted line of the locally weighted regression
of punishment assigned on the deviation from the punisher's contribution.
RESULT J: The punishmentfunction does not depend on framing, ceteris
paribus.
Support. In Figure 3.4, each dot represents a single observation. The
punishment functions appear quite similar across frames, having the
anticipated negative slope.
25 We refer to the punisher as player; • the recipient of punishment as player j, and the
third group member as player k .
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Figure 3.4 Punishment as a function of deviation from punisher'
contribution
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However, the graphs in Figure 3.4 are simply visual representations of
the punishment function and do not control for any factor other than j'
deviation from i's contribution. To test econometrically whether the lope
of the punishment function differs across frames, we estimated a Tobit
regression model. In this regression, the dependent variable is the
"punishment assigned by player i to player j" and the independent
variables compnse "Player k's contribution deviation", "Player i'
absolute negative (contribution) deviation", "Player j's po itive
(contribution) d viation", and the dummy variable "Tak ". We al 0 includ d
two interaction term . which indicate whether th lope of the puni hm nt
fun tion differ ith r pect to ncgativ and p itiv d iation a ro
fr m . ot that all d viation al ulat d -ith r p t t th uni h r
o
contribution. We include "absolute negative deviation" and "positive
deviation" as separate regressors, since Figure 3.4 suggests that these two
different sorts of deviation elicit different punishment responses. The
variable "absolute negative deviation" is the absolute value of the actual
deviation of subject j 's contribution from the punisher's contribution, when
subject j's contribution is below the punisher's contribution; and zero
otherwise. The variable "positive deviation" is constructed in an analogous
way. The variable "Player k's contribution deviation" is the actual
deviation of player k 's contribution from the punisher's contribution. The
reason for including such a variable is that player i 's attitude to player j
may differ according to the behaviour of player k. The dummy variable
"Take" equals 0 for the Give frame, and 1 for the Take frame. The
regression results are given in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3 The punishment function - Regression results
Dependent variable:
Punishment assigned by player
i to player j
Player j's absolute negative
deviation from punisher's
contribution
--------,
Player j's positive deviation from
punisher's contribution
Player k 's contribution deviation
from punisher's contribution
0.790**
(0.331)
-0.102
(0.337)
0.083
(0.096)
....M ••H _. _ •• _ M._ __ "_••_.__._•• ~ ._._•• _ ••• ._._ •• ._. • • _
Take
Take x Player j' s absolute
negative deviation from punisher's
contribution
-1.699
(2.739)
-0.007
(0.497)
..__ __ _ _._ _ _._.._.._._ _-----_._-------------
Take x Player j's positive
deviation from punisher's
contribution
Constant
Observations
0.378
(0.396)
-9.025***
(3.425)
162
Notes: Tobit estimates. Standard errors are presented in parentheses (clustered on groups).
Results are correctedfor heteroskedasticity. •• denotes significance at the 5-percent level,
and ••• at the l-percent level.
The results from Table 3.3 indicate that the vertical intercept of the
punishment function does not differ across treatments, since the coefficient
of the dummy variable "Take" is not statistically significant. The
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coefficients of the interaction terms are also insignificant, implying that the
slope of the punishment function with regard both to negative and positive
deviations is the same, irrespective of framing. These findings fail to reject
the null hypothesis that subjects punish given (negative and positive)
deviations from their own contribution equally in different frames.
According to our findings, the only variable that has a significant effect on
the assignment of punishment is the absolute negative deviation from the
punisher's contributions: a subject punishes a co-player more, the less the
co-player contributes relative to the punisher.
We next examine whether punishment as a function of beliefs about
contributions, varied across frames. As we have already seen in Section
3.4.1 contributions closely match beliefs about contributions, being
positively and highly correlated, and as a result, our expectation is that it is
very likely to observe similar patterns of punishment behaviour as a function
of beliefs about contributions compared to the case of deviations from
punisher's contributions. It is therefore of interest to look at whether our
conjecture actually holds by investigating the punishment function with
respect to deviations from punisher's beliefs about contributions. Our
findings again yield no evidence that the "punishment function" differs
between frames. Result 2 records our finding.
RESULT 2: Punishment as a function ofdeviation from punisher's beliefs
about contributions does not depend on framing, ceteris paribus.
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Support. Figure 3.5 provides a graphical illustration of the punishment
assigned as a function of deviations from the punisher's beliefs about
contributions. It turns out that the punishment function with respect to these
deviation s is very similar in both framing contexts.
Figure 3.5 Punishment as a function of deviation from punisher ' s
beliefs about contributions
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Table 3.4 provides econometric support for our Result 2. We have
estimated a Tobit model , including the same independent variables a III
Table 3.3, with the only difference that we now express deviation with
re pect to the puni her ' belief: about contribution . We fi nd evidence that
puni hment again doe not differ a a function of the de iation under
both framing nt ince th coeffic ient of th dumm ariabl Take '
and the interaction terms are statistically insignificant. Analogously with the
case of deviations from the punisher's actual contribution, the only
significant variable that explains punishment is player j's absolute
negative deviation from punisher's beliefs about contributions.
Table 3.4 Punishment as a function of punisher's beliefs about
contributions - Regression results
Dependent variable: Punishment
assigned by player i to player j
....
Player j's absolute negative deviation
from punisher's beliefs
Player j 's positive deviation from
punisher's beliefs
Player k 's contribution deviation from
punisher's beliefs
0.762**
(0.371)
-0.093
(0.261)
0.117
(0.101)
_..-.._._..._.__._---_.__.._._._-_.._-_._----------------
Take
Take x absolute negative deviation from
punisher's beliefs
._-_.._-_.__.._--._----
Take x positive deviation from
punisher's beliefs
Constant
Observations
-1.445
(2.945)
0.189
(0.659)
0.251
(0.357)
-8.866**
(3.483)
162
Notes: Tobit estimates. Standarderrors arepresentedin parentheses (clustered on groups).
Results are correctedfor heteroslcedasticity. •• at the 5-percent level. and ••• at the 1-
percent level.
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Thus far, we have found that subjects do not treat deviations from either
own contribution or beliefs about others' contributions differently across
frames, in terms of the punishment they mete out. However, this observation
could be attributed either to subjects perceiving deviations differently across
frames, but not being prepared to act differently on the basis of this
perception; or to subjects not perceiving deviations differently across frames
at all. In the next section, we use the elicited emotions to disentangle these
two possibilities.
3.4.3 The emotions 'function
In this section, we explore whether the self-reported emotions differ
across frames. Figure 3.6 displays each emotion separately for each
treatment. The horizontal axis indicates the deviation of an individual's
contribution from player i 's contribution, while the vertical axis indicates
for each emotion the intensity (ranging from 1 = "not at all" to 7 = "very
much") with which a group member felt each emotion when they saw the
contribution of the other group member.
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Figure 3.6 Emotions as a fun ction of devia tion from pl ayer i
contributions
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From the examination of each panel separately, it is worth mentioning
three interesting observations. First, subjects are feeling sadder about their
own contribution when other group members positively deviate from their
contribution (see positive slope of the function for sadness in the Give-N
and Give-P treatments in the positive deviation interval). This is an
indication that perhaps if they have been given a second chance to make a
contribution, they would have contributed more. Second, there are some
subjects displaying more contempt for others (see positive slope of the
function for contempt in the Give-P and Take-P treatments in the positive
deviation interval) when they realize that other group members have
contributed more than they did, suggesting that these subjects did not
appreciate their counterparts' good action of contributing even in a one-shot
game. Third, the slope of the function with respect to shame is almost flat in
the Take-N treatment, indicating that subjects did not feel any pressure even
if they were low contributors under this treatment. In all other cases, the
emotions' functions have the anticipated slope with respect to positive and
negative deviations. However, we have to bear in mind that in some cases
this tendency is driven by a few observations and need to be careful when
drawing conclusions.
Our main concern is with framing and for a formal statistical analysis of
whether emotions are frame sensitive, we estimate ordered probit models
where the dependent variable is each emotion separately. In these models,
all data are pooled. The inclusion of the independent variables follows
similar reasoning as for the case of the punishment function. We also
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include a dummy variable called "No-Punishment", which takes on the
value 'I' for the no-punishment treatments and '0' for the punishment
treatments, and its interaction terms with respect to absolute negative
deviation and positive deviation to test for any difference in the elicited
emotions between punishment and no-punishment treatments, for the
reasons explained in Section 3.3.2. The results are presented in Table 3.5.
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Table 35 Emotions as a fuactioa ofdeviatioas from player i's cODtributioDs- Regressiou results
DependentVariables
Warmth Anger Fear Envy Sadness Happiness Shame Irritation Contempt Guilt Joy Jealousy Surprise
Playerj's absolute -0.177··· 0.109··· -0.038 0.072·· 0.093*· -0.090** 0.069** 0.166*** 0.139*** -0.040 -0.100*** 0.085** 0.040
oegativedeviation (0.038) (0.023) (0.038) (0.032) (0.039) (0.035) (0.031) (0.033) (0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.034) (0.029)
from player i's
cODlribution
Playerj's positive 0.035 -0.060··· 0.026 -0.086* 0.012** 0.072** 0.102*** -0.064 0.031 0.121** 0.105*** -0.060 0.102***
deviation from (0.034) (0.037) (0.032) (0.049) (0.039) (0.034) (0.029) (0.041) (0.028) * (0.034) (0.043) (0.028)
playeri's (0.035)
contribution
P1ayerk's -0.009 0.004 0.029*** 0.020* -0.011 0.004 -0.004 0.015* 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.029*** 0.002
CODll'ibution (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.01\ ) (0.009)
deviation from
playeri's
contribution
-
Take -0.252 -0.249 -0.060 -0.284 -0.082 0.125 -0.149 -0.143 -0.098 -0.113 0.125 -0.\40 -0.2\9
(0.208) (0.224) (0.243) (0.244) (0.237) (0.193) (0.206) (0.187) (0.193) (0.280) (0.205) (0.263) (0.182)
Take lC Playerj's 0.030 0.051 0.058 0.065 0.012 -0.024 -0.022 0.049 0.0\2 0.032 -O.oJ8 0.063 0.053
absolutenegative (0.046) (0.041) (0.040) (0.047) (0.044) (0.036) (0.035) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042) (0.040) (0.047) (0.038)
deviationfrom
10 playeri's
- contribution
Take lC Playerj's 0.032 0.032 -0.023 0.007 -0.042 -0.033 -0.059* 0.00\ -0.010 -0.023 -0.052· -0.056 -O.oJ8
positivedeviation (0.030) (0.040) (0.037) (0.039) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.042) (0.031) (0.034) (0.027) (0.048) (0.033)
&omplayer j's
contribution
No-Punishment -0.609··· -0.022 -0.228 -0.235 0.303 -0.240 0.440** 0.222 0.513** 0.028 -0.08\ -0.364 -0.003
(0.201) (0.210) (0.250) (0.238) (0.245) (0.199) (0.213) (0.\86) (0.201) (0.294) (0.2\1) (0.254) (0.185)
No-Punishment lC 0.139··· -0.017 0.068 -0.005 -0.040 0.050 -0.045 -0.088*· -0.075· 0.0\3 0.064 -0.025 -0.003
Playerfs absolute (0.040) (0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.036)
negativedeviation
&om player j's
contribution
No-Punishment lC 0.086 -0.035 -0.046 0.061 0.059* 0.03\ -0.048 -0.027 -0.046 0.005 -0.003 -0.041** 0.063
Playerfs positive (0.031) (0.037) (0.036) (0.045) (0.036) (0.036) (0.030) (0.042) (0.032) (0.038) (0.030) (0.047) (0.035)
deviation from
player i's
contribution
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
Now: OnlBed probU estimates. Standard erron are presented in parentheses (clustered on groups). Results are correctedfor heteroskedasticity. ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and ••• at the
l-percatlnel. All""III are pookd.
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Table 3.5 indicates that the variable "Take" and its associated interaction
terms are not statistically significant for any of the elicited emotions." The
only independent variables which typically have a significant impact on
emotions (depending on whether they are positive or negative) are the
absolute negative and the positive deviation from player i 's contribution.
We therefore proceed by categorising emotions into positive and
negative ones, and using as tools the mean positive and mean negative
emotions' functions, which are aggregate measures of positive and negative
emotions, respectively, expressed as functions of other variables. Put
simply, we plot mean positive and mean negative emotions as a function of
deviations from player i's contribution. Positive emotions comprise
warmth, happiness and joy; whereas, negative emotions comprise anger,
fear, envy, sadness, shame, irritation, contempt, guilt and jealousy. To
control whether the presence of punishment opportunities has influenced
emotions, we also examine emotions for the no-punishment treatments. Our
findings are recorded in Result 3.
RESULT 3. (a) The (mean positive and mean negative) emotions' function
does not depend on framing, ceteris paribus. (b) The availability of
punishment affects the elicited mean positive emotions, ceteris paribus;
26 The only exception is shame and joy which appear to be marginally significant with
respect to the slope of the function in the positive deviation's interval.
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whereas, the elicited mean negative emotions are not affected by the
presence ofpunishm ent, ceteris paribus.
Support. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 pro vide a graphical illustration of the
positive and negative emotions' function for each of the four trea tments,
respectively. In all figures , each dot represents a single obse rvation and the
solid line indicates the fitted line of the locally we ighted regression of
emotions expressed on the deviation from the puni sher ' s contribution.
Figure 3.7 Mean positive emotions for each treatment
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Figure 3.8 Mean negative emotions for eac h treatment
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Table 3.6 provides econometric evidence for Result 3. The equations
reported in this Table include the same covariates as in Table 3.5.
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Table 3.6 The positive and negative emotions' function - Regression results
Player j's absolute negative
deviation from player i's
contribution
Dependent variable:
Mean positive
emotions
-0.139***
(0.034)
Dependent variable:
Mean negative emotions
0.131***
(0.030)
from player i's contribution
· - · P ' i ~ Y ~ ; - · k ' " ; ~ · · · ~ ~ ~ t r i b ~ t i · ~ ~ · · · · · - · · · · _ · · _ - - - -
deviation from player i's
contribution
" · - T ; k ~ · · · · · _ · " · · · · · · · · · " · · · · · · · " · · · · · · · · · " · · · · · · _ · · - - · . - . . ....__..
(0.030)
-0.001
(0.009)
-0.023
(0.194)
(0.027)
0.011
(0.010)
-0.155
(0.217)
negative deviation from player (0.038) (0.041)
i 's contribution
...................................................................................................................................-...-.-----_.._---------_.
--".-
Take x Player j 's positive -0.023 -0.022
deviation from player i's (0.028) (0.026)
contribution
.................__..._............_..............__.................................._......- .......-._--------
----No-Punishment -0.354* 0.182
(0.199) (0.1216)
..-._......._.._-_....._._--...........-.._-_._--..._----
No-Punishment> Player j's 0.091** -0.057
absolute negative deviation (0.037) (0.038)
from player t:s contribution
No-Punishmentx Player j 's 0.045 -0.005
positive deviation from player (0.029) (0.026)
i 's contribution
Observations 336 336
Notes: Ordered probit estimates. Standard errors are presented in parentheses (clustered
on groups). Results are corrected for heteroslcedasticity. •• denotes significance at the 5-
percent level, and ••• at the J-percent level. All dataarepooled.
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Examining the coefficients related to framing, it is clear that they are not
statistically different across frames, implying that the aggregate "emotions'
function" is not frame-sensitive, for either positive or negative emotions.
This strengthens our conclusion that subjects do not consider negative
deviations from their own contribution differently across frames.
Looking at the negative emotions, we observe that the coefficient on the
variable "No-Punishment" and its interaction terms are not statistically
significant in the equation reported in Table 3.6. This finding provides no
support for the idea that punishment opportunities expunge negati ve
emotional responses. However, for the positive emotions, we find that there
is a significant level difference at the lO% level and a significant slope
difference for the negative deviation interval at the 5% level.
We investigate further whether elicited emotions vary with the presence
or absence of a punishment option by estimating four ordered probit models:
two relating to the no-punishment case and two to the punishment case (in
each case, taking mean positive and mean negative emotions, separatelyj."
The rationale and interpretation of the independent variables in these models
is parallel to that described above. Our regression results indicate that the
coefficients for the dummy variable 'Take' and its interaction terms are not
statistically significant. Elicited emotions do not differ between the Give
n It would be potentially interesting to explore the correlation between punishment and
emotions, investigating whether one's own emotions affect one's own punishment assigned.
Since this is beyond the scope of our main research questions, we provide such an analysis
in Appendix B.
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and Take frames for either the no-punishment or the punishment treatment,
taken separately. The results are presented in Table 3.7.
97
Table 3.7 The positive and negative emotions' function in the absence and
presence of punishment opportunities - Regression results
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Mean positive emotions Mean negative emotions
No-Punishment Punishment No-Punishment Punishment
Player j's
absolute
negative
deviation from
-0.039
(0.041)
-0.162***
(0.043)
0.092***
(0.029)
0.104*"
(0.033)
player i's
contribution
· · · P ' i ; Y ~ ; · - T ; ; · " · · · · · " · · · · · · · ' · · · · ' · · · ' · ' ' ' · · ' · - ' · · ' · o T 4 4 ***-'-"-'-"--- 0.066-
positive
deviation from
player i's
contribution
(0.029) (0.038)
0.017
(0.021)
0.018
(0.038)
0.013
(0.014)
-0.204
(0.327)
0.097
(0.054)
0.012
(0.014)
-0.242
(0.300)
-0.000
(0.053)
0.007
(0.009)
-0.315
(0.284)
0.059
(0.057)
-0.006
(0.013)
j's absolute
negative
deviation from
Player k's
contribution
deviation from
player i's
contribution
·-·Take..·-···· · ·..·_ · · _·.._· O. 144
(0.273)
..----- _-----_.__ _ - _---
Take x Player -0.024
(0.049)
player i's
contribution
Take x Player
j 's positive
deviation from
player i's
contribution
-0.039
(0.034)
0.014
(0.045)
-0.018
(0.030)
-0.013
(0.045)
Observations 174 162 174 162
Notes: Ordered probit estimates. Standard errors are presented in parentheses (clustered
on groups). Results are corrected for heteroslcedasticity. •• denotes significance at the 5-
percent level. and ••• at the l-percent level. All dataarepooled.
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Table 3.7 suggests that, for positive emotions, in the absence of
punishment opportunities, the only significant variable is the positive
deviation from player i 's contribution when we examine positive emotions
(the more player j positively deviates from player i , the more positive
emotions player i is displaying); whereas, in the presence of punishment
opportunities, we find that the only significant variable is the absolute
negative deviation from player i's contribution (the more player j
negatively deviates from player i , the less positive emotions player i is
displaying). This can be interpreted that if player j deviates positively from
i, then player i feels positive emotions towards player j, but not if player i is
anticipating that player j might have punished him. If player j negatively
deviates from player i, then player i is not inclined to feel positive emotions
towards j, and when player i can punish, he feels positive (negative)
emotions with less (more) intensity.
When we examine negative emotions, it turns out that the mam
determinant of both positive and negative emotions is the negative deviation
from player i's contribution either in the presence or in the absence of
punishment (note that, as expected, the sign of this variable is negative for
positive emotions and positive for negative emotions). In sum, our results
imply that for negative emotions the presence of punishment makes very
little difference; whereas, for positive emotions, it makes a significant
difference. When j has deviated positively from i, i seems positively
disposed to j when no punishment opportunities are available. However.
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when j has deviated negatively from i, he tends not to be positively disposed
to j and punishment strengthen this effect.
Just as with the punishment function, we examine whether deviations
from beliefs about contributions evoke differences among treatments.
Appendix B (see Figure B.t and Table B.5) provides both graphical and
econometric analysis for each emotion separately expressed as a function of
deviations from player i's beliefs about contributions. From this analysis,
we find that there is little difference across frames for each emotion and we
thus restrict our attention to mean negative and mean positive emotions.
Result 4 records our finding.
RESULT 4. (a) Mean positive and mean negative emotions as a function of
deviations from player is beliefs about contributions do not depend on
framing, ceteris paribus. (b) The availability of punishment affects the
elicited mean positive emotions, ceteris paribus,' whereas, the elicited mean
negative emotions are affected less by the presence of punishment, ceteris
paribus.
Support. A graphical representation of the emotions' function in relation
to deviations from player i's beliefs about contributions is provided in
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 below.
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Fig ure 3.9 Me an positive emotions as a function of deviation
from player i's beliefs about contributions for eac h treatment
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Figure 3.10 Mean negative emotions as a function of deviations
from player i's beliefs about contributions for each treatment
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Econometric models reported in Table 3.8 test for any emotions'
differences across frames. It turns out that replacing deviations from
contributions with deviations from beliefs about contributions in the
emotions functions makes little qualitative difference to the results.
Table 3.8 Mean positive and negative emotions as a function of deviations from
player i's beliefs about contributions - Regression results
Dependent variable: Mean
positive emotions
Dependent variable: Mean
negative emotions
Player j 's absolute negative -0.207**· 0.134·**
(0.030)(0.043)deviation from player i 's beliefs
about contributions
.. · · P I ~ ~ ~ ; · · ' 7 ' · ; ~ · · p ~ ~ i t i ~ · ~ ~ ..d ~ ~ i ; t i · ~ · ~ · · f t ~ ; ; . . ..·..···..····......·..··....·..··------..--O.06'i""···--..··-..- ..·- ....·---· ..··........,....·...... ·---..---·--..oJ)i2"..·..·..--..----·--.... ··..·
player i 's beliefs about
contributions
(0.031) (0.028)
-0.009 0.006
(0.007) (0.011)
-0.145 0.014
(0.219) (0.217)
0.038
-0.008
(0.054) (0.043)
-0.032 -0.040
(0.032) (0.028)
-0.217 -0.039
(0.215) (0.214)
0.101** -0.064·
(0.046) (0.038)
0.044 0.006
(0.031) (0.027)
336 336
Player k 's contribution deviation
from player i's beliefs about
contributions
Take x absolute negative deviation
from player i 's beliefs about
contributions
No-Punishment
Observations
Take x positive deviation from
player i 's beliefs about
contributions
............- - - -- - ..--- -------::-"77=----
..., _ _ __.__.._-_.._.._._-.,...
Take
..........._ _ _ __ _ _ __._--_._-----------
_ _._._--,.._----_ _ _,.._ _.._ _- , _-_._- '----:-::-:-::-----
No-Punishment x absolute negative
deviation from player i 's beliefs
about contributions
"-NO-PtiOiShment ;-positive'-----·
deviation from player i 's beliefs
about contributions
Notes: Ordered probit estimates. Standard errors are presented in parentheses (clustered
on groups). Results are corrected for heteroslcedasticity. • denotes significance at the 10-
percent level, •• denotes significance at the 5-percent level, and ••• at the l-percem level.
All data are pooled.
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Econometric analysis finds no framing differences for either positive or
negative emotions, whereas the only significant variables is the absolute
negative (for both positive and negative emotions) and the positive deviation
(for positive emotions) from player i's beliefs about contributions. With
respect to the presence of punishment, our findings suggest that for positive
and for negative emotions, there does not appear to be a level difference, so
much as an interaction." In particular, in both equations the interaction
variable "No-Punishment x absolute negative deviation from player i's
beliefs about contributions" is significant (especially for the mean positive
emotions), implying that the slope of the corresponding emotions' functions
when player j negatively deviates from player i's beliefs about contributions
is affected by the availability of punishment opportunities.
3.5 Conclusions
Motivated by previous findings about altruistic behaviour in dictator
games and our evidence from moral judgments reported in Chapter 2, the
present chapter reports an investigation of the frame-sensitivity of two
indicators of negative reciprocity, an equally-important, if darker, source of
social preferences. Specifically, we study punishment and emotional
responses in a one-shot public goods game. Our findings suggest that
neither is sensitive to the Give versus Take framing manipulation we
28 As in the case of deviations from player i's contributions, a similar sort of analysis for
elicited emotions has been performed with respect to deviation from player i's beliefs
about contributions for either the no-punishment or the punishment treatment, taken
separately. These results are reported in Table 8.6 in Appendix 8.
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consider, controlling for the level of contributions. We conclude that the
main determinant of punishment is the difference between the contributions
of the punisher and the punished; and the same difference is also the main
source of emotional responses. We essentially reach the same conclusion
when we examine deviations from beliefs about contributions. In contrast to
the frame-sensitivity of moral judgments in public goods games or altruism
in dictator games, our framing has little effect on our indicators of negative
reciprocity. Interestingly, the availability of punishment affects elicited
emotions. More specifically, the presence of punishment opportunities
affects the mean positive emotions (but not the mean negative emotions)
when player j negatively deviates from player i 's contributions; whereas,
the mean positive emotions and, to a lesser extent, the mean negative
emotions are affected by the presence of punishment looking at negative
deviations from player i 's beliefs about contributions.
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Appendix A. Technical Appendix
Appendix A.I: Screenshot for eliciting emotions
[Note: The screenshot fo r elici ting self-reports on emotions is presented
below. The order ofemotions was exa ctly the same in all four treatments.]
Penod
1 outof 1
Youcannowseethenumberof tokens each member ofyourgroup hascontributed PleaseIndicate foreachemotion U'l.lnfenS1fy'tll1tn
wIllehyoufee' each emoncnwilen yousee tne contnounon oftne omarmemoers
TOken. contrlOuled Ilyyou loken.
Your Income GUlldsrs
G f f __ ' : G f ~ ~ 2 2
TOkens contnouted tokens TOkens contnbuted tokens
Income from slage 1 GUilders Income!'rom staoe 1 GUilders
nolal all ,.. r: ,.. ~ ,.. r verymueh nolal811 ,.. ~ - very muchWarmlh
Anger notat su r r r very much nolal all r r ~ , . . m u c c
Fe.. not at all rr r ~ r ,... 'l9rymuch nolal all werymuch
nolalall r: ,.. r ( rr r: very much n0181 all ,.. ~ r r m m ( hErN)'
Sadness net al all r r r ( r "'" very much nolalall ( r r very much
Happiness notal all r r r r rr r verymuCh nolal all very mUCh
Shame nol at all r r r- r: werymuch nolatall verymucn
~ r _ " i o o nolal all r r r r .... verymuch nOlat all ( .,.,.,muCh
Conlempl not at all r: r: r: r r: ,... r verymucn notat aM very much
nol at all r: r r- r very much notOIl all r r r Y8rymucnGullI
r rrrr ( ygrymuch notat all ( - very muchJqj nolat all
rrrrr( r verymuch nolalall r- r- . . r: r- - verymuctlJealousy notat all
nolat all r r r: r r r r- verymuch notit all r r: r: r r r r verymuchSwprlse
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Appendix A.2: Instructions
[Note: Instructions used for the Give and Punishment treatments.
Amendments to the Stage 1 instructions for the No Punishment treatments
are given in curly brackets, respectively.]
Instructions
You are now taking part in an economic experiment financed by the
University of Nottingham. You can earn a considerable amount of money
depending on the decisions made by you and other participants. It is
therefore very important that you read these instructions with care.
These instructions are solely for your private use. It is prohibited to
communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you have
any questions, please ask me. If you violate this rule, you will be dismissed
from the experiment and forfeit all payments.
During the experiment we will not speak in terms of Pounds, but in
Guilders. During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in
Guilders. At the end of the experiment the total amount of Guilders you
have earned will be converted to Pounds at the following rate:
I Guilder = 0.40 Pounds
At the end of the experiment your entire earnings from the experiment will
be paid to you in cash.
During the experiment, you will be asked to fill in a few questionnaires. The
answers you provide in these questionnaires are completely anonymous.
They will not be revealed to anyone either during the experiment or after it.
Furthermore, your answers to these questionnaires will not affect your
earnings during the experiment.
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants will be randomly
divided into groups of three. Apart from you, there will be two more
members in your group. You will not learn who the other people in your
group are at any point.
The experiment consists of two stages {one stage}. In the following pages
we describe the experiment in detail. At the end of this introductory
information we ask you to do several computerised control exercises which
are designed to check that you have understood the decision situation.
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Detailed Information on the Experiment
Stage 1
Each ~ a r t i c i p a n n receives an endowment of 20 tokens. At stage 1, you have
to decide how many of these 20 tokens you contribute to a group project and
how many you keep for yourself. The other two members of your group
have to make the same decision. They can also either contribute tokens to a
project or keep tokens for themselves. You and the other members of the
group can each choose any amount between 0 and 20 tokens to contribute.
Every token that you do not contribute to the project automatically
belongs to you and earns you one Guilder.
For the tokens contributed to the project the following happens: the
project's value will be multiplied by 1.5 and this amount will be divided
equally among all three members of the group. For example, if 1 token is
contributed to the project, the project's value increases to 1.5 Guilders. This
amount is divided equally among all three members of the group. Thus
every group member receives 0.5 Guilders.
Your income from the project rises by 0.5 Guilders if you contribute one
token more to the project. At the same time, the income of the other two
members of the group also rises by 0.5 tokens, because they receive the
same income from the project as you do. Therefore, if you contribute one
token more to the project, the income from the project received by the whole
group together increases by 1.5 Guilders. It is also true that your income
rises by 0.5 Guilders if another group member contributes one token more to
the project.
After all three members of the group have made their decisions about the
amounts of tokens they contribute to the project the total income achieved
by each participant is determined.
How is your income calculated from your decision?
The income of every member of the group is calculated in the same way. As
you can see, your income consists of two parts:
(1) The tokens which you have kept for yourself (' income from tokens
kept') whereby 1 token = 1 Guilder.
(2) The 'income from the project' calculated as follows: Your income from
the project = 0.5 times sum of all tokens contributed to the project by
members of your group.
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Your total income in Guilders at stage 1 of the experiment is therefore:
(20 - tokens contributed to the project by you) + O.5*(sum of all tokens
contributed to the project by members of your group)
If you do not contribute anything to the project the income from tokens kept
is 20. If you contribute for instance 7 tokens to the project your income from
tokens kept is 13. At the same time, the total sum of tokens contributed to
the project increases and so does your 'income from the project'.
In order to explain the income calculation we give some examples.
Please read them carefully:
Example 1:
If each of the three members of the group contributes 0 tokens to the project,
all three will receive an 'income from tokens kept' of 20. Nobody receives
anything from the project, because no one contributed anything. Therefore
the total income of every member of the group is 20 tokens.
Calculation of the income from stage 1 for every participant: (20-0) + 0.5 *
(0) = 20
Example 2:
If each of the three members of the group contributes 20 tokens, there will
be a total of 60 tokens contributed to the project. The 'income of tokens
kept' is 0 for everyone, but each member receives an income from the
project of 0.5 * 60 = 30 tokens.
Calculation of the income from stage 1 for every participant: (20-20) + 0.5
* (60) = 30
Example 3:
If you contribute 20 tokens, the second member 10 tokens and the third 0
tokens, the following incomes are calculated.
Because you and the second member of the group have together
contributed 30 tokens, everyone will receive 0.5 * 30 = 15 Guilders
from the project.
You contributed all your 20 tokens to the project. You will therefore
receive 15 Guilders in total from the project.
The second member of the group also receives 15 Guilders from the
project. In addition, he receives 10 Guilders as the 'income from
tokens kept', because he contributed 10 tokens to the project. Thus,
he receives 15 + 10 = 25 Guilders altogether.
The third member of the group, who did not contribute anything,
also receives the 15 Guilders from the project and additionally the 20
Guilders from the 'income from tokens kept', which means 20 + 15
= 35.
Calculation ofyour income from stage 1: (20-20) + 0.5 * (30) = 15
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Calculation ofthe income from stage 1f or the 2nd gro up member: (20-10) T
0.5 * (30) = 25
Calculation of the income from stage 1 for the 3rd group member: (20-0) -
0.5 * (30) = 35
Example 4:
The other two members of your gro up contribute 20 tokens each to the
project. You do not contribute an ything. In th is case the income will be
calculated as follows :
Calculation ofyour incomefrom stage 1: (20-0) + 0.5 * (40) = 40
Calculation of the income from stage 1for the 2nd group member: (20-20) +
0.5 * (40) = 20
Calculation of the income from stage 1f or the 3rd group member: (20-20) +
0.5 * (40) = 20
When making your decision, the following input-screen will appear:
PeJlod
lout of I
Your endowment 10
Howmany tokens doyou want 10 c o n ~ l b u t e e 1__
HELP
Please nil InlIleamount onokens (between 0and 10)you want tocontribute 10 lIleproject
When you areready, pleasepress lIle·OK'·butlon.
A mentioned above your endov ment in the experiment i 20 token .
You ha e to decide how many token you contribute to the project by typing
a number bet' een 0 and 20 in th input field . Thi fie ld can b r ached by
cli cking it \ ith th mou e. 8 d cid ing how many tok n to ontribut to
th project . ou automa tica ll d id ho man tok n you k p for
urs "If. ft r nt ring th am unt of tok ns you co ntribut 11 mu t pr
10
the O.K. button using the mouse. Once you have done thi , your deci IOn
can no longer be revised .
After that, you will be informed about the amount of tokens you contributed
to the project, the sum of tokens contributed to the proj ect and your total
income in this stage.
Penod
1 out 01 1
Tokens contnDuted byyOu
Sum enoxens conlnDuted
Your Income from lokenskepi
Your Income ~ o o theproject
Your Iotallncome III tIllsstage
conllnue
HELP
You can Inspect theresuliS ofthisslage
WIlen yOu ara ready, pleasepress the "Conllnue'·Dullon
Stage 1 is now over and stage 2 commences,
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Stage 2
At this stage, you will see how many tokens each of the other two group
members has contributed to the project and his or her corresponding income
~ r o o stage 1. Moreover, you can either decrease or leave unchanged the
income of each other group member by assigning deduction points to them.
The ot.her ~ o u u members can also decrease your income, by assigning
deduction points to you, if they wish to do so.
You will see the following input screen at stage 2:
Pellod
, oulof 1
Tokens contributed
Income from slage1
Your decisionInstage2
Assignnopok.s: 0
"""un dettJctlOl1 polllls:negalM! ""nM
Costs of d d d u c ~ o n pomts dlslnbuted byrou -
OK
HELP
Pleaseinsert ~ u r decrsien Nolethe sign o f f u r distribubon ofpOints.Then pressthe'Calculahon"·butlon
\'Illenrouarereadt.pleasepress the ·OK"·bunon
You must now decide how many deduction points to assign to each of the
other two group members. In the first column you can see your contribution
and your income from stage 1. In the other two columns, you can see the
same information for each of the other two members of the group.
If you do not wish to change the income of a pecific group member then
enter 0 in th large box for that group member. If you do wi h to reduce a
group member' income, nter in tead the number of deduction point that
you wi h to a ign to them prec ded by minu ign (\ ithout pac bet en
them) . For e ample to assign 2 deduction point to a group m mber type -
in th r I ant bo . You an mo from on input fi Id to th th r b
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pressing the tab -key ( ~ I I or by using the mouse. You must enter a
response in each large box.
You can assign between 0 and 5 deduction points to each other group
member.
For each deduction point that you assign, there is a cost to yOU of one
Guilder. Thus, the total cost to you in Guilders of assigning deduction
points to other group members is given by the total number of deduction
points that you assign. You can check the total cost on the computer, by
pressing the 'Calculation' button after you have assigned deduction points.
Until you press the OK-button, you can still change your decision. To
recalculate the costs after making a change, simply press the cost calculation
button again.
The effects of assigning deduction points to other group members are as
follows: If you give 0 points to a particular group member, you will not
have any effect on his or her income. However, for each deduction point
that you assign to a particular group member, you will decrease their
income by 2 Guilders (unless their income is already exhausted). For
example, if you give a group member 2 deduction points (i.e., enter -2), you
will decrease their income by 4 Guilders. And so on.
Your own income will be reduced by 2 Guilders for each deduction
point that is assigned to you by the other two group members, except
that, if all of your income from the first stage is exhausted as a result of
deduction points, your income cannot be reduced any further by other group
members. Therefore, your total income from the two stages is calculated as
follows:
Total income (in Guilders) after stage 2
= income from stage 1 (1)
- 2*(sum of deduction points assigned to you) (2)
- costs of deduction points assigned by you
if (1) + (2) is greater than or equal to 0;
= 0 - costs of deduction points assigned by you
if(l) + (2) is less than 0
Please note that your income in Guilders after stage 2 can be negative. if the
cost of deduction points assigned by you exceeds your income from stage 1
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less any reduction in your income caused by deduction points assigned to
you by other group members.
However, at the end of the experiment and in addition to the calculation just
given, you and the other members of your group will each receive a lump
sum payment of 10 Guilders. This payment is enough to cover any losses
that you could incur.
Do you have any questions?
Control Questionnaire
1. Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose that
nobody (including yourself) contributes any token to the project. What is:
Your income? .
The income of the other group members? ..
2. Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose that you
contribute 20 tokens to the project. All other group members each contribute
20 tokens to the project. What is:
Your income? ..
The income of the other group members? .
3. Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose that the
other two group members contribute together a total of 30 tokens to the
project.
a) What is your income if you contribute 0 tokens to the project? .
b) What is your income if you contribute 4 tokens to the project? .
4. Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. Suppose that you
contribute 8 tokens to the project.
a) What is your income if the other group members together contribute a
total of 14 tokens to the project? .
b) What is your income if the other group members together contribute a
h .?total of 22 tokens to t e project. .
5. At the second stage you distribute the following deduction points to the
other two other group members: -2,-4. What are the total costs of your
distributed deduction points? .
6. What are your costs if you distribute a total of 0 points? .
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y. By h o o many Guilders will your income from the first stage be changed
If you receive a total of 0 deduction points from the other group
members? .
~ ~ By h o o many Guilders will your income from the first stage be changed
If you receive a total of 4 deduction points from the other group
members? .
[Note: Instructions used for the Take and Punishment treatments.
Amendments to the Stage 1 instructions for the No Punishment treatments
are given in curly brackets, respectively.}
Instructions
You are now taking part in an economic experiment financed by the
University of Nottingham. You can earn a considerable amount of money
depending on the decisions made by you and other participants. It is
therefore very important that you read these instructions with care.
These instructions are solely for your private use. It is prohibited to
communicate with other participants during the experiment. If you have
any questions, please ask me. If you violate this rule, you will be dismissed
from the experiment and forfeit all payments.
During the experiment we will not speak in terms of Pounds, but in
Guilders. During the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in
Guilders. At the end of the experiment the total amount of Guilders you
have earned will be converted to Pounds at the following rate:
I Guilder = 0.40 Pounds
At the end of the experiment your entire earnings from the experiment will
be paid to you in cash.
During the experiment, you will be asked to fill in a few questionnaires. The
answers you provide in these questionnaires are completely anonymous.
They will not be revealed to anyone either during the experiment or
thereafter. Furthermore, your answers to these questionnaires will not affect
your earnings during the experiment.
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants will be randomly
divided into groups of three. Apart from you, there will be two more
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members in your group. You will not learn who the other people in your
group are at any point. .
The e x p e ~ i m e n n consists of two stages {one stage}. In the following pages
:,e d e s c ~ b b the experiment in detail. At the end of this introductory
information we ask you to do several computerised control exercises which
are designed to check that you have understood the decision situation.
Detailed Information on the Experiment
Stage 1
There are 60 tokens in a project for your group. You have to decide how
many of these 60 tokens you withdraw from the project for yourself and
how many of them you leave in the project. Each participant can withdraw
up to 20 tokens from the project. The other two members of your group have
to make the same decision. They can also either withdraw tokens from the
project for themselves or leave tokens in the project. You and the other
members of the group can each choose any amount between 0 and 20 tokens
to withdraw.
Every token that you withdraw from the project for yourself
automatically belongs to you and earns you one Guilder.
For the tokens that are not withdrawn from the project the following
happens: the project's value will be multiplied by 1.5 and this amount
will be divided equally among all three members of the group. For
example, if I token is not withdrawn from the project, the project's value
increases to 1.5 Guilders. This amount is divided equally among all three
members of the group. Thus every group member receives 0.5 Guilders.
Your income from the project rises by 0.5 Guilders if you withdraw one
token less from the project. At the same time, the income of the other two
members of the group also rises by 0.5 tokens, because they receive the
same income from the project as you do. Therefore, if you withdraw one
token less from the project, the income from the project received by the
whole group together increases by 1.5 Guilders. It is also true that your
income rises by 0.5 Guilders if another group member withdraws one token
less from the project.
After all three members of the group have made their decisions about the
amounts they withdraw from the project the total income achieved by each
participant is determined.
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How is your income calculated from your decision?
The income of every member of the group is calculated in the same wav. As
you can see, your income consists of two parts: -
(1) The tokens which you have withdrawn for yourself ('income from
tokens withdrawn') whereby 1 token = 1 Guilder.
(2) The 'income from the project' calculated as follows: Your income from
the project = 0.5 times (60 - sum of all tokens withdrawn from the
project by members of your group)
Your total income in Guilders at stage 1 of the experiment is therefore:
(Tokens withdrawn from the project by you) + 0.5*(60 - sum of all
tokens withdrawn from the project by members of your group)
If you withdraw all 20 tokens from the project the income from tokens
withdrawn is 20. If you leave for instance 7 tokens in the project your
income from tokens withdrawn is 13. At the same time, the total sum of
tokens left in the project increases and so does your 'income from the
project' .
In order to explain the income calculation we give some examples.
Please read them carefully:
Example 1:
If each of the three members of the group withdraws 20 tokens from the
project, all three will receive an 'income from tokens withdrawn' of 20.
Nobody receives anything from the project, because no one left anything.
Therefore the total income of every member of the group is 20 tokens.
Calculation of the income from stage 1 for every participant: (20) + 0.5 *
(60-60) = 20
Example 2:
If each of the three members of the group withdraws 0 tokens, there will be
a total of 60 tokens left in the project. The 'income of tokens withdrawn' is
o for everyone, but each member receives an income from the project of 0.5
* 60 = 30 tokens.
Calculation of the income from stage 1 for eve,)' participant: (0) + 0.5 *
(60-0) = 30
Example 3:
If you withdraw 0 tokens, the second member 10 tokens and the third 20
tokens, the following incomes are calculated.
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Because the second and the third member of the group have together
withdrawn 30 tokens, everyone will receive 0.5 * 30 = 15 Guilders
from the project.
You withdrew 0 tokens from the project. You will therefore recei ve
15 Guilders in total from the project.
The second member of the group also receives 15 Guilders from the
project. In addition, he receives 10 Guilders as the .income from
tokens withdrawn', because he withdrew 10 tokens from the project.
Thus, he receives 15 + 10= 25 Guilders altogether.
The third member of the group, who withdrew all tokens, also
receives the 15 Guilders from the project and additionally the 20
Guilders from the 'income from tokens withdrawn', which means 20
+ 15 = 35.
Calculation ofyour incomefrom stage 1: (0) + 0.5 * (60-30) = 15
Calculation ofthe income from stage 1for the 2nd group member: (10) + 0.5
* (60-30) = 25
Calculation ofthe income from stage 1for the 3rdgroup member: (20) + 0.5
* (60-30) = 35
Example 4:
The other two members of your group withdraw 0 tokens each from the
project. You withdraw all tokens. In this case the income will be calculated
as follows:
Calculation ofyour incomefrom stage 1: (20) + 0.5 * (60-20) = 40
Calculation of the income from stage 1 for the 2nd group member: (0) + 0.5
* (60-20) = 20
Calculation of the income from stage 1 for the r' group member: (0) + 0.5
* (60-20) = 20
When making your decision, the following input-screen will appear:
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Penod
1 OUlol 1
There are60tokens In aprolectfor your group
Howmany tokens doyou wanttoWIthdraw? Ic---
HELP
Pleasefill Intileamount oftokens (belWeen 0and20) youwanttoWltIldraw ~ o o Illeprolect
\'illenyou are ready, please press tile·OK"·buUon.
As mentioned above, there are 60 tokens in a proj ect for your gro up. You
have to decide how many of these 60 tokens you withdraw from the project
by typing a number between 0 and 20 in the input field . Thi s field can be
reached by clicking it with the mouse . By deciding how man y tokens to
withdraw from the project, you automatically decide how many tokens you
leave in the project. After entering the amount of tokens you withdraw you
must press the O.K. button using the mouse. Once you have do ne this, your
decision can no longer be revised.
After all participants have made their deci sions, your total incom e will be
displayed on the following screen:
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1 outO! 1
Tokens ..11Mrawn by you
SumOfIOkens ..11Mrawn
Your Income fromIOkens ..11Mrawn
Your IncomefromlIle prolecl
Your total Income
HELP
You can,"spetlllle results otnus period
Whenyou are ready, please press lIle "ConUnue"·bunon
Stage 1 is now over and stage 2 commences.
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Stage 2
At thi s stage, yo,u will see how man y tok ens each of the other two group
~ e m m e e s has withdrawn from the project and his or her corre ponding
mcome from stage 1. Moreover , you can either decrease or lea ve
u n ~ h a n g e e the income of each other group member by assigning deduction
pomts. to. them. The other group members can also decrease your income.
by assigrung deduction points to you , if they wish to do so.
You will see the following input screen at stage 2:
Period
1 oul of 1
Tokenswrthdrawn
Income ~ o o stage1
YOUIcensien Inslage2
AssIgnno poInfs: a
AsSllllldllWction IJOl'lts: IleQdlMl nulnWl
Costs of deducbon POints d l s ~ l b u 1 e e byyou -
011
HELP
Please Insertyour dension NotethesignofyourdlSlnbu1lon of pOints Then press lIle"Cakulabon'-bu1lOl1
WIlen you areready, pleasepress the·OK'·bunon.
You must now decide how many deduction points to assign to each of the
other two group members. In the fir t column you can see your withdrawal
and your income from stage 1. In the other two columns, you can cc the
same information for each of the other two member of the group.
If you do not wi h to change the income of a pecific group member then
nt r 0 in the large box for that group member. If you do i h to redu ce a
group member' income. enter in tead the number of deduction point that
you wi h to a ign to them. pr ceded by minu ign without pace b tw en
th m) . For ample to a sign 2 deduction point to a group m ernb r typ -
in the r I ant bo . You can move from on input fi Id to th th r b
1 0
pressing the tab -key (--; I) or by usmg the mouse. You must enter a
response in each large box.
You can assign between 0 and 5 deduction points to each other group
member.
For each deduction point that you assign, there is a cost to you of one
Guilder. Thus, the total cost to you in Guilders of assigning deduction
points to other group members is given by the total number of deduction
points that you assign. You can check the total cost on the computer, by
pressing the 'Calculation' button after you have assigned deduction points.
Until you press the OK-button, you can still change your decision. To
recalculate the costs after making a change, simply press the cost calculation
button again.
The effects of assigning deduction points to other group members are as
follows: If you give 0 points to a particular group member, you wiIl not
have any effect on his or her income. However, for each deduction point
that you assign to a particular group member, you will decrease their
income by 2 Guilders (unless their income is already exhausted). For
example, if you give a group member 2 deduction points (i.e., enter -2), you
will decrease their income by 4 Guilders. And so on.
Your own income will be reduced by 2 Guilders for each deduction
point that is assigned to you by the other two group members, except
that, if all of your income from the first stage is exhausted as a result of
deduction points, your income cannot be reduced any further by other group
members. Therefore, your total income from the two stages is calculated as
follows:
Total income (in Guilders) after stage 2
= income from stage I (1)
- 2*(sum of deduction points assigned to you) (2)
- costs of deduction points assigned by you
if (I) + (2) is greater than or equal to 0;
= 0 - costs of deduction points assigned by you
if (1) + (2) is less than 0
Please note that your income in Guilders after stage 2 can be negative, if the
cost of deduction points assigned by you exceeds your income from stage 1
less any reduction in your income caused by deduction points assigned to
you by other group members.
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~ o w e v e r r at the end of the experiment and in addition to the calculation just
given, you and the other members of your group will each receive a lump
sum payment of 10 Guilders. This payment is enough to cover any losses
that you could incur.
Do you have any questions?
Control Questionnaire
1. There are 60 tokens in a project of your group. Suppose that everyone
(including yourself) withdraws 20 tokens from the project. What is:
Your income from the first stage? .
The income of the other group members? .
2. There are 60 tokens in a project of your group. Suppose that you
withdraw 0 tokens from the project. All other group members each
withdraw 0 tokens to the project. What is:
Your income from the first stage? .
The income of the other group members? ..
3. There are 60 tokens in a project of your group. Suppose that the other
two group members withdraw together a total of 10 tokens from the project.
a) What is your income from the first stage if you withdraw 20 tokens
from the proj ect at the first stage? ..
b) What is your income from the first stage if you withdraw 16 tokens
from the project at the first stage? ..
4. There are 60 tokens in a project of your group. Suppose that you
withdraw 12 points from the project.
a) What is your income from the first stage if the other two group
members together withdraw a total of26 tokens from the project? .
b) What is your income from the first stage if the other group members
together withdraw a total of 18 tokens from the project? .
5. At the second stage you distribute the following deduction points to the
other two group members: -2,-4. What are the total costs of your distributed
d . .?eduction points ..
6. What are your costs if you distribute a total of 0 points? ..
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7. By how many Guilders will your income from the first stage be changed
if you receive a total of 0 deduction points from the other group
members? ..
8. By how many Guilders will your income from the first stage be changed
if you receive a total of 4 deduction points from the other two group
members? .
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Appendix B. Data Analysis
Table B.1. Standard deviations for contributions and beliefs about
contributions for the Give-N treatment
Groups Standard deviation for Standard deviation for
contributions beliefs about
contributions
1
.............................................._ _.._ _ __ - - .
2
10
5.774
10
··..·..··..·..·..····..··..·..·······················3..··..··· - ·'·'-·-1':155--- -..-.·.- - ·.- -.- -..--- ---2. iss----- ·-..-·- ·.. --..
···························..········-····4..····················..-······················-··----·--I-i:547--·---·-----·-···-··-..·-···-·-·6.658 ----..-.-----..
..... ·..·······..····5..·········..········· ·-··.. · · · · - - - - - · - · - · - i ~ i 5 5 - - - .._---..--· -..--·..·····..··..·····-·-··-·-r732 ----.---.-..- -
..................................................(5 ········..·············..·······-·····..··-····..--·--2·.887--··_-·--..·..·---···-···········-······__···..·_·8-.520--..---.-..- - .
5.204o7
........._ _ _._ _ _..-•.._ _-_._--
..···..·········..·························8..····•····..·· -.- -'2:887-·--···-···-------- 3.464----·
·---····-·..-·-···..--·····-9·-··-·······-···..··-····..··-·-..-·····-·------2.887--------- 2.309
.._-_ _--_._----_ _ .- .
10 0.577 1.732
.._-_ _-_ __.._--_.._------_ ...
11 4.619 5.204
2.5
._-----------.__.._ - - _ . _ - - - - - - - - - - : : ~ - - -
12 2.887
13 6.807 6.538
14 9.019 3.329
Table B.2. Standard deviations for contributions and beliefs about
contributions for the Take-N treatment
Groups Standard deviation for Standard deviation for
contributions beliefs about
3.775
2.887
10.408
contributions
._-_.__.._-._._----...
o
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2
3
._ _-_ _.._-_._---_ _._-----_ _--.._-
.........._.•_ __ _-----.._.._.._-.-.._..-._ -._........•._-_._-
...........•......•_ _ _.....•- _ _ _-----
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..··....·········..····-···..·········..····5..·········..·····-··..·········..··-···-·-···--·-----4.0M---------·· 2.291
5.7746
..............................................._ __._..-..__._-
2.309
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..···..·-······..···-····..·····-··..···9·········-···········-······-..·-······..·-···.... · - - - - · 6 6 ..110 6.614
..·························..·············1'0·················..··········..·········..··-·--_·-·--10.408··---·------·---.. 7.211
.........................................1'1" - ········..··················----··-..·-···2.887 .__._---._----
o
.- -- -.1'2' - ·········..········-·······---·--·TCoTS----------8.660- -.- - ---- ..
----·-------13"'··--·--..-·..··-..·-·····..··----· 4.583 4.481
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·---··--·----1·5-··--..--··--·--··..· .
4.619
2.887
2.887
2.646
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Table B.3. Standard deviations for contributions and beliefs about
contributions for the Give-P treatment
Groups Standard deviation for Standard deviation for
1
2
3
contributions
5.774
3.512
beliefs about
contributions
5.074
2.517
1.443
···..· ·..·..·..·· ·..·..·..·..· ··········..4 ·····..· · - -.- -·..·-.-·5-.-..·--·.·..·.·.··-..·..·..· ···--··..-- ---·----':f.464--'-"'''-''''''''''·'·'·'_·''''''-'
5 3.512
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o
.......................................................................................................- - - ------..----·----··--------7 006----·---·--·
7 2.887 .
················..·········..·········..····8..·········..· -----.-7.767-----·-----..· 3.215
............................................'9 ·····-..·········..·············-······--·-··--·----i 0.287
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11
12
1
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14 7.937
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3.969
Table B.4. Standard deviations for contributions and beliefs about
contributions for the Take-P treatment
Groups Standard deviation for Standard deviation for
contributions beliefs about
contributions
1 o 2.5
.........................._ _ ___.._ _._ _--------
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Figure B.t: Emotions as a function of deviations from player i' be lief
about contributions
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Table B.5. Emotions as a function of deviations from player j's beliefs about contributions - Regression results
DependentVariables
Warmth Anger Fear Envy Sadness Happines Shame Irritation Contem Guilt Joy Jealousy Surprise
-DL.____________._______
- - - - - - - - - ~ - ~ ~
Playerj's absolute -0.217··· 0.120··· -0.079·· 0.107** 0.114*** -0.150*** 0.048 0.220*** 0.147** -0.116** -0.176*** 0.118*** 0.074***
negativedeviation from (0.044) (0.026) (0.037) * (0.040) (0.037) (0.035) (0.034) * (0.055) (0.048) (0.037) (0.028)
player i's beliefsabout (0.034) (0.037)
contributions
---------------_._---_.__._--------_._-.-._---_.
Player j's positive 0.040 -0.044 -0.003 -0.041 0.013 0.050*** 0.083** -0.035 0.032 0.088*** 0.062** -0.040 0.113***
deviation fiom player i's (0.040) (0.039) (0.027) (0.044) (0.031) (0.031) * (0.039) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032) (0.038) (0.030)
beliefs aboutcontributions (0.029)
----_._------_._-------_._-..,--..__._------_.._--_._..--_....
Player t's cootribution -0.016* 0.007 0.022** 0.017 -0.025** -0.005 -0.002 0.015 0.009 -0.007 -0.004 0.028** -0.004
deviation from playeri's (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009)
beliefsabout contribution
,_._.__.._____,.___.__.__._.______.M._...........______________.______.__._
Take -0.315 -0.057 -0.217 -0.008 0.214 0.053 -0.122 0.063 0.063 -0.218 -0.047 0.034 -0.140
(0.221) (0.224) (0.253) (0.232) (0.247) (0.212) (0.218) (0.215) (0.225) (0.301) (0.221) (0.234) (0.201)
._-______00______-_.
-._._.__...-_.__.-_.._-_._-_...._..._._,......__ .._............ ~ - - - - - - - - . - - - - - ...-.---.--.-.---.---.-.
-
Take )( Playerj's absolute 0.072 0.018 0.085* 0.028 -0.030 -0.002 -0.044 0.014 -0.019 0.054 0.014 0.037 0.039~
0 negativedeviationfrom (O.OSS) (0.041) (0.042) (0.OS2) (0.043) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.047) (0.045) (0.043)
playeri's beliefsabout
contributions
,____•___.___._.___.__•__..____ .•..• ~ ..._.__ ~ .._...~ ~ __._._,.____._____.._.·.n..".__....._.... ~ . . ...· · ~ ~ ..· ~ ~
Take )(Playerj's positive 0.011 0.017 -0.022 -0.036 -0.087*** -0.047 -0.052* -0.009 -0.018 -0.020 -0.043 -0.072 -0.023
deviationfrom player i's (0.038) (0.042) (0.039) (0.048) (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.041) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.046) (0.036)
aboutcontributions
.._-_._--------
._----_...__ . ~ ~ __._.-_._--_._-,_._......_._.._...__ ._.._ . _ . . ....-.-._.._-_._--_._-_ ......._.-......._._._._..._... ~ . _ . _ . ~ ~
No-Punishment -0.300 -0.168 -0.201 -0.152 0.218 -O.1S4 0.190 0.094 0.301 -0.015 -0.147 -0.378 -0.054
(0.225) (0.221) (0.255) (0.224) (0.247) (0.211) (0.217) (0.213) (0.226) (0.304) (0.220) (0.238) (0.198)
_ . ~ - - _ . _ - _ . - - - - _ . _ . _ - - - - - _ . . ..... ~ . _ . _ _ .._._._._ .........._..-_..._._---_._-_._...•-._ ..__.._ . _ . . ..._ ~ . ~ . . ... ~
No-Punishment )( Player 0.10S** -0.026 0.061 -0.045 -0.056 0.072* -0.002 -0.113*** -0.065 0.059 0.109** -0.055 -0.023
j's absolutenegative (0.047) (0.034) (0.044) (0.045) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) (0.054) (0.050) (0.045) (0.038)
deviationfrom player i's
beliefsabout contributions
._--_._-_.--------------_._.__.__._.__._.__._._-------_..~ . ~ - - ........_. __ ._,_..-.-._... ~
No-Punishment )( Player 0.060 -0.027 -0.070** -0.031 0.067 0.029 -0.023 -0.033 -0.026 0.014 0.022 0.036 0.086
j's positivedeviationfrom (0.038) (0.042) (0.03S) (0.046) (0.032) (0.034) (0.030) (0.041) (0.030) (0.034) (0.1032) (0.044) (0.036)
player i'sabout
contributions
._--_._--_.__ . _ - - ..__._.-
Observations 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336 336
NtJIG: 0rtJ..Jprobil utimllla. StIlIIdturJ errors are presented in parentheses (clustered on groups). Results are corrected for heteroskedasticity. .. denotes significance at the 5-perunt level. and ••* at the
I I lewl. AU data are pooled.
Table B.6. Mean positive and negative emotions as a function of deviations from
player i's beliefs about contributions in the absence and presence of punishment
options - Regression results
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Mean positive emotions Mean negative emotions
No-Punishment Punishment No- Punishment
Punishment
Player j's
-0.103**
-0.212*** 0.072** 0.120***
absolute negative (0.053) (0.047) (0.036) (0.032)
deviation from
player i's
contribution
..__........__..._.......-......_.__....__....... _ - ~ ~
Player j's 0.128*** 0.032 0.021 0.018
positive deviation (0.029) (0.036) (0.025) (0.040)
from player i's
contribution
•• ..... , .......................n ...... ~ .................._ ...... , ................._.__..
_........._.-._.._.._._-_._---
_._._.__._._._.. _ _ .._--_.- .._._.-.__ ._..-.
Player k :» -0.016** 0.003 0.004 0.010
contribution (0.007) (0.010) (0.014) (0.017)
deviation from
player i's
contribution
...................._......................_-_..-................_.
Take 0.130 -0.485 -0.220 0.078
(0.287) (0.329) (0.314) (0.313)
.............,................................................................
--------_..- ._------Take x Player 0.024 0.060 0.004 0.060
j's absolute (0.068) (0.063) (0.054) (0.060)
negative
deviation from
player i's
contribution
Take x Player -0.074·· 0.021 -0.030 -0.036
j 's positive (0.036) (0.050) (0.032) (0.047)
deviation from
player i's
contribution
Observations 174 162 174 162
Notes: Ordered probit estimates. Standard errors are presented in parentheses (clustered
on groups). Results are corrected for heteroskedasticity. • * denotes significance at the 5-
percent level. and *•• at the I-percellt level. All data are pooled.
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Correlation between punishment and emotions
In the analysis provided earlier in the main text, both punishment and
emotions are treated as separate indicators to measure the frame sensitivity
of negative reciprocity. However, it is likely that these two notions are
interdependent, in the sense that one's own emotions may affect one's own
punishment assigned. The aim of this appendix is to investigate the
correlation between punishment and emotions, as emotions could be an
important determinant of how punishment is assigned. It is worth noting that
investigating the correlation between punishment and emotions does of
course not establish any causation (which is beyond the scope of this
. d 1') 29expenment an ana YSIS .
A graphical representation of the relationship between punishment
points assigned and each emotion separately is given in Figures B.3.1a and
B.3.1 b for the Give-P and the Take-P treatments, respectively. In these
figures, we depict punishment points assigned by player i to player j as a
function of each emotion separately (mean positive and mean negative
emotions defined earlier are also shown) for the punishment treatments.
Circles represent combinations of punishment points and emotions, with the
size of the circles being proportional to the number of observations.
2'1 As earlier analysis suggests the causation could go the other way for the case of positive
emotions.
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Figure B.2. Relationsh ip between punishment and emotion - Give-P
treatment
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Figure 8.3. Relationship between punishment and emotions - Take-P
treatment
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At the 5% level, the Spearman correlation coefficients indicate that in
the Give-P only guilt (p = -0.238 ; p-value = 0.030) is significa ntly correl ated
with the punishment points assigned; whereas, in the Take-P fear (p = 0.276;
p-value = 0.015) and surprise (p = 0.232; p-value = 0.041 ) are sign ificantly
correlated (at the same conventional level ).
However, these correlation coefficients do not distingui sh between
punishers and non-punishers . From a visual inspection of the panels above,
we observe that only some subjects actually decide to punish , with the va t
majority of them choosing to refrain from punishment. Hence, it could be
the ca e that the process determining whether to puni h or not and, gi en
that a ubj ect puni he the proce det ermining hov mu ch to pun i h may b
differ nt. th refor model th e two proce di fl er ntl y. or
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specifically, to examine the correlation between punishment and emotions,
we estimate a hurdle model. The idea underlying the hurdle formulations is
that a binomial probability model governs the decision of whether to punish
or not. If the realization is positive, the "hurdle is crossed", and the
conditional likelihood of those who punish is governed by a truncated model
(see McDowell, 2003). Our regression results are presented in Table 8.3.1.
The model corresponding to the punishment decision estimates the
likelihood that an individual will punish by using a Probit model, where the
dependent variable is equal to 1 if a given subject has assigned punishment
points and 0 otherwise. The model corresponding to the punishment level
estimates the conditional likelihood of an individual who actually punishes
and examine whether his punishment decision is explained by his emotions
using as an estimation method a truncated regression. The reason we use a
truncated regression is that in this analysis the observations of those who
decided to assign zero punishment points are not included. In both models
(for the punishment decision and the punishment level), the only
independent variable included is the emotion expressed, with each line
representing a different regression.
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Table B.7. Relationship between punishment assigned and emotions
across frames - Regression Results
Give-P Take-P
Punishment decision Punishment level Punishment decision Punishment level
Warmth
Anger
Fear
Envy
-0.139**
(0.057)
0.370*
(0.190)
-0.038
(0.044) (0.121)
· - · · · ~ o : o 4 i · · * · - - - · - - - - - - ' · · - - - · · · " · · - · ~ 0 . 0 0 3
0.003
(0.029)
0.027
(0.023)
0.045*
(0.024)
. _ - - - - - ~ . _ - - - _ . _ - - -
0.029
(0.027) (0.259)
Sadness ---·····O·j33T··------·---0.452*** --"'--"-
(0.025) (0.120)
(0.014)
0.377
(0.414)
-0.106
(0.372)
-0.541**
(0.261)
0.009
(0.328)
(0.027)
0.035
(0.025)
0.029
(0.020)
(0.176)
-0.000
(0.244)
0.268
(0.165)
-0.065**
Happiness
Irritation
Shame
- - = ~ - - - - ..._._...._..._----
Contempt
Guilt -0.096**
0.389***
(0.119)
0.179
(0.145)
0.030
(0.019)
-0.019
(0.026)
-0.076
(0.350)
-1.294**
(0.576)
Joy -0.295*** 0.023
(0.024)
-0.215
(0.340)
-0.314
(0.327)
0.360
(0.351)
-0.072
(0.388)
0.026
(0.026)
0.038*
(0.019)
0.014
(0.031)
-0.336*··
(0.119)
-----------------------------
-0.041*
(0.022)
Surprise
Jealousy
Mean positive
emotions
Mean negative
emotions
-0.011
(0.033)
0.589·
(0.356)
0.049
(0.037)
-0.245
(0.488)
Notes: Hurdle model estimates. Punishment decision is estimated using a Probit
specification and punishment level is estimated using a truncated regression. Standard
errors are presented in parentheses (clustered on groups). Results are corrected for
heteroskedasticity. • denotes significance at the ltl-percent level, *. denotes significanceat
the 5-percent level, and ••• at the l-percem level.
139
Two interesting observations emerge from Table B.3.1. First, the
regression coefficients from the first model (punishment decision) suggest
that in the Give-P treatment, it is less likely for a subject to punish the more
shameful, guilty and happy he is. The likelihood to punish is marginally
significant (p = 0.096) and negatively correlated with those subjects who
feel envy. On the other hand, looking at the Take-P treatment, we find that
the likelihood to punish or not is weakly affected by fear and surprise
(which is classified as a neutral emotion). Second, Table B.3.1 indicates
that, once a subject decides to punish, his decision is also correlated with
different emotions between Give-P and Take-P. More specifically, regarding
the Give-P treatment, the higher the intensity of the sanction, the less intense
all positive emotions (namely, warmth, happiness and joy) are and the more
intense the emotions of anger, sadness and contempt are. However,
regarding the Take-P treatment, we observe that only shame and guilt are
negatively correlated with the decision of how much to punish (the more
shameful and guilty a subject is, the less punishment points he is willing to
assign).
Our main conclusions can be summarised as follows. First, the emotions
that affect punishment seem to be different across frames. Second, for a
given frame, the decision of whether to punish or not and the decision of
how much to punish seem to be driven by different emotions.
140
Chapter 4
The behavioural consequences of
unfair punishment
4.1 Introduction
A central theme in the experimental literature is the examination of the
ability of punishment to sustain high cooperation rates and to regulate
behaviour in social dilemma games. Thus far, the vast majority of this
literature establishes the importance of punishment as a successful norm
enforcement mechanism that fosters cooperation (e.g., Fehr and Gachter,
2000, 2002; Masclet et aI., 2003; Noussair and Tucker. 2005; Page et al.,
2005; Carpenter, 2007a). Recent experimental research demonstrates that
the assignment of punishment mainly depends on three factors: (i) cost and
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effectiveness of punishment (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter,
2007b; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Nikiforakis and Nonnann, 2008), (ii) second-
round punishment opportunities (Cinyabuguma et aI., 2006; Denant-
Boemont et aI., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008), and (iii) antisocial punishment
(Gachter and Herrmann, 2007; Herrmann et aI., 2008).30
Our present investigation is integrated into this literature by exploring
the impact that the unfair assignment of punishment has on people's
willingness to punish. But why are we interested in the unfair assignment of
punishment? We are motivated by the observation that evidence from public
goods experiments with punishment suggests that one condition for
punishment to work is that individuals assign it fairly by sanctioning non-
cooperators only (e.g., Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Fehr and Gachter, 2002;
Masclet et al., 2003; Bochet et aI., 2006; Herrmann et aI., 2008). These
findings are interpreted as evidence that individuals punish non-cooperators
because they violate a norm of, or a predisposition towards, reciprocity. We
extend this line of investigation by looking at how an unfair environment
that violates such norms impacts on subjects' willingness to assign
punishment. Previous evidence from bargaining and public good games (see
Henrich et al., 2004 and Herrmann et aI., 2008, respectively) suggests that
people's everyday experiences are reflected in their observed experimental
behaviour. However, in these experiments, experiences have been shaped
exogenously, outside of the lab. Our experiment explores how the
experience of a corrosive environment experienced m the lab affects
individuals' expectations of how punishment might work, adding thus to the
.10 For a more analytical discussion on these experiments, see Section 4 2.
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existing literature that identifies possible candidates for the assignment of
punishment.
To generate an environment where punishment is assigned unfairly, we
propose a variant of the standard punishment game (Fehr and Gachter,
2000) to which we refer as the default punishment game. In this game,
members of a group participate in a two-stage game. In the first stage, they
are engaged in a standard linear public goods game, in which they have to
decide how much of their initial endowment they are willing to contribute
(see Ledyard, 1995). However, at the beginning of the second stage, we
introduce a new element: all group members are exogenously sanctioned by
having imposed on them an automatic penalty - the default punishment.
This implies that all group members receive a decrease in their monetary
income, irrespective of their first stage behaviour. Because the default
punishment is unrelated to first stage behaviour, we assume that it is
perceived as unfair. During the second stage, after contribution decisions
have been anonymously revealed, subjects are given the opportunity to
alleviate the exogenous default punishment of others at some cost to
themselves.
A noteworthy aspect of the default punishment game is that it resembles
the reward game previously studied in the experimental literature (see
Sefton et aI., 2007). Specifically, helping behaviour (i.e. reward via
alleviation of the automatic penalty) in the default punishment game is
tantamount to rewarding in the reward game. Therefore, the main
substantive difference between the default punishment game and the reward
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game is the presence of the automatic penalty in the former but not in the
latter game. This implies that behaviour from the default punishment game
can be affected either by the existence of the default punishment which is
allocated to each group member or by the opportunity given to group
members to reciprocate positively by helping each other. In order to
disentangle these effects, we also explore subjects' behaviour in the reward
game where they can only reciprocate positively via rewards. In this reward
game, there is no automatic penalty, but the reward dimension remains
unchanged relative to the default punishment game. Thus, investigation of
the default punishment game automatically extends to the investigation of
the reward game as well.
Our two main research questions can be formulated as follows: First, is
behaviour in the default punishment game different from behaviour in the
standard punishment game and in the reward game? Secondly, how do
subjects behave (a) when they have previously experienced the default
punishment game and (b) when they have previously experienced the
reward game?
Our findings suggest that contribution levels in the default punishment
game are not significantly different from those in the standard punishment
game. The same holds for the contribution levels generated by an
environment where there are only rewards. Yet, we document significant
time trends in the contribution behaviour of the default punishment game: at
the beginning of the game we observe an increase in the levels of
contributions, which after the second half of the game begin to decline. We
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also find that contribution levels in the standard punishment game remain
unaffected after a history of the default punishment game and the reward
game.
Regarding second stage behaviour, our findings suggest that assigned
alleviation and reward are not significantly different. Furthermore, the
assignment of punishment is unaffected by the previous experience of a
corrosive environment. However, it turns out that subjects' reactions to
alleviation, reward and punishment differ. Those subjects who contributed at
least as much as the group average decreased their contributions per reward
point received, but did not change their contributions when reward takes
place via alleviation. However, those who contributed less than the group
average decreased their contributions at least weakly significantly in the
default punishment game but did not change their contributions in the
reward game. Relative to reactions to punishment, we observe that those
subjects who contributed less than the group average increased their
contributions per punishment point received when they have already
experienced the reward game (or when they do not have any previous
experience at all), but not when they have experienced the default
punishment game, in which case they do not change their contributions
significantly.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 gives a
brief literature review on public goods experiments related to our
experiment. Section 4.3 presents the design and the procedures of the
experiment. Section 4.4 reports the results and Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.2 What affects the assignment of punishment: A Literature Review
The linear public goods game with punishment is one of the most
frequently used experimental games for studying human cooperation and
measuring social preferences. This game, as designed by Fehr and Gachter
(2000), consists of two stages: in the first stage, players make their decisions
about how much to contribute to the public good and after that, in the
second stage, they decide whether, and if so, how much to punish other
fellow group members. Subjects can assign up to ten punishment points and
punishment is costly both for the punishing and the punished party. Fehr and
Gachter compared subjects' behaviour in the presence and absence of
punishment opportunities. They also investigated contribution and
punishment behaviour in the cases where the composition of the group
remained the same throughout the whole experiment (Partner matching
protocol) and where it randomly changed from period to period (Stranger
matching protocol).
The findings from their experiment are impressive. Contributions
dramatically increase when a punishment option is added, contrary to the
theoretical predictions, and thus, punishment is found to lower the return on
self-interested behaviour and provide a credible and strong incentive to
sustain high cooperation. This trend is observed when the experiment with
punishment is played either in the first or in the second sequence. With
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respect to matching, contributions are significantly higher under a Partner
than under a Strangers matching protocol.
Another important feature of their experiment is that subjects are
prepared to expend their own resources and punish those who contribute less
than the average group contribution. Their findings indicate that the average
punishment points received by a subject increase with this subject's negative
deviation from the other group members' average contribution. Their data
suggest a consistent pattern with the norm for conditional cooperation,
which is a norm that prescribes cooperation if the other group members
cooperate as well.
In another study, Fehr and Gachter (2002) examme the role of
punishment in explaining human cooperation when no subject ever met
another subject more than once (Perfect Stranger matching protocol). Their
findings suggest altruistic punishment as a key motive for the explanation of
cooperation. We refer to altruistic punishment as the case where punishment
is costly for an individual but does not yield a future material benefit. That
is, a punished defector will refrain from free riding and this will benefit
other individuals in future interactions.
These two seminal studies by Fehr and Gachter boosted the
experimental literature on public good games with punishment, with
subsequent experiments having replicated their findings (see, for instance,
citations in Section 4.1). From these experiments, it is clear that punishment
at least under some circumstances is an effective mechanism that fosters
cooperation and remedies the free rider problem. However, the effectiveness
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of punishment is not immune in all treatment manipulations. Three main
factors have been identified to affect its assignment and as a result, subjects'
contribution behaviour: (i) cost and effectiveness of punishment, (ii) second-
round punishment opportunities, and (iii) antisocial punishment. We
comment on these factors in tum.
(i) Cost and effectiveness of punishment. A stylised fact from public
good experiments with punishment demonstrates that subjects are willing to
demand punishment and spend their own resources to "buy" punishment.
The extent to which this demand varies with the price of punishment (i.e.,
the amount by which a punishment point reduces the punisher's payoff) is
explored by Anderson and Putterman (2006) and Carpenter (2007b). Both
studies converge to the conclusion that the demand for punishment does
obey the law of demand, implying that the higher its price is, the lower is the
use of punishment. In a different series of experiments, Egas and Riedl
(2008) investigated how subjects' contribution behaviour and punishment
attitudes change as the cost and the impact of punishment vary across
treatments, contrary to Anderson and Putterman (2006) and Carpenter
(2007b), where the price of punishment changes within treatments. It turns
out that cooperation is only maintained when the cost for the punisher is low
and the impact on the punished is high. Additionally, as the effectiveness of
punishment decreases, holding constant its cost, the threshold up to which a
deviation in contribution is not punished increases. In a similar study,
Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) analyse the effectiveness of punishment
(i.e., the amount by which a punishment point reduces the recipient's
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payoff) by systematically varying it across treatments. With regard to
contributions, they find that the more effective punishment is, the higher
average contributions are. Turning to punishment behaviour, their findings
suggest a positive and concave relationship between punishment assigned
and its effectiveness.
(ii) Second-round punishment opportunities. Thus far we have
examined punishment in cases where there is only one opportunity to
sanction in each period and no possibility to identify individual punishment
behaviour. Nikiforakis (2008) added a third stage to the standard public
good game with punishment of Fehr and Gachter (2000), in which subjects
are given the opportunity to avenge the sanctions received. This second
round of sanctions is termed counter-punishment. It turns out that the
addition of such a stage affects subjects' punishment attitudes significantly
and as a consequence, their contribution behaviour. More specifically,
subjects avenge sanctions assigned to them in the previous punishment
stage. As a result, punishment of high contributors leads to a decline of
contributions over time.
Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) also give subjects the opportunity for a
second round of punishment, but their design differs significantly from
Nikiforakis' design with respect to the rules governing punishment. In
particular, Cinyabuguma et al. allow for a second stage of punishment in
every third period of the experiment, in which stage each individual was
informed about how much punishment other group members had assigned to
below average, above average and average contributors. Then, each
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individual was allowed to punish, on the basis of others' punishment
patterns. Therefore, since individual punishment decisions were not linked
to subject identifiers (contrary to Nikiforakis' design where subjects had the
possibility to identify the punisher and as a result, to avenge sanctions),
motives for counter-punishment were precluded. In their experiment, second
order punishment can be motivated by those who failed to punish free riders
in the first stage of punishment and/or by those who punish high
contributors. These kinds of sanctions are termed sanction enforcement.
Cinyabuguma et al. also find that punishment of high contributors in the first
stage of punishment decreases significantly, but this was offset by second
order punishment of punishers of low contributions. Contrary to
Nikiforakis' findings, a second round of sanctions increases contributions
and earnings; however, this increase is not significantly different from those
treatments where only one stage of punishment is allowed. Based on these
two studies and building on their design, Denant-Boemont et al. (2007)
conduct an experiment in order to isolate the effects of counter-punishment
and sanction enforcement, and measure their magnitude. To do so, they
employ treatments in which (i) each subject is fully informed about the
sanctioning decisions of other group members; (ii) each subject is informed
about how much punishment each other group member assigned to him (this
treatment allows for counter-punishment); (iii) each subject is informed
about how much punishment was assigned to each group member except for
himself (this treatment precludes counter-punishment). Their data confirm
the negative effect on contributions from the possibility of counter-
150
punishment as suggested by Nikiforakis (2008) and the positive effect of
sanction enforcement on contributions as identified by Cinyabuguma et al.
(2006). Comparing both effects, it turns out that the effect of sanction
enforcement in increasing contributions is smaller than that of counter-
punishment in decreasing contributions, suggesting that the overall effect of
a second stage of punishment and a third stage of punishment that allows for
unrestricted sanctions is a reduction in contributions.
(iii) Antisocial punishment. Gachter and Herrmann (2007), Herrmann,
Thoni and Gachter (2008) and Gachter and Herrmann (2009) examine the
extent to which the assignment of punishment differs across subject pools.
All experiments document the widespread existence of antisocial
punishment (that is, punishment of high contributors) in a number of subject
pools around the world. In sum, their findings suggest that the cooperation-
enhancing effect of punishment opportunities cannot be taken for granted.
The reason for that is the existence of antisocial punishment: the higher
antisocial punishment was in a participant pool, the lower was the rate of
increase in cooperation when punishment was available relative to when it
was not. The explanation of Herrmann et al. (2008) for the presence of
antisocial punishment hinges on the intensity of norms of civic cooperation
and the rule of law across societies. In particular, the stronger norms of civic
cooperation are, the stronger should free riders be punished. In other words,
subjects in countries with strong norms of civic cooperation would perceive
free riding more unacceptable and thus, would not punish high
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contn utors. On the other hand, if such norms are weak, the restraint on
using antisocial punishment is weak too. Similarly, the stronger a country's
rule of law is, the higher the perceived confidence in this country's law
enforcement institutions is and in consequence, this indicator mirrors the
. I 32
way socia norms are enforced. It turns out that both norms of civic
cooperation and the rule of law are significantly and negatively correlated
with antisocial punishment. Put differently, punishment of cooperators is
harsher in subject pools with weak norms of civic cooperation and a weak
rule of law.
From the hitherto reviewed literature, we can summarize that previous
research suggests that punishment works well only if free riders get
punished, the punished free riders accept that their behaviour gets punished,
and as a result, free riders increase their contributions accordingly. Yet,
possibilities for subjects to retaliate or the existence of antisocial
punishment are significant factors that undermine the effectiveness of
punishment. In our experiment, we extend this literature and provide a
framework where the assignment of punishment is unfair from the
beginning of the game. The next section describes how we implemented
such a framework and presents our experimental design that addresses our
research questions stated earlier.
31 The variable ''norms of civic cooperation" is derived from answers of representative
residents of a country to questions such as how justified behaviours like tax evasion, benefit
fraud and dodging public transport fares are. Norms of civic cooperation are stronger with
the condemnation of these behaviours.
32 The rule of law indicator based on a number of different variables measures the extent to
which individuals have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. A strong rule of law
implies high levels ofconfidence of how a law is enforced in a given society.
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4.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
4.3.1 Experimental design
Our experimental design consists of three conditions: the "default
punishment condition" (D-condition), the "standard punishment condition"
(S-condition) and the "reward condition" (R-condition). In all three
conditions, subjects were involved in a two-stage game. The first stage of
the game was common to all three conditions. Yet, regarding the second
stage, some of its features were common, while others varied.
To begin with, the first stage involves a voluntary contributions
mechanism game with linear payoffs. For this stage, subjects, being
randomly assigned to a four-person group, are privately endowed with 20
tokens and have to decide how many of these to keep for themselves and
how many to contribute to a public good (described to subjects as "project").
For each token kept, each subject earns 1 Money Unit; whereas, for each
token contributed the return is equal to 0.5 Money Units, resulting in a total
of 2 Money Units for the whole group. Subjects make their decisions in
private and, at the end of the first stage, they are informed about the sum of
the contributions to the public good by the whole group and about their own
first stage income.
After the first stage has finished, a second stage begins. In each of our
three conditions, the common characteristics of the second stage are as
follows. At the beginning of the second stage, subjects can see the profile of
contributions of the other three group members. However, no subject could
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identify the particular contribution of any other subject, since the order of
contributions shown in each screenshot randomly changed from period to
period. Therefore, subject-specific reputations cannot develop across
periods. After being informed about how much each member in their group
has contributed in the first stage, each subject can assign adjustment points
to other group members. Since subject-specific reputation cannot build up,
the possibility that player i assigns adjustment points to player j in period t
for contribution decisions made in a previous period from t is ruled out.
Subjects could assign between 0 and 2 adjustment points to each other group
member. Assignment of adjustment points is always costly, with each
adjustment point having a cost of one Money Unit per token. In addition,
assigning an adjustment point has an impact on the payoff of the assignee
whose absolute magnitude is equal to three. How these adjustment points
can be used depends on each condition, but in any case, subjects are given a
message/suggestion about how they might use their adjustment points.
Finally, note that, at the end of the second stage, subjects were informed
about their own cost of assigning adjustment points, the total number of
adjustment points assigned to them, and their earnings. No information
about the number of adjustment points received by each group member was
available.
Depending on the condition, there are three features that vary: (i) the
presence or absence of an automatic penalty; (ii) the sign of the impact of an
adjustment point on the assignee; and (iii) the message regarding the use of
the adjustment points.
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In particular, under the D-condition, all subjects incurred an automatic
penalty irrespective of their first stage contributions. We refer to this penalty
as default punishment and assume it to be unfair since it was unrelated to
subjects' past behaviour and was assigned to all group members. In this
stage, the message subjects were given was that they can reward other group
members by alleviating their automatic penalty, which was costly for the
alleviator, but beneficial for the person receiving the adjustment points.
Note that if a subject received more alleviation points than the automatic
penalty, their income did not increase by this extra amount. In our
experiment, the automatic penalty was set equal to 10 Money Units. We did
so for two reasons. First, complete alleviation of the automatic penalty was
possible only if the majority of the group members decided to assign
adjustment points. Recall that each group member can assign up to 2
adjustment points, with each point decreasing the automatic penalty by 3
Money Units. This essentially implies that the automatic penalty is fully
alleviated only if two or more group members assign the total amount of
points they control. Second, we did not want to create a situation where
subjects would be very likely to end up with substantial losses due to the
automatic penalty at the end of the experiment. In the case that this could
occur, subjects would receive a large lump sum payment to cover possible
losses in the D-condition. However, since the lump sum payment has to be
kept constant across conditions, an unnecessarily high level of it might
affect behaviour, which we wanted to avoid for our purposes.
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Contrary to the D-condition, the S-condition does not include any
automatic penalty, but subjects are given the opportunity to decrease other
group members' income. In other words, the message sent to subjects in this
condition was that they can penalise each other group member. Assignment
of adjustment points is costly both for the punisher and the recipient of the
punishment.
In order to assess the extent to which behaviour differs in a situation
where punishment is assigned unfairly and exogenously and a situation in
which it is not assigned in such a way, we compare contribution levels
between the D- and the S-condition. However, by comparing behaviour
between these two conditions, we end up that such a difference could be due
to two reasons: either the sign of the impact of an adjustment point on the
assignee or the automatic penalty components (that is, the presence/absence
of the automatic penalty and the message suggested to subjects).
It is therefore crucial to include a treatment which allows us to
disentangle between these two effects. This can be done by the inclusion of
the R-condition, in which subjects are given the opportunity to increase the
earnings of each other group member. That is, under this condition, subjects
were given the message that they can reward their counterparts. Contrary to
the S-condition, assignment of adjustment points is costly for the donor, but
benefits its recipient. The cost-to-impact ratio was identical to the one used
in the D-condition. Clearly, the inclusion of the R-condition allows us to
identify the source of a potential difference between the S-condition and the
D-condition. If it turns out that the R-condition is the same as the S-
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condition, the difference between the S-condition and the D-condition will
be due to the automatic penalty. However, if it turns out that the R-condition
is the same as the Decondition, the difference between the S-condition and
the D-condition will be due to the sign of adjustment points. In sum, the
differences between our three conditions are given in Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1 Differences between D-, S- and R-conditions
Automatic
penalty
Sign of impact of
adjustment
points
Message
S-condition
No
-3
"You can
penalise the
other group
b "mem ers.
D-condition
Yes
+3
the other group
members. This
can alleviate the
automatic
penalty of 10
Money Units."
R-condition
No
+3
the other group
b "mem ers.
To answer our research questions, we implement a within-subjects
design under which the same individual participates in two conditions, with
each condition being played for 10 periods. In total, we have three
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experimental sequences: the OS sequence, in which the D-condition is
followed by the S-condition; the SO sequence, in which the S-condition is
followed by the O-condition; and the RS sequence, in which the R-condition
is followed by the S-condition. Each of the three sequences described above
was conducted twice, yielding a total of 6 sessions. For both conditions
within a sequence, we implemented a Partners' matching protocol meaning
that the group composition remained the same across all 20 periods. In the
OS sequence 40 subjects participated, resulting in 10 independent
observations; while in the SO and RS sequences 36 subjects participated
separately, resulting in 9 independent observations per sequence. At the
beginning of each sequence, subjects were informed that the session consists
of two conditions in order to reduce the possibility for having wrong
expectations about the nature of the experiment. However, they were not
told what will happen in the second condition. The design information is
summarised in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Design Overview
Sequence
OS sequence
SO sequence
RS sequence
Periods
1-10
S-condition
R-condition
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Periods
11-20
S-condition
O-condition
S-condition
First, our experimental design as presented in Table 4.2 enables us to
explore whether behaviour in the D and R conditions differs from behaviour
in the S-condition. In other words, our design allows us to investigate the
pure behavioural effects of each of the three conditions in terms of
contributions. For instance, comparing the D-condition of the DS sequence
with the S-condition of the SD sequence allows us to assess whether there is
any difference in contribution levels between these two environments as
subjects experience them both for the first time. This is also the case for the
comparison between the R-condition of the RS sequence with the S-
condition of the SD sequence. Second, our design allows us also to
investigate the robustness of both contribution and punishment behaviour
after the experience of either the D-condition or the R-condition. Recall that
we chose a cost-to-impact ratio which is equal to 1:3. We did so in the light
of previous experimental findings on public goods experiments with
punishment (see Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Egas and Riedl, 2008)
which demonstrate that these ratios can induce high and stable contribution
levels. Based on this observation, we can test whether the effectiveness of
the S-condition is still maintained after the experience of the D and R
conditions. Thus, in order to investigate the robustness of behaviour in the
S-condition of the SD sequence, we compare it with the S-condition of the
DS sequence and the S-condition of the RS sequence.
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4.3.2 Procedures
All sessions took place in April and May 2008 in the Centre for Decision
Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) lab. Recruitment was
conducted via the software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) at the University of
Nottingham using subjects from a university-wide pool of registered
students. All conditions were computerised and programmed with the
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At the beginning of each sequence
subjects received instructions for the first condition and at the end of it for
the second condition." All participants answered several test questions,
concerning the calculation of payoffs for various hypothetical configurations
of behaviour. None of the treatments proceeded until every subject had
answered these questions correctly. At the end of a sequence, subjects were
privately paid according to their accumulated earnings from all 20 periods,
using an exchange rate of 0.015p per Money Unit. Average earnings per
sequence were as follows: £10.44 for the DS sequence; £9.48 for the SD
sequence; £11.65 for the RS sequence. Sessions lasted, on average, 75
minutes, with no session taking longer than 90 minutes.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 First stage behaviour: Does the default punishment game differ from
the standard punishment game and the reward game?
We begin our data analysis by looking at how contribution levels
evolved in our three sequences. Data are presented as the amount of tokens
33 A copy of the instructions is reproduced in Appendix A.
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contributed to the group account. Starting with the DS sequence and
averaging across all ten periods, we find that subjects' mean contributions
were 13 and 15.09 tokens for the D and the S conditions, respectively.
Regarding the SD sequence, average contributions across all ten periods
were 13.29 tokens for the S-condition and 10.18 tokens for the Decondition;
while regarding the RS sequence, the corresponding mean contribution
levels were 10.27 tokens for the R-condition and 16.43 tokens for the S-
condition." The average contribution pattern as a function of periods is
illustrated in Figure 4.1 for each sequence separately. In each panel, the
mean contributions across periods for each condition, the corresponding
standard deviation and the p-values for within sequence comparisons are
also shown.
34 The average contributions for each matching group in each treatment and condition is
given in Appendix B. Table B.l.
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Figure 4.1 Time series of average contribution for th e D , D and R
sequences
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To assess the extent to which contributions differ among our three
conditions, we contrast the average contributions for the following three
comparisons: (i) the S-condition of the SD sequence versus the D-condition
of the DS sequence, (ii) the R-condition of the RS sequence versus the S-
condition of the SD sequence, and (iii) the R-condition of the RS sequence
versus the D-condition of the DS sequence. Recall that if we find a
difference between the Sand D conditions, then the R-condition will help us
understand such a difference. That is, if the R-condition is like the S-
condition, the difference between the D versus the S condition is due to the
automatic penalty; whereas, if the R-condition is like the D-condition, the
difference between the D and S conditions is due to the sign of the
adjustment points.
A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test suggests significant differences
among the three conditions (i(3) = 35.763, p-value = 0.0001). To identify
whether there are any differences between the comparisons of our interest,
we perform a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. We find that contributions are not
statistically significantly different between any of the three comparisons.
More specifically, we find that comparing the S-condition (SD sequence)
with the O-condition (DS sequence) yields a p-value of 0.775; comparing
the R-condition (RS sequence) with the S-condition (SD sequence) yields a
p-value of 0.2332; and comparing the R-condition (RS sequence) with the
O-condition (OS sequence) yields a p-value of0.1651.
Our econometric analysis also suggests no difference in contribution
levels relative to the three different examined conditions. We estimate three
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OLS models, in which the dependent variable is the contribution to the
group account and the independent variable comprises four dummies, where
each one corresponds to a block of two periods and an additional dummy
variable called "condition" that captures the possible difference between our
condition comparisons. The dummy variable "condition" equals 1 for the
first condition in each comparison. For instance, for the first comparison of
Table 4.3, "condition" equals 1 for the S-condition of the SD sequence and 0
for the D-condition of the DS sequence. Our regression results are presented
in Table 4.3. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 4.3 Condition differences in contribution Ie I R .ve s - egression
Results
Dependent variable: Contribution
S-condition
(SD sequence)
vs. D-condition
(DS sequence)
(1)
' - P e r T o d s T & r - ' - - " ' - ' - ' - " - " ' ' ' ' ' ' - ' ' ' ' - ' ' ' ' - - i ~ 7 0 4 - - -
(1.171)
·-P·erio·ds-i&4"-· ··_ ·..,,···..·,,···_·.. · - - · ~ f 3 - 6 2 · * * - - . . --..
(0.573)
· · · · C o I ; d i t f o · ~ · · ..·..·,,····....·,,·..·-..·..····-·,,··....······..·.. · · O ~ 2 · 8 9 9 ..·..··__·..····__·
(2.378)
···CoI;stant..·....·....·..···..···..·..··_-_..····..·....··-iT363**'*'''-'-'
R-condition
(RS sequence)
vs. S-condition
(SD sequence)
(2)
1.319
(1.066)
1.472*
(0.775)
1.319*
(0.656)
0.896*
(0.426)
-3.025
(2.496)
12.290***
(2.141)
720
R-condition
(RS sequence)
vs. D-condition
(DS sequence)
(3)
1.836
(1.164)
3.112***
(1.016)
2.138**
(0.863)
1.514**
(0.672)
-2.736
(2.015)
11.283***
(1.547)
760
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors (clustered on independent matching groups)
presented in parentheses. For the first comparison (1), the dummy variable "condition" equals 1
for the S-condition in the SD sequence and 0 otherwise. For the second comparison (2), the
dummy variable "condition" equals 1for the R-condition in the RS sequence and 0 otherwise. For
the third comparison (3), the dummy variable "condition" equals 1 for the R-condition in the RS
sequence and 0 otherwise. Periods 9 & 10 are the baseline. • denotes significance at the 10-
percent level, •• denotes significance at the 5-percent level and ••• denotes significance at the 1-
percent level.
Regression coefficients from Table 4.3 suggest that subjects do not
contribute differently on average in any of the three conditions we examine,
when subjects experience them for the first time. In other words, the default
punishment game does not yield significantly different contribution levels
from the standard punishment game and the reward game.
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However, observing Figure 4.1, we notice that the contribution patterns
over time seem to be different among the three conditions. We next examine
this possibility by exploring whether there are any period effects that
influence the observed contribution patterns illustrated in each panel above.
To do so, we run three OLS regression models in which the dependent
variable is the contribution to the group account. To control for period
effects, we include four dummies, where each one corresponds to a block of
two periods (as in Table 4.3). The regression results from this analysis are
given in Table 4.4. Robust standard errors are also presented in parentheses.
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Table 4.4 Period effects in the D- Sand R di .
,- -con Ittons
Dependent variable: Contribution
S-condition R-condition
(SD sequence) (RS sequence)
(2) (3)
1.181 1.458
(1.564) (1.548)
0.681 2.264
(0.627) (1.418)
1.361 1.278
(0.814) (1.083)
1.361*** 0.431
(0.406) (0.746)
12.375*** 9.181***
(2.336) (1.863)
360 360
10.712***
(1.821)
(DS sequence)
(1.026)
(1.327)
D-condition
(1.795)
- P e r i o d s · - 3 · & ~ f - - - · _ · - · · · · · _ - - - 3.875**
(1)
· P e r i o d s - T & 2 · _ · - · _ · · - - _ · · · · - - - 2 ' . P I 7 ~ 5 : - - - - - - - - ; - ; ; - ; ; - ; - - - - - - : - - - - -
-_._-_._--_._----------:;-::-:=-:-::-:-:--:------:------------
Constant
_._----_..-_._------_..._.
Obs. 400
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors (clustered on independent matching
groups) presented in parentheses. Periods 9 & 10 are the baseline. • denotes significance
at the JO-percent level. •• denotes significance at the 5-percent level and ... denotes
significance at the J-percent level.
Table 4.4 reveals that period effects are significant for the D-condition,
as suggested by the first panel of Figure 4.1. Specifically, we observe that
the contribution patterns for the D-condition follow a hump-shaped pattern.
Contributions increase up to a certain level, but after that they decline till the
end of the game. In contrast, for both other conditions (8- and R-
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conditions), contribution levels are not strongly affected by periods and
show a rather stable pattern across time.
4.4.2 First stage behaviour: Does experience of the default punishment
game and the reward game affect behaviour in the standard punishment
game?
Having documented these period effects, it is of interest to investigate
whether they can affect the effectiveness of the S-condition. We explore this
possibility in this subsection. In particular, we assess whether the ability of
the S-condition to sustain contributions can survive after subjects have
experienced the D-condition and the R-condition. To answer this question,
we compare the contribution levels in the S-condition when it is played first
versus the S-condition when the D-condition preceded the S-condition. We
also compare the contribution levels in the S-condition when it is played
first versus the S-condition when the R-condition preceded the S-condition,
as the R-condition isolates the reward element incorporated in the 0-
condition. Performing a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test reveals no
significant differences from either comparison.35
This finding is corroborated by our formal econometric analysis.
Following a similar econometric methodology as previously, our regression
results are presented in Table 4.5. Note that in this Table our dependent
variable comprise contributions to the group account and the independent
variables comprise the four block dummies and the dummy variable
35 The corresponding p-values are 0.3691 and0.2004, respectively.
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"condition" which equals 1 fo th fi
r e irst condition in each comparison as
explained earlier.
Table 4.5 Robustness of contribution in the S-condition after a history
of the D-condition and the R-condition - Regression Results
Dependent variable: Contribution
S-condition S-condition
(SD sequence)
vs. S-condition
(DS sequence)
(SD sequence)
vs. S-condition
(RS sequence)
(1) (2)
" - P e ~ i ~ d s ' T & 2 ' " " ' " ' - - - - ' - - - - - - ' - - ' - ' - ' - ' - ' - - ' - - f 6 4 5 - - - . - - - . - - - - - - 0.139
(1.052) (1.187)
·-PerTods-3&4····-·-·--------·--·--·--·---·-·---I.447------------------------0.951--·-
-- .__. , ~ ~ ._M._..__._
Periods 7&8
(0.666)
1.375**
(0.581)
1.271 ***1.007*
(0.864)
._-_._-_._.__._------
1.408
(0.876)
Periods 5&6
----_._--
Condition
(0.558)
-1.801
(2.521)
(0.322)
-3.133
(2.216)
Constant 13.991*** 15.678***
Obs.
(1.908)
760
(1.291)
720
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors (clustered on independent matching
groups) presented in parentheses. For the first comparison (l), the dummy variable
"condition" equals I for the S-condition in the SD sequence and 0 otherwise. For tlte
second comparison (2), the dummy variable "condition" equals I for the S-condition in the
SD sequence and 0 otherwise. Periods 9 & 10 are the baseline. • denotes significtlllce at
the IO-percent level. •• denotes significance at the 5-percent level and ••• denotes
significance at the l-percent level.
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Table 4.5 suggests that the downward trend on contributions observed
after the second half of the default punishment game cannot affect the
effectiveness of the punishment game to generate high contribution levels.
Not surprisingly, a history of the reward game in which the contribution
pattern is rather stable does not also affect the ability of the punishment
game to sustain contributions.
However, although contributions are not significantly different across
sequences, it is worth exploring whether one condition yields different
contribution levels from those in another condition experienced by the same
subjects. Our design allows us to make within-subject comparisons since in
a given sequence subjects experience two conditions. This implies that we
can identify whether there is any impact of a history of one condition on
another. Specifically, we are able to explore how the default punishment
game impacts on the standard punishment game and vice versa, as well as
how the reward game impacts on the standard punishment game.
A Wilcoxon signed-rank test suggests that average contributions in the
D-condition are significantly lower than in the S-condition for both the DS
(p = 0.0469) and the SD sequence (p = 0.0506). It also suggests that
regarding the RS sequence, average contribution levels are higher in the S-
condition than in R-condition (p = 0.0109). This evidence is corroborated by
our formal econometric analysis presented in Table 4.6. Our dependent
variable comprise contributions to the group account and the independent
variables comprise four block dummies and the dummy variable "condition"
which equals 1 for the first condition in each comparison. For instance,
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regarding the DS sequence, the variable "condition" equals 1 for the D-
condition and 0 for the S-condition.
Table 4.6 Contribution differences within a given sequence
Dependent variable: Contribution
SD sequence RS sequence
(2) (3)
3.826*** - - - ~ - _ . _ - -0.278
(0.775) (0.937)
2.569*** 1.743**
(0.751) (0.673)
2.764*** 1.333**
(0.602) (0.483)
1.903** 0.806
(0.690) (0.488)
3.117**
-6.158***
(1.066) (1.395)
7.963*** 15.593***
(2.151) (1.185)
720 720800
13.314
(0.835)
(2.168)
Constant
Obs.
(1.325)
DS sequence
(0.804)
(1)
·..·Perio·ds··1'&2·_····,·····...... ·....······,....·'-·iTf9··-.-'-"...""-",,""..
(1.513)
..-P..e r T o d ~ ~ ..3·&4..···········....·..·············..·fo06*--.-."."--.....
(1.423)
·_·Periods···S&6..······_······......_..··....·····..·2TsT-·_·-.._-_..., - - - ; ~ ; - : - : ; : - - : : : : - : : ; : - - - - - - - : - - : - : - ~ - -
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors (clustered on independent matching
groups) presented in parentheses. For the first comparison, the dummy variable
"condition" equals I for the D-condition in the DS sequence and 0 otherwise. For the
second comparison, the dummy variable "condition" equals I for the S-condition in the SD
sequence and 0 otherwise. For the third comparison, the dummy variable "condition"
equals I for the R-condition in the RS sequence and 0 otherwise. Periods 9 & 10 are the
baseline. • denotes significance at the IO-percent level, •• denotes signifiCtlllce at the 5-
percent level and·" denotes significance at the I-percen: level.
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Regression results from Table 4.6 suggest that contribution levels in the
S-condition are always higher than those in either the D-condition or the R-
condition when subjects experience both conditions. This implies that when
subjects can compare two conditions the tool of punishment can discipline
them more efficiently than the corresponding tools of rewards and rewards
via alleviation. From Table 4.6, we also observe significant and strong
period effects with respect to the SD sequence. It is worth mentioning that
these period effects are due to the D-condition of this sequence. Specifically,
running a similar regression as in Table 4.4 (see Appendix B, Table B.2), we
notice that the coefficients of the block dummies are positive in decreasing
order and statistically significant, indicating a clear downward trend in
contribution levels for the D-condition. This observation implies that
subjects realise the unfairness of the D-condition and react to it by
decreasing their contributions faster, when they have already experienced
the S-condition, which is arguably a fairer condition, and can compare it
with the D-condition. However, when there is no previous experience of
another condition and thus, no other means of comparison, subjects start
lowering their cooperation rates after the second half of the game.
The results from the analysis of the first stage behaviour can be
summarised as follows. First, contributions in the D-condition and the R-
condition are not significantly different from those in the S-condition.
Second, significant time trends are recorded for the contribution pattern in
the D-condition; whereas, these trends are not significant for the
contribution patterns in the S- and R-conditions. Third, the ability of the S-
172
condition to sustain contributions survives a history of the D-condition and
R-condition. Fourth, within subjects comparisons suggest that contributions
in the S-condition are always significantly higher than contributions in any
of the DS, SD and RS sequences.
4.4.3 Second stage behaviour: Does assignment ofadjustment points in the
default punishment game differ from that in the reward game?
In the following we investigate behaviour in the second stage of our
conditions. We begin by comparing whether second stage behaviour differs
between the D- and the R-condition. In both conditions, assignment of an
adjustment point reduces that group member's earnings by 1 Money Unit,
but increases the recipient's earnings by 3 Money Units. We can compare
the assignment of alleviation and rewards, since the cost-to-impact ratio and
the sign of the adjustment points is identical across both conditions and thus,
rewarding is tantamount to alleviating. In the following, we investigate the
extent to which the D-condition differs from the R-condition by examining
subjects' willingness to alleviate and reward, respectively. This is a test for
whether the automatic penalty affects helping behaviour (i.e. either
alleviation or reward).
Figure 4.2 provides a graphical illustration of how subjects alleviated
and rewarded as a function of the recipient's deviation from the
alleviator'sldonor's contribution. The vertical axis indicates the average
alleviation and reward assigned to a group member. The horizontal axis
indicates the deviation in discrete intervals of the recipient's contribution
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from the contribution of the alleviator/donor. We refer to the solid lines of
Figure 4.2 as the "alleviation function" or the "reward function" depending
on the condition. From a visual examination of this figure, we observe
similar patterns both with respect to the level and the slope of the alleviation
and the reward function. Specifically, both functions are positively sloped
for negative deviations, suggesting that the less a group member contributes
relative to the alleviator/donor, the less alleviation/reward is assigned to
him. For non-negative deviations, the slope of the function is negatively
sloped as well, indicating that higher contributions from the
alleviator's/donor's contribution trigger less alleviation/reward. The
intuition behind this negative slope of both functions is that in the positive
deviation intervals subjects are low contributors and not willing to incur
costs in order to reward high contributors. Consequently, as we move further
down to the right of the horizontal axis, low contributors are less and less
willing to give up some of their earnings for the sake of costly alleviation
and reward of other group members.
Performing a Wilcoxon rank sum test, we test for differences between
average assigned alleviation and reward for each of the five deviation
intervals. All performed tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the
assigned alleviation is equal to the assigned reward across conditions (p-
values > 0.142).36 Note that adapting the deviation intervals that are
mentioned in Fehr and Gachter (2000, pp. 991) yields similar conclusions. It
turns out that alleviation and reward are not statistically different from each
36 The corresponding p-values for each deviation interval, starting from the largest negative
deviation interval and ending to the largest positive deviation interval, are: 0.2226,0.1416,
0.6830,0.1208 and 0.7322, respectively.
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other in all deviation intervals, but for the one in \ hi 11 the recipi nt
positively deviates from the donor 's contribution between
and 14 (inclusive) tokens .
(not inclu ive
Figure 4.2 Average alleviation/reward assigned
[-20, -11] [-10, -1] o [1 , 10] [11 , 20]
Deviation from player i's contribution
• D-treatment • R-treatment I
For a formal analysis, we estimate an ordered probit regre ion model,
upporting the patterns observed in the above figure. A dependent ariable,
we include the expenditures on alleviation or reward by player i . Th
independent ariables comprise the recipient's contribution, the ab olute
negative (nonnegative) deviation from the alleviator /donor ' contribution.
and the dummy variable "condition" to captur I I differenc
the two condition . Th ariabl "ab clute negative d iation" i th
ab olut value of the a tual deviation of ubject j ' ontributi n fr m
ubj t i ' ntribution wh n ubj t j
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i 's contribution; and zero otherwise. The variable "non-negative deviation"
is constructed in an analogous way. The variable "condition" equals to 1 for
the D-condition of the DS sequence and 0 otherwise. The regression results
are reported in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7 Assigned alleviation for negative and nonnegative deviations _
Regression Results
Independent variables Dependent Variable: Alleviation/Reward
assigned by player i
..__ ...._--_..._-..-----_.._--_......._-_.
D-condition in the DS sequence vs. R-condition
in the RS sequence
........_ _•..•.- _._ -.....•--_.__._--_ _._-
Player j 's contribution 0.128***
..........................- _ , - __ __---_.---_ __ _..
Absolute negative
deviation
Non-negative deviation
Condition
Condition x Absolute
negative deviation
Condition x Non-
negative deviation
Obs.
(0.012)
-0.080***
(0.024)
-0.059***
(0.016)
0.141
(0.193)
0.023
(0.031)
-0.002
(0.020)
2,280
Notes: Orderedprobit estimates. Standard errors presented in parentheses (clustered on
independent matchinggroups). * denotes Significance at the ltl-percent level. •• at the 5-
percent level. and *•• at the J-percent level.
The regression coefficients corroborate our findings from the non-
parametric Wilcoxon test, failing to reject the null hypothesis that alleviation
176
and reward as a function of both nonnegative and negative deviations are the
same. Both level and slope differences are insignificant at conventional
levels. As illustrated in Figure 4.2, we find econometric evidence that both
alleviation and reward functions have a positive slope for the negative
deviation interval (the sign of the "absolute negative deviation" is negative)
and a negative slope for the non-negative deviation interval (the sign of the
"non-negative deviation" is negative as well). Additionally, assigned
alleviation and reward are both found to be higher the more the recipient
contributes. In sum, the main finding from Table 4.7 implies that the
assignment of alleviation is the same as rewarding.
However, from our first stage behaviour analysis, we have recorded
significant period effects with respect to how subjects contributed when
unfair punishment is present. In the following, we investigate whether
experiencing the automatic penalty has an impact on the average
contribution level as a function of received alleviation or reward. In
particular, we examine how a subject reacted who got alleviated/rewarded
for a contribution above (or equal to) the group average and for a
contribution below the group average. In our econometric model, the
dependent variable is the change in the recipient's contribution between
period t and period t+1. The independent variables are the amount of
alleviation/reward received from the other three group members in period t
and variables measuring the time trend ("Period" and "Final period"). We
estimate this model either for the cases in which a group member
contributed less than the other group members or at least as much as the
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other group members. Table 4.8 and Table 4.9, respectively, report our
regression results for each case separately.
Table 4.8 Reactions to alleviation/reward - Regression results (1)
Change in contribution if a subject contributed less than
the other group members
R-condition of the RS
sequence sequence
-1.395*
alleviation/reward (0.748) (0.705)
···Perio·(i·-···--·-···..·····......·..----..·---·
-0.342 0.022
(0.280) (0.170)
..··Finai"'p·eriocf···-····....-·..·..·....-..·......--..----l921--------.- -----_. --'-'-'--
-0.581
(2.500) (2.941)
2.291 **
_._-----_._-----
5.785**Constant
..._._-- _ _..•._ _.._ _._-_._---
(1.893) (0.933)
Obs. 138 140
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors (clustered on independent matching
groups) presented in parentheses. *denotes significance at the lO-percent level, **denotes
significance at the 5-percent level and **. denotes significance at the l-percent level.
Table 4.8 suggests that subjects who have contributed less than the
group do not change their contributions significantly with the received
reward, whereas they lowered their contributions at least weakly
significantly per adjustment point alleviated. Looking at those who have
contributed more than (or equal to) the other three group members, we also
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observe different reactions across conditions Table 4 9 b I
. . e ow reports the
results of OLS estimations for these cases.
Table 4.9 Reactions to alleviation/reward - Regression results (2)
Change in contribution if a subject contributed more
than the other group members or equal
R-condition of the RSD-condition of the DS
-- - - -..-.-- -.----.. - n - = = ~ = - : : : J ~ ~ - ~ - _ ; : _ : _ - - = - - : - - - -
sequence sequence
..··Receiv·ecj'""·..·..···..·-···..···..··-..···..·..·..·········..·- ----- 0.484------------·
-0.578***
alleviation/reward
....._......_......_-_..._..._---_..._-._---_._-
Period
(0.300)
-0.304*
(0.171)
-0.246
(0.152) (0.203)
..··F1naTp·efioCi....··..·..·..·..·-..·..-·..·····-
-0.339
-0.723
(1.534) (1.396)
Constant -1.591 -0.646
(1.177) (1.012)
._----_ -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _----------
Obs. 222 184
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors (clustered on independent matching
groups) presented in parentheses. • denotes Significance at the JO-percent level, •• denotes
Significance at the 5-percent level and ••• denotes significance at the J-percent level.
Two observations emerge from Table 4.9. First, for the D-condition of
the DS sequence, those subjects who have contributed at least as much as
the group average do not change significantly their contributions per
adjustment point received. Second, and contrary to the D-condition, we find
that for the R-condition of the RS sequence, those subjects who have
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contributed at least as much as the group average significantly decreased
their contributions per adjustment point received.
4.4.4 Second stage behaviour: Does experience of the default punishment
game and the reward game affect behaviour in the standard punishment
game?
Since subjects indicate different reactions with respect to received
alleviation and reward, it is of interest to investigate whether and if so, how
the D-condition and the R-condition impact on the punishment assigned. In
this subsection, we contrast punishment behaviour in the S-condition of the
SD condition versus the S-condition of the DS treatment. Recall that helping
behaviour in the D-condition is tantamount to rewarding behaviour in the D-
condition. We thus isolate the effects of the rewarding element (in the D-
condition) by examining subjects' willingness to punish after they
expenence the R-condition where there are only rewards. In sum, the
comparisons that we are examining are the following: (i) the S-condition of
the SD sequence versus the S-condition of the DS sequence; and (ii) the S-
condition of the SD sequence versus the S-condition of the RS sequence.
Figure 4.3 below shows the assignment of punishment in each of the three
sequences.
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Figure 4.3 Punishment assign ed in eac h eq uc ncc
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In the above figure, the horizontal axis indicates the deviation in di crete
intervals of the recipient' s contribution from the contribution of the
punisher. The vertical axis shows the average puni hrnent a igned. We
refer to the solid lines of Figure 4.3 a the "puni hment func tion", which
gives the average punishment point a igned by the puni her a a fun tion
of the recipient's deviation from the puni her' s contribution. A expect d,
looking at the negative de iation intervals, the puni hment func tion
negatively loped, indicating that the mor an individual ncgati ely de i, t
from the puni her' contribution the higher the puni hrnent ( izn ed t him
or her. We al 0 ob erve some puni hm nt targ t d at high ontribut r . In
th folio ing, e .armne h eth r pum hm nt dif r r
omp ri on (i nd (ii m ntion d arli r.
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We find that a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test yields no
significant differences either for negative or non-negative deviations (p-
values > 0.13)37. We also test formally for the existence of possible
differences by estimating two ordered probit regression models. Table 4.10
provides the econometric evidence. In this table, for all regression models
the dependent variable is the punishment points assigned by player i to
player j. The independent variables comprise the recipient's contribution,
the absolute negative (nonnegative) deviation from the punisher's
contribution, and the dummy variable "condition" to capture level
differences between the two conditions. The variable "absolute negative
deviation" is the absolute value of the actual deviation of subject j's
contribution from subject i's contribution, when subject j 's contribution is
below the subject i's contribution; and zero otherwise. The variable "non-
negative deviation" is constructed in an analogous way. The variable
"condition" equals to 1 for the first condition of each comparison and 0
otherwise." To capture slope differences between conditions relative to
negative and non-negative deviations, we additionally include two
interaction terms for each deviation interval separately. The interaction
variable "condition x absolute negative deviation" equals to the product of
the dummy variable "condition" and the variable "absolute negative
37 More specifically, for the comparison between the S-condition of the SO sequence v e ~ u u
S-condition of the OS sequence, the corresponding p-values were 0.9648 for the negative
deviations and 0.1381 for the non-negative deviations. Regarding the comparison between
the S-condition of the SO sequence versus S-condition of the RS sequence, the
corresponding p-values were 0.8253 and 0.2004 for the negative deviations and for the non-
negative deviations, respectively.
38 For instance, for the comparison between the S-condition of the SO sequence and the S-
condition of the OS sequence, the variable "condition" takes the value I for the fonner
condition and 0 for the latter one.
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deviation'" and th . bl "
, e vana e condition x non-negative deviation" IS
constructed analogously. The regression results are shown in the table
below.
Table 4.10 Differences in punishment assigned after a history of D- and R-
condition - Regression Results
Independent variables Dependent Variable: Punishment assigned by player;
S-condition in the SO S-condition in the SO
sequence vs. S-eondition in sequence vs. S-condition in
the OS sequence the RS sequence
-0.032"···-----·
(0.012)
-0.032
(0.021 )
0.125·"
deviation
-Condhi'oii-·-··-·..-·····-·--·----·-..-
---_._--
Condition x absolute
negative deviation
Condition x non-negative
deviation
Obs.
(0.025) (0.027)
-0.025
-0.025
(0.021) (0.021)
0.101
-0.184
(0.233) (0.273)
0.006 0.051
(0.026) (0.033)
-0.004 0.061··
(0.025) (0.030)
2,280 2,280
Notes: Ordered probit estimates. Standard errors presented in parentheses (clustered on
independent matching groups). For the comparison between the S-condition of the SD
sequence and the S-condition ofthe DS sequence. the variable "condition" takes the value
I for the former condition and 0 for the latter one. For the comparison between the S-
condition of the SD sequence and the S-condition of the RS sequence. the variable
"condition" takes the value I for the former condition and 0 for the laner one. • denotes
significance at the IO-percent level• • • at the 5-percent level. and ••• at the l-percent
level.
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Starting from the first comparison, we observe that the experience of the
D-condition does not have any impact on the assigned punishment either
with respect to negative or non-negative deviations. Both the variable
"condition" and the corresponding interaction terms are insignificant
indicating that subjects' willingness to punish is insensitive to the
experience of an unfair environment (that is, the D-condition). Turning to
the second comparison of Table 4.10 we also reach the same conclusion. A
history of an environment where there are only rewards (and not automatic
penalty) does not affect the assignment of punishment. Notice also that we
observe some antisocial punishment in the S-condition of the RS sequence,
as the interaction term "condition x non-negative deviation" turns out to be
statistically significant, but it is not economically significant as identified in
other subject pools (see e.g. Herrmann et aI, 2008).
The message from Table 4.10 is that the assignment of punishment is
unaffected from either a history of the D- or the R-condition. However, from
our analysis in Section 4.4.1, we have recorded significant period effects
with respect to how subjects contributed when unfair punishment is present.
In the following analysis, we examine how a subject reacted who got
punished for a contribution above (or equal to) the group average and for a
contribution below the group average. In our econometric model, the
dependent variable is the change in the recipient's contribution between
period t and period t+1. The independent variables are the amount of
punishment received in period t and variables measuring the time trend
(UPeriod" and "Final period"). We estimate this model either for the cases in
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which a group member contributed less than the other grou bp mem ers or at
least as much as the other group members. Table 4.11 and Table 4.12.
respectively, report our regression results for each case separately.
Table 4.11 Reactions to punishment - Regression results (1)
Change in contribution if a subject contributed less than
the other group members
S-condition of S-condition of S-condition of
1.341 ** 1.179*
(0.615) (0.619)
0.198 -0.617**
(0.220) (0.239)
-3.557 2.751
(3.331) (2.241)
-1.438 2.765
(1.340) (1.560)
109 82104
1.376
(0.185)
(1.165)
(1.231)
-3.010**Final period
Constant
punishment (0.359)
Obs.
the DS sequence the SD sequence the RS sequence
· - R e - c e I ~ e ( r - - · · " · " · · · _ · · · - · - · - · · · - · - · · · 0.288
.....-._ __ _ --_.._----------_.
Period 0.124
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors (clustered on independent matching
groups) presented in parentheses. • denotes significance at the JO-percent level, .. denotes
significance at the S-percent level and ••• denotes significance at the J-percent level.
Table 4.11 suggests that a history of either the D-condition or the R-
condition produces different reactions with respect to punishment when a
subject contributes less than the other three group members. Specifically,
when there is a history of the R-condition the estimated coefficient of
185
"Received punishment" is statistically positive, indicating that subjects who
contributed less than the average contribution of the other three group
members increased their contributions per punishment point received. This
is exactly the case when there is no previous history of any environment.
Yet, a history of the D-condition renders the relationship between change in
contributions and punishment received insignificam, implying that subjects
with such an experience did not change their contributions significantly in
the S-condition that was followed. We next turn to a situation where a
subject contributes more than the group average.
Table 4.12 Reactions to punishment - Regression results (2)
Change in contribution if a subject contributed more
than the other group members or equal
............- -.., - - ···---S-condition of S-condition of S-conditionof
the DS sequence the SD sequence the RS sequence
-0.055 0.680 -0.529
(0.370) (0.382) (0.849)
-0.157 -0.040 -0.022
(0.212) (0.105) (0.067)
....__...- ...._--_.----
Received
punishment
---_._--_..._ - - - - _ . , - - - - - - - : : - : ~ - - - - ~ ; ; ; ; ; - - -
Period
-0.085 -1.079 -2.404
(1.335) (1.019) (1.352)
Constant 1456 0.270-0.448 - .
(0.967) (0.894) (0.498)
Obs. 256 215 242
Note' OLS estimates with robust standard errors (clustered on zrz: .,::tchi;g
rou' s) resented in arentheses.· denotes significanceat the JO-percent eve. eno es
g IfJ p P l l d ••• denotessignificanceat the / -percent level.significance at the 5-percent eve an
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Findings from Table 4.12 suggest that similar reactions across
conditions. In particular, it turns out that in any of the three comparisons
subjects did not change their contributions per punishment point received
when they contribute at least as much as the group average.
Our analysis regarding punishment behaviour suggests that the
assignment of punishment is not affected by a previous experience of either
the D- or the R-condition. However, the reactions to punishment depend on
previous history. It turns out that those subjects, who contributed less than
the group average, increase their contributions if they experience a game
where there are only rewards or if they do not have any experience. Yet,
after the experience of a game with unfair punishment the correlation
between received punishment and change in contributions becomes
insignificant.
Summarising our findings from this section we conclude that the
assignment of alleviation and reward as a function of the deviation from the
alleviator's/donor's contribution is not significantly different between the D-
and the R-condition. Additionally, the assignment of punishment is
unaffected after a history either of the D-condition or the R-condition.
However, we observe significant differences with respect to how subjects
react to alleviation, reward and punishment. In particular, those subjects
who contributed at least as much as the group average decreased their
contributions per adjustment point received in the R-condition, but did not
change their contributions in the D-condition. Regarding those who
contributed less than the group average, we find that they decreased their
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contributions in the D-condition, but not in the R-condition. Reactions to
punishment also differ depending on previous history. Our findings suggest
that those subjects who contributed less than the group average increased
their contributions after a history of the R-condition (or after no history at
alI), but not after a history of the D-condition.
4.5 Conclusions
Previous research on public good games with punishment suggests that
punishment is effective when subjects assign it fairly by sanctioning non-
cooperators. In this chapter, we report an experiment in which punishment is
assigned unfairly. SpecificalIy, in our experiment, punishment is meted out
exogenously to alI members (default punishment), irrespective of their
behaviour. We tested whether an unfair environment with default
punishment generates a difference relative to the standard punishment game,
both in terms of contribution behaviour and punishment attitudes. Notice
that our default punishment game has also a reward element incorporated in
its structure because subjects can alIeviate the exogenously assigned
punishment. As an auxiliary condition, we therefore included a condition in
which group members are only given the opportunity to reward their fellow
group members, without having been exogenously punished.
Our findings suggest that contributions do not differ significantly among
the default punishment game, the standard punishment game and the reward
game. Yet, it is worth noting that the contribution pattern in the default
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punishment game is characterised by strong period effects, which are not
present neither in the standard punishment game nor in the reward game.
Specifically, after the second half of the game contribution levels decline
over time. In addition, a history of an unfair environment does not affect the
ability of the standard punishment game to sustain high levels of
contributions. Interestingly, a history of the standard punishment game
causes contribution levels in the default punishment game to collapse from
the very beginning of the game.
Turning to second stage behaviour, we find that assigned alleviation and
reward are not significantly different. We also find that the assignment of
punishment is unaffected by the previous experience of a corrosive
environment. However, it turns out that reactions to alleviation, reward and
punishment differ. More specifically, those subjects who contributed at least
as much as the group average decreased their contributions per adjustment
point received in the reward game, but did not change their contributions in
the default punishment game. Regarding those who contributed less than the
group average, we find that they decreased their contributions in the default
punishment game but did not change their contributions in the reward game.
Relative to reactions to punishment, we observe that those subjects who
contributed less than the group average increase their contributions per
punishment point received when they have already experienced the reward
game (or when they do not have any previous experience at all), but not
when they have experienced the default punishment game, in which case
they do not change their contributions significantly.
Appendix A. Technical Appendix
Appendix A.I: Instructions
{Note: There are three experiments in total. We refer to each experiment as
"D-condition ", "Sscondition II and "Rscondition ". Each experiment consists
oftwo stages. Instructions for the first stage in all experiments are identical.
Instructions for the second stage in each experiment are presented
separately. The control questionnaire was identical for all experiments.}
Instructions
You are now about to take part in an experimental economics session
financed by the University of Nottingham. If you read the following
instructions carefully, you can, depending on the decisions that you and
other participants make, earn a considerable amount of money. It is
therefore very important that you read these instructions with care.
These instructions are solely for your private use. It is prohibited to
communicate with the other participants during the session. Should you
have any questions, please ask us.
During the session we will not speak in terms of Pounds, but of Money
Units. Your entire earnings will, thus, be calculated in Money Units. At the
end of the session the total amount of Money Units you have earned will be
converted to Pounds at the following rate:
1 Money Unit = 0.015 Pounds
At the end of the session your entire earnings will be paid to you in cash.
During this session, you will take part in two experiments. You will. now
undertake the first experiment. You will learn about the second expenment
at the beginning of that experiment, where you will receive new instructions.
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FIRST EXPERI E. T
This experiment has ten periods. In each period the parti ipants ar div id d
into groups of four. You will therefore be in a group with" ther
participants. The composition of the groups will remain the am
throughout the experiment. Each period has two tages. whi h ar
described below.
The first stage
At the beginning of each period each participant receives 20 token . \ e call
this his or her endowment. Your task is to decide how to u e our
endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 token you want to
contribute to a project and how many of them to keep fo r your elf. The
consequences of your decision are explained in detail below.
At the beginning of each period the following input- crccn for the fir t rage
wiII appear:
I Penod
1 outol' '0
I HElP
P . .. .. .,, __ c ~ b u t O O
Th period id ntifier appear in the top I ft rn r f th re n. In th t P
. I an mor c nd r m 111 f r 1 t 1
nght comer you an e 10\ m . t
II I 90 ' nd t d ' I In t 1on the di tribution four tok n . u V.I 13
I I
first period and 30 seconds in the remaining periods. Your decision must be
made before the time displayed is 0 seconds.
Your endowment in each period is 20 tokens. You have to decide how
many tokens you want to contribute to the project by typing a number
between 0 and 20 in the input field. This field can be reached by clicking it
with the mouse. By deciding how many tokens to contribute to the project,
you automatically decide how many tokens you keep for yourself: This is
(20 - your contribution to the project) tokens. After entering your
contribution you must press the O.K. button. Once you have done this, your
decision can no longer be revised.
Your income consists of two parts:
(1) The tokens which you have kept for yourself ("Income from retained
tokens") whereby
1 token = 1 Money Unit.
(2) The "Income from the project". This income is calculated as follows:
Your income from the project = 0.5 times the total contributions to the
project.
Your income from the first stage of a period in Money Units is
therefore:
(20 - your contribution to the project) + 0.5*(total contributions to the
project)
After all members of your group have made their decision the following
screen will show you the total amount of tokens. c o ? t r i b u t e e by all four
group members to the project (including your contribution). This screen also
shows you how many Money Units you have earned at the first stage.
Numbers shown in this screenshot are for example purposes only.
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1 O!..fet 10
Incom e screen at the end of the fir t ta
'l''''''t.... ~ k ) h D t o r - c c 11
~ G f c c • • •
Intof"Ietom,...• .,.... 3D
WlCOtNttlf"Il'Ifllf'Ott(1 no
YOUfNomttom .... .-.s.. r:1 PtI\lG4 HI
You u n Inlpecl 1M',.Iullt Of" I l'I'S!It. g. Ofl'lll p, nOd
The income of each group member from the project i calculated in the am
way, i.e., each group member receives the ame income fro m the pr jee r.
Assume, for example , that the sum of the contribution of all group
members is 44 tokens. In thi case each member of the group re civ an
income from the project of: 0.5*44 = 22 Money Unit.
For each token which you keep for yourself you earn an income of lone
Unit. Supposing you contributed this token to the project in t ad. then th
total contributions to the project would rise by one token. Your income from
the project would rise by 0.5*I=0.5 Money Unit . Howe er the income of
the other group members would al 0 ri e by 0.5 Money nit each, ' 0 that
the total income of the group from the project would ri e by 2 on . nit .
Your contribution to the project therefore al 0 rai e the income of th th r
group members. On the other hand you earn an incom for ach t k n
contributed by the other members to the project. For ach tok n contnbut
by any member you eam 0.5*1 =0.5 Money Unit .
To vi w the income creen at the nd of th fir t tag ,
in the first period and 20 econd in th r m IIlIll
fini h d with it b fore th tim i up pi a pr th
long a ou h in p t d the r sults 0 f th ti t t
nd tag tart .
{Note: Second stage for the D-condition}
The second stage
At the start of the second stage, you see how much each group member
contributed to the project in the first stage. Regardless of contributions,
you will also receive an automatic penalty of 10 Money Units. During
this stage, you can alter the income of each other group member by
assigning adjustment points. By assigning adjustment points, you can
reward the other group members. This can alleviate the automatic
penalty of 10 Money Units. You can assign between 0 and 2 adjustment
points to each group member.
Each adjustment point that you assign to another group member
increases their income by 3 Money Units, so alleviating their automatic
penalty by the same amount. For example, if you assign 2 adjustment
points, this group member's income will be increased by 6 Money Units,
except that adjustment points cannot do more than fully alleviate the
automatic penalty. Thus, a group member's income cannot be increased by
more than ten, through adjustment points assigned by others.
If you assign adjustment points, you have costs in Money Units. The more
adjustment points you assign, the higher your costs. Specifically, for each
adjustment point that you assign, there is a cost to you of 1 Money Unit.
For example, if you assign 2 adjustment points, this costs you 2 Money
Units. We refer to this as "Cost of adjustment points assigned by you".
Just as you can alleviate other players automatic penalty by assigning
adjustment points to them, so they can also alleviate your automatic p e n ~ l t t
by the same method. We refer to this as "Number of adjustment points
assigned to you".
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Your total income from the two stages i therefore calculated a f 11 0\\ .
Total income (in Money nits) at th e end of th e econ d tao = Per iod
Income =
= Income from the first stage
- Automatic penalty
- Cost of adjustment points assigned by you
+ 3*(Number of adjustment points assigned to you)
if the impact of the adjustment points assigned to you i Ie than the
automatic penalty;
OR
= Income from the first stage
- Cost of adjustment points a signed by you
if the impact of the adjustment points as igned to you i greater than the
automatic penalty.
The way with which you can assign adjustmcnt point i
input screen at the second stage. Numbers shown in thi
example purposes only.
}nput screen at the s e ~ o n n stage
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Besides the period and time display, you now see how much each group
member contributed to the project in the first stage. Your contribution is
displayed in blue in the first column, while the contributions of the other
group members of this period are shown in the remaining three columns.
Please note that the order in which contributions are displayed changes in a
random order in each period. The contribution in the second column, for
example, generally represents a different group member each time. The
same holds for the contributions in the other columns. That way you are
informed about the contributions but not about the identities of the other
group members. Besides the absolute contributions, the income from the
first stage and the income after the automatic penalty are also displayed.
You must decide whether and if so how many adjustment points to assign.
In any case you must enter a number in the large blue box for each group
member. For this decision, you have 180 seconds in the first period and 60
seconds in the remaining periods. You can move from one input field to the
other by pressing the tab-key ( ( I)or by using the mouse.
You can determine the total costs you incur on the computer. To perform the
calculation you have to press the button "Calculation" (see the input screen
at the second stage). You can do this after you have made an input. On the
screen you will see the total costs of the points you assigned. As long as you
have not yet pressed the OK-button, you can still change your decision
(within the remaining time). To recalculate the cost after a change of the
adjustment points you assigned, simply press the "Calculation" button again.
After all participants have made their decisions, your income fro.m t ~ ~
period will be displayed on the following screen. Numbers shown III this
screenshot are for example purposes only. To view the income screen at the
end of the second stage, you have 45 seconds in the first period and 30
seconds in the remaining periods. If you are finished with it before the time
is up, please press the continue button.
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Depending on the decisions that you and others take, it is po sible for th net
effect on your income of the adjustment point a igned in the econd
stage to be negative. However, taking all periods together, any uch 10 es
will always be outweighed by the income from the fi r t stage and a lump
sum payment of 60 Money Units that you receive at the beginning of the
experiment.
Do you have any questions?
I 7
{Note: Second stagefor the S-condition}
The second stage
At th.e start of the s ~ c o n n stage, you see how much each group member
contributed to the project In the first stage. During this stage, you can alter
the income of each other group member by assigning adjustment points.
By assigning a d j u s t ~ e n n points, you can penalise the other group
members. You can assign between 0 and 2 adjustment points to each group
member.
Each adjustment point that you assign decreases this group member's
income by 3 Money Units. For example, if you assign 2 adjustment points,
this group member's income will be decreased by 6 Money Units. The only
exception arises because adjustment points cannot do more than eliminate a
group member's first stage income. Thus, a group member's income cannot
be decreased by more than their first stage income, through adjustment
points assigned by others.
If you assign adjustment points, you have costs in Money Units. The more
adjustment points you assign, the higher your costs. Specifically, for each
adjustment point that you assign, there is a cost to you of 1 Money Unit.
For example, if you assign 2 adjustment points, this costs you 2 Money
Units. We refer to this as "Cost of adjustment points assigned by you".
Just as you can penalise other players by assigning adjustment points to
them, so they can also penalise you by the same method. We refer to this as
''Number of adjustment points assigned to you".
Your total income from the two stages is therefore calculated as follows:
Total income (in Money Units) at the end of the second stage Period
income =
= Income from the first stage
- Cost ofadjustment points assigned by you
- 3*(Number of adjustment points assigned to you)
if the impact of the adjustment points assigned to you is less than the income
from the first stage;
OR
=0 - Cost ofadjustment points assigned by you
if the impact of the adjustment points assigned to you is greater than the
income from the first stage.
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Besides the period and time display, you now ee how much each group
member contributed to the project in the fir t stage. Your contribution i
displayed in blue in the first column, while the contribution of the other
group members of this period are hown in the remaining three olurnn. .
Please note that the order in which contribution are di played chang " 111 a
random order in each period. The contribution in the econd olumn. for
example, generally represents a different group mernb r each tim h
ame holds for the contribution in the other column . That wa u r
informed about the contributions but not about the identiti of th th r
group members. Besides the absolute contribution , the income from th
first stage is also displayed.
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have not yet pressed the OK-button , you can till change v ur dec: 1 n
(within the remaining time). To recalculate the co t aftera . hang f th
adjustment points you assigned , simply pre s the "Calculation" button again
After all participants have made their decision , your in orne fr m the
period will be displayed on the following screen. umber hewn lI1 tlu
screenshot are for example purposes only. To view the incom reen , t th
end of the second stage , you have 45 seconds in the fir t p riod and "'0
seconds in the remaining periods . If you are finished \ ith it b fore th time
is up, please press the continue button.
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experiment.
Do you ha any que tion ?
{Note: Second stage for the R-conditionj
The second stage
At th.e start of the s ~ c o n n stage, you see how much each group member
contnbuted to the project in the first stage. During this stage, you can alter
the income of each other group member by assigning adjustment points.
By assigning a d j u s t ~ e n n points, you can reward the other group
members. You can assign between 0 and 2 adjustment points to each group
member.
Each adjustment point that you assign to another group member
increases their income by 3 Money Units. For example, if you assign 2
adjustment points, this group member's income will be increased by 6
Money Units.
If you assign adjustment points, you have costs in Money Units. The more
adjustment points you assign, the higher your costs. Specifically, for each
adjustment point that you assign, there is a cost to you of 1 Money Unit.
For example, if you assign 2 adjustment points, this costs you 2 Money
Units. We refer to this as "Cost of adjustment points assigned by you".
Just as you can reward other players by assigning adjustment points to them,
so they can also reward you by the same method. We refer to this as
"Number of adjustment points assigned to you".
Your total income from the two stages is therefore calculated as follows:
Total income (in Money Units) at the end of the second stage - Period
income =
= Income from the first stage
- Cost of adjustment points assigned by you
+ 3*(Number of adjustment points assigned to you)
The way with which you can assign adjustment points is apparent from the
input screen at the second stage. Numbers shown in this screenshot are for
example purposes only.
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Control Questionnaire
1. Each group.member has an endowment of20 tokens. Nobody (includin
yourself) contnbutes any tokens to the project. g
What is your income from the first stage? .
What is the income from the first stage of the other group members? ..
2. Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. You contribute 20
tokens to the project. All other group members each contribute 20 tokens to
the project.
What is your income from the first stage? ..
What is the income from the first stage ofthe other group members? .
3. Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. The other three
group members contribute together a total of 30 tokens to the project.
What is your income from the first stage if you contribute 0 tokens to the
. ?project. ..
What is your income from the first stage if you contribute 15 tokens to the
. ?project. .
4. Each group member has an endowment of 20 tokens. You contribute 8
tokens to the project.
What is your income from the first stage if the other group members
together contribute a total of 7 tokens to the project? .
What is your income from the first stage if the other group members
together contribute a total of 22 tokens to the project? ..
5. At the second stage you assign the following adjustment points: I, I, O.
What are the costs of adjustment points assigned by you? ..
6. What are your costs if you assign a total of 0 adjustment points? ..
7. By how many Money Units will your income from the first stage be
changed by the adjustment points assigned to you by other group members
if the other group members assign a total of 0 adjustment points to you?
8. By how many Money Units will your income from the first stage be
changed by the adjustment points assigned to you ~ ~ other g r o ~ ~ members
if the other group members assign a total of 3 adjustment points to you?
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Appendix B. Data Analysis
Table B.l Average contributions for each matching group for each
condition per sequence
OS sequence SO sequence RS sequence
Decondition S-condition S-condition D-condition R-condition S-condition
Matching 17.95 20 9.5 5.125 9.65 13.425
group 1
Matching 14.675 18.1 17.95 18 4.3 17.2
group 2
Matching 11.75 10.45 7.475 2.675 10.35 18.5
group 3
Matching 18.5 19.75 19.125 18 1.65 13.175
group 4
Matching 13.175 19.275 10.4 4.375 12.275 12.075
group 5
Matching 10.75 15 17.4 9.875 12.35 19.525
group 6
Matching 8.25 13.425 16.725 17.75 15.475 19.75
group 7
Matching 5.15 3.675 18.925 13.35 10.6 14.775
group 8
Matching 17.075 16.9 2.125 2.425 15.75 19.4
group 9
Matching 12.75 14.35 -- -- --
group 10
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Table B.2 Period effects for the D-condition of the SD sequence
Dependent variable: Contribution
D-condition of the DS sequence
._---_._-_._.__.
.__._------
6.472***
4.458**
(1.535)
----_.._-_._-_..---_.__.__.._..__.----_._._.__._.._..------_.'-_.' -----.".._...__...._-_...._._--_._-_..._......_-
Periods 3&4
(1.611)
· · · · · p · ~ ; i " o · d s · · · 5 & 6 · · · _ · - · · · · · · ..-·----··.. · - · · · · · _ - - · " · · · · - · · · · · · · - · · - · - · · - · · · - · - · - · · · - - - · · · - - - ~ { · i - 6 7 * - * · . - - . . -.--- ------.-
(1.006)
..···P·e;i"ods···7&·S··········..·----·-···-···..-····--·----..-.-.-.....--..--.---.....-...-..-...--.-.-....-..-----2.444*·---·--·······-·--····--···---··-·-······
(1.300)
· · · · · c · ~ · ~ s t ~ ~ t · · · ..·······..·········..······-········· -- -..--.---- -..-- - - . - . - · - · - - · · · · · · · - - - - · · - · · 6 ~ 6 6 6 *•.---.--.-----.--- ..
(1.987)
360Obs.
...._ _ __ - _--_ -.-_._ _-_._--_ _.-_._ _._._-_ - _ _._--_ _-.-------_._-_._-- __.__.---_.__ .
Note: OLS estimates with robust standard errors (clustered on independent matching
groups) presented in parentheses. Periods 9 & 10 are the baseline. *denotes significance
at the lO-percent level, *. denotes significance at the 5-percent level and .*. denotes
significance at the l-percent level.
206
Chapter 5
Conclusions
This thesis reports three experimental studies related to the provision of
public goods when economic agents face free rider incentives. Its unifying
theme is the investigation of different measures for how subjects perceive
free riding under a number of treatment manipulations. In this Chapter, we
conclude our findings and suggest further research avenues motivated by
our experimental investigations presented earlier.
Our first study begins with the examination of whether a social dilemma
game is perceived as having a moral dimension. We were particularly
interested in how subjects perceive the action of free riding from a moral
perspective, as free riding may be seen to constitute a violation of a basic
moral principle (that is, causing harm to another person) and, thus, it is of
moral significance. To do so, we elicit subjects' moral evaluations towards a
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free rider when they are detached from the decision situation and act as
impartial observers. Our results are summarised as follows. First, we
establish that free riding is indeed usually perceived as a morally
inappropriate action. However, there is a notable exception on this. When
the free rider moves second and observes that the other player has also free
ridden, then subjects perceive free riding as a morally acceptable (even
praiseworthy) action. We also find that framing of the decision situation and
the order of moves are major determinants of moral evaluations.
Specifically, withdrawing resources from the public good is condemned less
strongly than failing to contribute, and sequential moves trigger stronger
moral condemnation of free riding than simultaneous moves if the other
player contributes. A noteworthy aspect of all these treatment manipulations
is that as the contribution of the non-judged player rises, the free rider is
condemned increasingly strongly, especially when he moves second.
Interestingly, when moves are made simultaneously, the increasing
condemnation hypothesis holds for a substantial minority of subjects;
whereas, when the order of moves is sequential, an overwhelming majority
of subjects take this view.
Having identified that the public good game generates a dilemma of
moral significance, our study provides further motivation to explore how
moral norms are formed when individuals are involved in the decision
situation, acting as players materially affected by their and other players'
choices. The relationship between morality and actual behaviour has so far
been investigated in the context of bargaining games (Gachter and Riedl,
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2005, 2006). However, there is a gap in the literature with regards to how
subjects' normative views are shaped when they have to make actual
choices that affect their monetary payoff in social dilemma situations.
Specifically, further research on the interaction of moral norms and actual
behaviour in social dilemma games is warranted since moral attitudes may
be a candidate explanation for sanctioning behaviour, rendering morality as
an additional non-behavioural indicator to measure social preferences.
Recent evidence (e.g. Bosman and van Winden, 2002) indicates that
emotions are identified as a proximate mechanism that generates economic
behaviour and negative emotions drive the dark side of human behaviour.
Yet, it is also possible that another mechanism, namely, moral judgments, is
at work when basic moral principles are violated and individuals need to
negatively reciprocate. Questions such as whether the moral legitimacy and
purpose of sanctions are a direct function of the legitimacy of the action
performed, and, to the extent that impartial moral evaluations are sensitive
to framing, whether they are still context dependent when moral judgments
are elicited from subjects involved in the decision situation are of great
importance for the economic theories motivated by social preferences and
for the explanation of subjects' behaviour, but still remain unanswered.
Motivated by our findings suggesting that subjects' moral evaluations of
free riding are sensitive to the re-description of the social dilemma as a
common resource problem, but also by previous experimental studies about
altruistic behaviour in dictator games, Chapter 3 investigates whether frame
sensitivity holds with respect to two measures of social preferences which
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have played a crucial role in the related public goods literature. Our two
measures comprise of self-reported emotions, as a non-behavioural indicator
of disapproval, and punishment, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval.
The framing manipulation takes a Give vs. Take form and is identical to the
one implemented in the first experiment. Our findings are that, for a given
pattern of contributions, neither punishment nor emotional responses
depends on the Give versus Take framing that we manipulate, suggesting
that the social preferences we observe, using punishment and emotions as
indicators, are robust to framing effects. The main determinant of both
punishment and emotions is the difference between the contributions of the
punisher and the punished group member. A possible reason why
punishment and emotions are not frame sensitive, albeit moral judgments
are, may be that being involved in the situation makes individuals see
through the framing and/or concentrate more on consequences of a given
situation.
Yet, the fact that punishment and emotional responses are context
immune to the Give vs. Take manipulation does not preclude the possibility
that these indicators are sensitive to other (perhaps, more suggestive)
framing manipulations, such as label framing. In particular, evidence from
public goods experiments that use a "Community" framing has recorded
strong framing effects even in one-shot game contexts (see e.g., Rege and
Telle, 2004 and Dufwenberg, et al., 2006). Investigation of whether framing
is context dependent by examining whether, for a given level of
contributions, punishment attitudes and self-reported emotional responses
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differ across this particular framing manipulation is on the agenda for future
research. In addition, the finding that punishment as a measure of negative
reciprocity cannot explain the existence of framing effects raises the
interesting question of whether measures of positive reciprocity are able to
give an explanation for these effects. Such research questions are still open
and invite further investigation.
Our thesis is completed In Chapter 4 with the conduct of a third
experiment which explores how subjects' assignment of punishment
depends on the experience of an environment where punishment has already
been assigned unfairly. To achieve such an environment, we implement a
variant of the standard punishment game by Fehr and Gachter (2000), in
which all members of a group have been punished exogenously, unrelated to
their prior behaviour. Subjects are then given the opportunity to alleviate the
automatic penalty imposed on them by incurring a cost. Since our default
punishment game has also a reward element incorporated in its structure
because subjects can alleviate the exogenously assigned punishment. we
also examined as an auxiliary condition, a game in which group members
are only given the opportunity to reward their fellow group members,
without having been exogenously punished.
Our main findings suggest that, on average, contributions do not differ
significantly among the three games investigated (i.e. the default
punishment game, the standard punishment game and the reward game).
Interestingly, we find that the time profile of contributions is different.
Specifically, for the default punishment game, we document strong period
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effects, which are not present either in the standard punishment game or in
the reward game. After the second half of the game contribution levels
decline over time. In addition, a history of an unfair environment does not
affect the ability of the standard punishment game to sustain high levels of
contributions. However, a history of the standard punishment game causes
contribution levels in the default punishment game to collapse from the very
beginning of the game. Regarding behaviour in the second stage, we find
that assigned alleviation and reward are not significantly different and that
the assignment of punishment is unaffected by the previous experience of a
corrosive environment. However, it turns out that reactions to alleviation,
reward and punishment differ. More specifically, those subjects who
contributed at least as much as the group average decreased their
contributions per adjustment point received in the reward game, but did not
change their contributions in the default punishment game. Regarding those
who contributed less than the group average, we find that they decreased
their contributions in the default punishment game but did not change their
contributions in the reward game. Relative to reactions to punishment, we
observe that those subjects who contributed less than the group average
increase their contributions per punishment point received when they have
already experienced the reward game (or when they do not have any
previous experience at all), but not when they have experienced the default
punishment game, in which case they do not change their contributions
significantly.
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An obvious research possibility from the findings of this experiment is
whether and if so, how the severity of the exogenous punishment (which can
alternatively be seen as the cost for the enforcement of a social norm) and its
subsequent automatic losses have an impact on whether punishment
attitudes in the standard punishment treatment alter.
To sum up, the present thesis has provided answers III questions
pertaining to the broader topic of social preferences by making use of both
non-traditional (that is, moral judgments and emotions) and traditional (that
is, actual behaviour) data. Our view is that in the future, the science of
experimental economics will benefit from the integration of non-behavioural
measures into its tool kit. Furthermore, from our main findings described in
this thesis we conclude that perceptions of free riding are indeed affected by
various treatment manipulations, but this depends on the special
circumstances in which economic agents interact. As a whole, we believe
that the current thesis provides answers to pervasive questions in public
good experiments and contributes to the related experimental literature in
social preferences and economic moral psychology. At the same time, it
opens new avenues for future research options that would give new insights
and help us draw more reliable conclusions regarding issues of human
cooperation.
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